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THE IMPACT OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA
CONSUMER PROTECTION CODE ON
SOUTH CAROLINA USURY LAW
HARRY J. HAYNSWORTH, IV*
INTRODUCTION
The South Carolina Consumer Protection Code (SCCPC),1
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law, B.A., Duke Univer-
sity, 1961; J.D., Duke University, 1964.
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-101 to 37-9-102 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977). For the benefit
of persons doing research on the SCCPC, the following is a brief summary of the protracted
history of this legislation as distilled from the South Carolina Senate and House Journals,
1971-76.
(1) The original legislation, which was a modified version of the UNIFORM CONSUMR
CREDrr COnE (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 UCCC], was introduced in 1971 as S. 120,
1971 S.C. SEN. J. 265-66 and H. 1359, 1971 S.C. HousE J. 740-41. These bills were the
recommended work product of the Joint Legislative Uniform Consumer Credit Code
Study Committee created by concurrent resolution, H. 1291, 1969 S.C. HOUSE J. 1904-05;
1969 S.C. SEN. J. 1665-66. The differences between the recommended legislation and the
UCCC are summarized in the Study Committee's Report under the section titled Pro-
posed South Carolina Consumer Credit Code, 1971 S.C. SEN. J. 311, 442-48; 1971 S.C.
HOUSE J. 369, 509-15. No action was taken on these bills.
(2) A modified version of the 1971 proposals was introduced in 1973 as S. 340, 1973
S.C. SEN. J. 693. After considerable debate, it was passed by the Senate on March 7, 1974,
and sent to the House where it was referred to the Judiciary Committee. In the meantime,
the House had passed and sent to the Senate H. 2356, a controversial bill that authorized
the practice by merchants of making service charges of 18% per annum on items purchased
with credit cards. The provisions of S. 340, except for the most controversial aspects of
this legislation dealing with rates and charges for loans and the licensing provisions for
high rate lenders, were attached as amendments to H. 2356, and this amended version of
H. 2356 was approved by the Senate on June 27, 1974. 1974 id. 1877-1965, 1981. When
the House refused to concur in the Senate action, a Conference Committee was appointed
and the Conference Committee Report, which contained several important compromise
amendments, see Conference Committee Report, 1974 S.C. HousE J. 3098-99, resulted in
a final bill, No. 1241, 1974 S.C. Acts 2879-966, that was ratified on August 8, 1974, H.
2356, S.C. HOUSE J. 3156-57, and signed by the Governor on August 13, 1974. Act 1241
[hereinafter referred to as the 1974 SCCPC] became effective on January 1, 1975.
(3) In 1975 the loan and licensing provisions of S. 340 of 1973, which had been
deleted from the 1974 SCCPC, were introduced as H. 2435, 1973 id. 427, and referred to
the Judiciary Committee. In addition, another bill, designated S. 119, 1975 S.C. SEN. J.
187, was introduced in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Banking and Insur-
ance. S. 119 was essentially a clean-up bill that included several provisions designed to
clear up problems caused by the last minute revisions made in.S. 340 of 1973. The Senate
passed S. 119, 1975 id. 281, but no action was taken on it in the 1975 session by the House.
In February 1976, however, the Joint Study Committee on the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, the successor to the original Study Committee created in 1969, recommended a
comprehensive bill that added the loan and licensing provisions included in H. 2435 and
a number of additional and revised consumer protection provisions based primarily on the
1974 official text of the UCCC. See note 5 infra. The Study Committee bill was reported
5
Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
which was originally enacted in 19742 and substantially revised in
1976,1 comprehensively regulates a major portion of what are
commonly referred to as consumer credit transactions. In addi-
tion, certain provisions substantially affect South Carolina laws
regulating real estate mortgages and business credit.4
Essentially, the SCCPC is a modified combination of the
1968 and 1974 official texts of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(UCCC) 5 promulgated by the prestigious National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and currently enacted in
ten other states.' It also incorporates by reference Regulation Z7
and the Truth In Lending provisions (TIL) of the Federal Con-
out of the House Judiciary Committee as part of S. 119 and after extensive debate, but
very few amendments, was passed by the House on June 25, 1976, 1976 S.C. HOUSE J. 3577,
and sent to the Senate, which on June 25 concurred with the House amendments. 1976
S.C. SEN. J. 2303-04. This bill, designated as Act 686 of 1976, No. 686, 1976 S.C. Acts 1792-
1853, was ratified on June 25 and signed on June 30, 1976. Act 686 [hereinafter referred
to as the 1976 SCCPC Amendments] became effective on September 29, 1976. Ad. Inter-
pretation No. 9.101-7606, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1976).
2. No. 1241, 1974 S.C. Acts 2879-966.
3. No. 686, 1976 S.C. Acts 1792-1853. An integrated version of the SCCPC
[hereinafter referred to as the INTEGRATED CODE] with comments prepared by the author
of this article will be published in 1979. It is uncertain at this point whether it will be
distributed by the Department of Consumer Affairs or by the printer.
4. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-3-601, -605 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
5. The 1968 UCCC was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, the body that promulgated the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
and the American Bar Association in 1968. It provides the basic framework for the 1974
SCCPC. As a result of several significant developments, including the implementation of
the Truth in Lending Act (TIL), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976), Truth in Lending Regula-
tions, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Regulation Z], and the publica-
tion of the comprehensive report of the National Commission on Consumer Finance enti-
tled CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES (1972) [hereinafter cited as CONSumER Fi-
NANCE REPORT], the National Conference undertook to revise the UCCC. The revised
version (hereinafter cited as the 1974 UCCC] was approved by both the National Confer-
ence and the American Bar Association in 1974. For background material on the UCCC,
see Curran & Fand, An Analysis of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 49 NEB. L. Rv.
727 (1970); Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
387 (1968); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 445 (1968); and Symposium - Consumer Credit Reform, 33 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 639 (1968). For an explanation of the changes made in the 1968 UCCC
by the 1974 UCCC, see 1974 UCCC PREFATORY NOTE and Miller & Warren, 1974 Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, 23 KAN. L. REV. 619 (1975). The full texts of both the 1968 and
1974 UCCC, together with the official comments are located in 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT.
at 63-323 (1970), 174-305 (Supp. 1971-77) and [1976] 1 CoNs. CRED. GUIr (CCH) 1
5000-6603.
6. The other states are: Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Oklahoma,
Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 7 UNIFORM LAws ANNOT. 102, 158 (Supp. 1971-77).
7. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1977).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976).
6
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sumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA).'
Like the UCCC, the SCCPC is divided into nine articles.
Article 110 contains basic definitions of terms used throughout the
Code and provisions defining the scope and application of the
SCCPC.
Article 2," which is broken down into six parts, governs all
aspects of consumer credit sales and consumer leases covered
by the SCCPC, including the maximum charges that can be
made in consumer credit sales (Part 2);12 disclosure and adver-
tising rules (Part 3); 13 and limitations on the use of referral
9. Id. §§ 1601-1692o (1976 & Supp. 1977) [hereinafter referred to as CCPA]. Title I
of CCPA is known as the Truth in Lending Act (TIL), id. §§ 1601-1667e, and contains
general disclosure provisions for consumer credit transactions, consumer leases, and con-
sumer credit advertising, and provisions regulating credit billing and credit cards. The
regulations implementing these provisions are known as Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. § 226
(1977). Other titles in CCPA deal with garnishment restrictions, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677
(1976), fair credit reporting requirements, id. §§ 1681-1681t, extortionate credit transac-
tions, 18 id. §§ 891-896, equal credit opportunity, 15 id. §§ 1691-1691f, and regulation of
debt collection practices, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692-1692o (Cum. Supp. 1978).
The 1968 UCCC included disclosure provisions parallel to those of TIL on the theory
that a UCCC state could qualify for an exemption from TIL and Regulation Z. See, e.g.,
12 C.F.R. § 226.12 (1977). Because of the number of changes in the TIL provisions and
Regulation Z and other legal problems, however, the 1974 UCCC adopted the concept of
incorporating by reference TIL and Regulation Z. See 1974 UCCC § 3.201. This approach
was adopted in both the 1974 SCCPC and the 1976 SCCPC Amendments, which utilize
the wording of one of the early working drafts of the 1974 UCCC. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§
37-1-302, 37-2-301, 37-3-301 (1976). In spite of this legislative history, a recent opinion by
the South Carolina Attorney General held that the SCCPC incorporated only those provi-
sions in TIL that were in existence on the effective date of the SCCPC, 1976 Op. S.C. ATr'Y
GEN. No. 4208. This opinion seems to be incorrect. TIL has been amended in several
respects since January 1, 1975, and major revisions are now pending in Congress. The
attorney general's opinion would require SCCPC disclosures that are inconsistent with
current and any future TIL requirements. In the event of this inconsistency, TIL and
Regulation Z would control. 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1976). A more correct interpretation
would be that the SCCPC incorporates by reference all existing and future provisions of
TIL and Regulation Z. A given transaction, however, would be subject to the TIL and
Regulation Z provisions in effect at the time the transaction was entered into. This inter-
pretation is consistent with the intent of the UCCC drafting committee in promulgating
what is now § 3.201 of the 1974 UCCC to have dual administrative enforcement of TIL.
See 1974 UCCC § 3.201, Comment. See also 7 UNiFoRM LAws ANNOT. 172 (Supp. 1971-77)
(citation of authorities for the incorporation principle).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-101 to -303 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
11. Id. §§ 37-2-101 to -605.
12. Id. §§ 37-2-201 to -211.
13. Id. § § 37-2-301 to -304. In addition to incorporating by reference the TIL disclo-
sure and advertising regulations, see note 9 supra, the SCCPC disclosure provisions re-
quire the issuance of written receipts for cash payments, statements of account upon
demand, written acknowledgment of payment, and special notices and copies of relevant
documents to cosigners, guarantors, and similar parties. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-302,
7
Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
726 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEW [Vol. 29
schemes, balloon payments,'" wage assignments,'" cognovit
clauses authorizing confession of judgment, 7 waiver of defense
clauses," attorneys' fees,' 9 default charges, 0 and restrictions on
-303 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Identical provisions are applicable to loan transactions governed
by the SCCPC. Id. §§ 37-3-302, -303.
14. Id. § 37-2-411.
15. Id. §§ 37-2-405 to -406 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977). Balloon payments in connec-
tion with consumer loans are also regulated in a similar fashion. Id. § 37-3-402 (1976).
16. Id. § 37-2-410. A parallel provision limits wage assignments arising out of a
consumer loan. Id. § 37-3-403. See also id. § 41-11-30.
17. Id. § 37-2-415. An identical provision prohibits cognovit clauses in consumer
loans. Id. § 37-3-407. Post-default confession of judgment is, however, permissible. Id. §§
15-35-350 to -380.
18. Id. § 37-2-404(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See also id. §§ 37-2-403 (negotiable instru-
ments other than a check prohibited in a consumer credit sale), 37-3-410(4) (interlocking
relationship between lender and seller or lessor can result in making the lender subject to
the debtor's claims and defenses against the seller or lessor), 37-3-411 (credit card issuer
subject to claims and defenses of the. cardholder against a seller or lessor). The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) Rule on Consumer Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433.1-.2
(1977), and TIL, 15 U.S.C. § 1666h (1976), and Regulation Z credit card regulations, 12
C.F.R. § 226.13(i) (1977), are designed to produce the same basic legal results as the above
sections in the SCCPC.
There are, however, several significant differences in the SCCPC and the federal
rules. See INTEGRATED CODE, supra note 3, §§ 37-2-404, 37-3-410 to -411, Comments. For
example, under the SCCPC the debtor is not allowed to recover from the assignee mire
than the amount owing at the time the assignee receives written notice of the claim or
defense. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-404(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Under the FTC rule, however,
the debtor can also recover all amounts previously paid on the obligation. See 16 C.F.R.
§ 433.2 (1977); Guidelines on the Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of
Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,022, 20,023-24 (1976); [1976] 5 CoNs.
CRED. GumE (CCH) 11,394-95. Under the federal preemption doctrine, the federal
statute or regulation will control over an inconsistent state provision. This assumes that
the federal rule is constitutional. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663
(1962). See generally Verkuil, Preemption of State Law by the Federal Trade Commission,
1976 DUKE L.J. 225. On the other hand, to the extent there is no specific federal provision,
under the same doctrine the state law would control, and if there are dual but not incon-
sistent provisions, then both apply. Cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1610, 1666j, 1667e (1976)(these
principles codified into TIL).
This latter principle can be very beneficial to consumers. For example, as a general
rule, there is no private right of action to enforce a violation of a Federal Trade Commis-
sion rule. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Sebert,
Obtaining Monetary Redress for Consumers Through Action by the Federal Trade
Commission, 57 MiNN. L. REV. 225, 225-29 (1972). This principle, however, has no effect
on private remedies to enforce consistent state statutes; for example, a South Carolina
consumer can bring a private action in South Carolina to enforce a violation of the SCCPC
limitations on the defenses of assignees, and presumably would be able to recover the
amounts authorized by the FTC rule even though no private action is available for viola-
tion of the FTC rule.
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-413 (1976). Similar provisions limiting attorneys' fees in
connection with consumer loan transactions are contained in §§ 37-3-404, -514 (Cum.
Supp. 1977).
20. Id. § 37-2-414 (1976). Consumer loans are also subject to the same restrictions on
default charges. Id. § 37-3-405 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
8
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the amount and type of collateral that can be taken by a secured
party2' (Part 4) .22 Article 2 also provides for a three-day right of
rescission for home solicitation sales (Part 5).2 Part 6 deals with
charges that can be made for credit sales that are not consumer
credit sales.
24
Article 32 governs all aspects of consumer loans and basically
follows the same pattern as Article 2. Parts 2 2 and 5" contain
provisions regulating the charges that can be made for consumer
loans governed by the SCCPC rate structure, and Part 6 21 con-
tains complex rules regulating the contract provisions for charges
made for loan transactions that are not covered by the SCCPC.
Part 5 also contains licensing and examination provisions for su-
pervised lenders.29 Part 330 contains disclosure and advertising
rules, and Part 431 contains limitations on certain creditor prac-
tices. These limitations are similar to those in Part 4 of Article
2.32
Article 4- regulates the sale of insurance sold in consumer
credit transactions, including the amount, price, and term of
credit life, disability, property, and liability insurance.
21. Id. §§ 37-2-407 to -409 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977). With the exception of a
prohibition against a lender taking a security interest in land in a supervised loan (a loan
in which the loan finance charge exceeds 12% per annum) unless the principal exceeds
$1,000, there are no similar provisions regulating security interests taken in connection
with SCCPC consumer loans. See id. § 37-3-510 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
22. Id. §§ 37-2-401 to -416 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
23. Id. § 37-2-501 to -506. Home solicitation sales are also subject to the provisions
of the FTC regulation, Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1977).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-506 (1976) specifies that compliance with the FTC rule constitutes
compliance with the SCCPC provisions, thereby minimizing the conflict between the two
regulations. See note 18 supra. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-503(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
In this connection, the FTC rule only covers sales of goods or services where the purchase
price is $25 or more. 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1977). The SCCPC, however, has no dollar
minimum and, therefore, is the exclusive regulation governing door-to-door sales of less
than $25. On the other hand, the FTC rule covers consumer leases as well as sales, but
the SCCPC provisions only regulate sales.
24. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-601 to -605 (1976).
25. Id. § 37-3-101 to -605 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
26. Id. § 37-3-201 to -210 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
27. Id. § 37-3-500 to -515.
28. Id. §§ 37-3-601, -605.
29. Id. §§ 37-3-502 to -507. Except for consumer finance companies operating with
licenses issued under Act 988 of 1966, see Part I, section C(9) infra, all lenders making
loans with rates in excess of 12% must either be a supervised financial institution such as
a bank or have an SCCPC supervised loan license. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-301(17), 37-3-
501(1), -502 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
30. Id. § 37-3-301 to -304 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977). See note 13 supra.
31. Id. §§ 37-3-401 to -411 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
32. See notes 15-21 supra.
33. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-4-101 to -304 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
9
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Article 534 contains the basic remedies and civil penalties in
the SCCPC and is divided into three parts. Part 13 places limita-
tions on many traditional creditor remedies. The limitations in-
clude the elimination of the right of a creditor to obtain a defi-
ciency judgment in consumer credit sales in which the initial cash
price is $1,500 or less" and the abolishment of the right of wage
garnishment for collection of the balance due in a consumer credit
transaction.37 Part 1 also defines the restrictions on the circum-
stances under which default can be declared 38 and requires a one-
time notice to the debtor and an opportunity for cure before re-
possession or foreclosure proceedings can be undertaken.39 Part 240
of Article 5 sets out the broad scope of private civil remedies
available to consumers for SCCPC violations. In addition to dam-
ages and penalties, Part 2 also mandates the award of attorneys'
fees for a debtor who successfully proves that a creditor has vio-
lated the SCCPC." The SCCPC also gives the debtor a three-day
right of rescission in certain real estate transactions, 2 which par-
allels similar provisions in TIL and Regulation Z.13 A separate
section in Part 2 provides disclosure violation penalties." Part 345
34. Id. § § 37-5-101 to -303.
35. Id. §§ 37-5-101 to -112.
36. Id. § 37-5-103 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The threshold figure for deficiency judgments
in the 1974 SCCPC was $1,000. Id. § 37-5-103 (1976). A credit-seller is entitled to a
deficiency judgment if he foregoes the right to repossess the collateral. Neither the SCCPC
nor the UCCC official texts contain any limitations on the right to deficiency judgments
in connection with consumer loans.
37. Id. § 37-5-104. See also id. § 15-39-410. The South Carolina prohibition against
any wage garnishment is more stringent than the CCPA garnishment provision and con-
trols. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1675, 1677 (1976). See also note 18 supra.
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-109 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The burden of proving a default
other than failure of the debtor to make a required payment is on the creditor. Id. § 37-5-
109(2).
39. Id. §§ 37-5-110, -111. The notice must be given at least 20 days before any
acceleration, repossession, or foreclosure is undertaken. Id. § 37-5-111(1).
40. Id. §§ 37-5-201 to -205 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
41. Id. § 37-5-202(8) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
42. Id. § 37-5-204 (1976).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (1977). The federal rules are incorpo-
rated into the SCCPC. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-301, 37-3-301 (1976). See also note 9
supra.
44. S.C. Coo ANN. § 37-5-203 (1976). The incorporation of TIL and Regulation Z into
the SCCPC results in dual enforcement of the disclosure provisions of TIL by federal and
state statutes. If a creditor fails to comply with TIL, he has violated both TIL and the
SCCPC and is subject to the remedies provided in both statutes. See INTERATrD CoDE,
supra note 3, §§ 37-1-102, 37-5-203, -204, -302, 37-6-104(2), Comments. Under § 37-5-
203(7) (1976), however, only a single action claiming either an SCCPC or TIL disclosure
violation can be brought. This protects a creditor against multiple suits and possible
double liability arising from the same alleged disclosure violation.
45. Id. §§ 37-5-301 to -303 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
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contains criminal penalties for violation of the SCCPC.
Article 611 deals with the administrative machinery in the
SCCPC. This article provides for a Code Administrator,47 who is
the Administrator of the South Carolina Department of Con-
sumer Affairs," a state agency charged with responsibility for
enforcing the SCCPC. The Code Administrator is employed by a
policy-making board known as the Commission on Consumer Af-
fairs (Part 5)9 and advised by a Council of Advisors on Consumer
Credit (Part 3). 50 Other provisions in this article specify a wide
range of administrative and judicial enforcement powers avail-
able to the Administrator, including the right to seek cease and
desist orders5' and injunctions,52 to bring civil actions, including
class actions, for damages or civil penalties, 3 to file suit to collect
unpaid notification fees due from creditors,5' and to issue sub-
stantive rules, declaratory rulings, and administrative interpreta-
tions.15 In addition, the SCCPC Administrator has broad author-
ity to conduct investigations to determine if suspected violations
are in fact occurring." Part 457 of Article 6 sets out the procedures
for hearings and other matters brought before the Commission by
the Administrator. Part 211 stipulates the fees that are to be paid
46. Id. § 37-6-101 to -510.
47. Id. § 37-6-501(c) (1976). See also id. §§ 37-6-103, -507.
48. Id. § 37-6-501(a).
49. Id. §§ 37-6-501 to -506 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
50. Id. §§ 37-6-301 to -303 (1976).
51. Id. § 37-6-108(1).
52. Id. 88 37-6-110 to -112 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
53. Id. § 37-6-113 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The Administrator can bring a civil action for
damages or penalties, but not both. rd. § 37-6-113(1).
54. Id. § 37-6-113(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
55. Id. § § 37-6-104, -506(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977), -409 (1976). See also Rules and Regs.
of the S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. 28-24 to -26, S.C. CODE OF STATE REGS. (1976). A creditor
who relies on these rules and interpretations is protected against any liability for penalties
or attorneys' fees. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-6-104(4), -506(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See also
Part I, section E(2) infra.
56. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-6-105 to -106 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977). See also id. § 37-
3-506 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Some of these investigatory powers are delegated to the State
Board of Financial Institutions. Id. See INTEGRATED CODE, supra note 3, §§ 37-3-506, 37-
6-105 to -106, Comments.
57. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-6-401 to -416 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977). Some conflict
exists between these SCCPC provisions and the general South Carolina Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), id. §§ 1-23-10 to -400 (Cum. Supp. 1977). To the extent of any
conflict, the APA would prevail. See, e.g., Garey v. City of Myrtle Beach, 263 S.C. 247,
209 S.E.2d 893 (1974). See INTEGRATED CODE, supra note 3, §§ 37-6-401 to -415, Comments
for discussion of other areas of conflict.
58. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-6-201 to -203 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
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to the Code Administrator by creditors extending credit that is
governed by the SCCPC.9
Article 7, dealing with consumer credit counseling, and Arti-
cle 8, providing for wage earner receiverships, are reserved for
future use.
Article 960 specifies the effective dates for the SCCPC1 and
rules for transactions, part or all of which take place prior to these
effective dates." Article 9 also contains a special licensing provi-
sion that allows small loan consumer finance companies operat-
ing with licenses granted under the authority of Act 988 of 1966
to obtain licenses for high interest supervised loans, as authorized
by Part 5 of Article 3.83
Although the format of the SCCPC and the UCCC are simi-
lar, they differ in several important respects. Most of these differ-
ences primarily affect the rates and charges that can be made by
creditors. The most significant variations from the UCCC are (1)
the enactment of several additional exclusions that leave a large
number of consumer credit transactions regulated in whole or in
part by South Carolina statutes other than the SCCPC," and (2)
the failure to enact the UCCC provisions that effectively repeal
all prior statutes dealing with rates and charges. 5 The SCCPC
actually does not repeal any significant South Carolina statute
regulating interest or other credit charges.66 Yet it has radically
59. Id. § 37-6-203 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
60. Id. §§ 37-9.101 to -102 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
61. The effective date of the 1974 SCCPC was January 1, 1975. Id. § 37-9-101(1)
(1976). The effective date of the 1976 SCCPC Amendments was September 29, 1976. No.
686, 1976 S.C. Acts 1853; Ad. Interpretation No. 9.101-7606, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff.
(1976).
62. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-9-101(2) to -101(4) (1976).
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-9-102 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part I, section C(9) infra for
further explanation of the significance of this provision.
64. See Part I, sections B(5) and C infra.
65. The UCCC achieved this result by the simple device of repealing all usury and
other statutes regulating credit charges other than those in the UCCC. 1968 UCCC §§
2.605, 3.605. The original Joint Legislative Study Committee, see note 1 supra, recom-
mended the UCCC approach. See 1971 S.C. SEN. J. 311, 490-91; 1971 S.C. HOUSE J. 526,
559, 596. While the South Carolina Legislature eventually agreed to this approach for
credit sales, it rejected the approach for loan transactions. Therefore, the pre-SCCPC loan
usury laws remain effective. See Part III infra for further explanation of the problems that
result from the failure to enact 1968 UCCC § 3.605.
66. The rate provisions of the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§
56-17-10 to -100 (1976) were incorporated into the SCCPC. Id. § 37-2-211. Unfortunately,
an abortive attempt to delete § 37-2-211 during consideration of the 1976 SCCPC Amend-
ments resulted in the repeal of subsection 2(c) of § 2.201 of the 1974 SCCPC, id. § 37-2-
201(2)(c), which specified that § 37-2-211 was the exclusive section for maximum rates
for motor vehicles, thereby creating the possibility that the general rates specified in §
12
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altered the other South Carolina usury laws.6" The net result is
that another layer of statutory law has been added to the already
patchwork, overly complex, and arcane law of usury in South
Carolina.
There are now at least five different categories of credit sales
and nine different categories of loans." The determination of the
maximum credit charges that are permissible for a given transac-
tion, as well as the penalties for violation if the applicable maxi-
mum charges are exceeded, depends not only on the type of trans-
action but also on the status of the creditor as a seller or lender
and the purpose and amount of the credit. The interrelationship
of all these factors produces an immensely complex rate struc-
ture. For example, there are five distinct types of real estate
mortgage loans governed by eleven possible rate maximums rang-
ing from a low of eight percent per annum to no limitation at all."
Even a seemingly simple transaction like the financing of an au-
tomobile could fall into one of seven possible categories, many of
which have more than one rate structure; the maximum permissi-
ble rate could vary from twelve percent per annum (if the auto-
mobile is financed through a credit union) to no limitation (if it
is purchased primarily for business as opposed to personal, fam-
ily, or household use and is financed by the seller)."
The main purpose of this article is to analyze this maze of
rate statutes with special emphasis on the changes imposed by
the SCCPC. A second purpose is to provide some guidelines to
37-2-201 (Cum. Supp. 1977) also apply to credit sales of motor vehicles purchased for
personal, family, or household use. See INTEGRATED CODE, supra note 3, § 37-2-211, Com-
ment. See also Part II, section B(1)(b) infra.
67. In addition to altering the usury laws, the SCCPC also alters a number of tradi-
tional creditor rights with the indirect effect of modifying other statutes. For example, the
SCCPC limits the right of creditors to enforce deficiency judgments in credit sales, regu-
lates the amount of collateral and cross-collateral, and provides a limited right of cure
before acceleration and foreclosure. See notes 36-39 supra. These, and other provisions,
modify the traditional rights of secured parties under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The drafters of the UCC had the foresight to anticipate the impact of this type of
consumer legislation and as a consequence no section of the UCC is repealed by the
SCCPC. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-201 to -203(2), -206 (1976). See generally Hogan,
Integrating the UCCC and the UCC-Limitations on Creditors' Agreements and
Practices, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 686 (1968); Note, The Uniform Consumer Credit
Code and Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Nw. U.L. Rav. 838 (1970).
68. See Part V infra.
69. See Part V, chart B(9) infra.
70. See Part V, chart A(1), A(2), A(5), B(1), B(3), B(4), B(8) infra. This transaction
could also be handled as a lease, in which case there would be no rate limitation, assuming
the transaction was a true lease. See Part I, section B(3) infra.
1979]
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assist lawyers, creditors, and other persons working with the
South Carolina usury laws to determine the applicable statutes
regulating the credit charges and penalties for a particular trans-
action. The article is divided into five parts. Part I analyzes the
coverage and exclusion sections of the SCCPC. Part II explains
the SCCPC rate, charge, and penalty provisions. Part III dis-
cusses South Carolina law for credit transactions not governed by
the SCCPC rate and charge provisions. Part IV contains some
concluding observations and recommendations for amending the
SCCPC to reduce the existing complexity. Finally, Part V con-
tains a chart summarizing the existing South Carolina rules gov-
erning each different major category of credit.
PART I. SCCPC COVERAGE AND
EXCLUSIONS
A. Overview
On the surface, determining which of the substantial number
of statutes regulating rates and other charges that are to be ap-
plied to credit transactions appears confusing. In practice, how-
ever, once the basic legal rules governing each major type of credi-
tor are understood, these rules, with certain notable exceptions,"
are relatively easy to apply to a properly categorized transaction.
The key to properly categorizing the transaction lies in determin-
ing whether and to what degree the transaction is governed by the
SCCPC. Because the question of coverage by the SCCPC is the
initial determination, the basic types of transactions included
and excluded by the SCCPC are analyzed in this Part. Permissi-
ble rates and charges for SCCPC and non-SCCPC credit transac-
tions are discussed in Parts II and H.
B. Coverage
The SCCPC, like the UCCC, is designed to cover most typi-
cal consumer credit transactions involving individual debtors and
professional creditors. The rationale behind the extensive regula-
tion of consumer credit is the premise that the consumer credit
market traditionally has been characterized by the widespread
71. For example, the rules applicable to real estate credit are particularly complex.
See Part I, section B(4)(d) infra for a discussion of real estate transactions.
[Vol. 29
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use of standardized adhesion contracts, and in reality no effective
bargaining over credit charges or other contract terms takes
place. There is substantial evidence that some unscrupulous
creditors have used overreaching, abusive tactics against consum-
ers, particularly in transactions involving less knowledgeable and
less sophisticated individual debtors. 72 Credit for business pur-
poses, however, is essentially excluded from regulation by the
SCCPC and the UCCC because the market for business credit is
generally highly competitive and provides a reasonable opportun-
ity for effective creditor-debtor bargaining.
This division between typical consumer credit transactions
and business credit is implemented through the definitions of the
terms "consumer credit sale, '7 3 "consumer lease,"74 and
"consumer loan."75 Transactions falling within the parameters of
these definitions, which are derived from the 1968 UCCC, 71 are
72. For background material on the UCCC, which provided the basic framework for
the SCCPC, see the authorities cited in note 5 supra. For further information on the
problems of adhesion contracts, see Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of
Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072 (1953); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 629 (1943). Hearings on creditor abuse in
South Carolina were held by the original UCCC Study Committee in 1969 and 1970. A
report on the testimony and findings was published as part of the Committee's 1971 report
to the Legislature. See 1971 S.C. SEN. J. 311, 331-46, 374-92; 1971 S.C. HOUSE J. 369, 389-
405, 435-58.
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-104 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
74. Id. § 37-2-106 (1976).
75. Id. § 37-3-104 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
76. See 1968 UCCC §§ 2.104, .106, 3.104. The UCCC, in turn, essentially utilized the
coverage language of TIL and other provisions of the CCPA. See note 9 supra. See
generally Landers, The Scope of Coverage of the Truth in Lending Act, 1976 AM. B.
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 565; Warren & Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems of
Coverage, 24 STAN. L. REV. 793 (1972).
Coverage provided by the SCCPC and TIL differs in some respects, but TIL disclo-
sures are required for transactions covered by TIL even if the SCCPC does not apply. The
most prominent example of the difference in coverage is agricultural credit, which is
totally excluded from the SCCPC, S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(8) (Cum. Supp. 1977);
however, only agricultural credit above $25,000 is currently excluded from TIL, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1603(5) (Supp. 1977). Other examples involving the application of this principle are
loans by credit unions and government supported education loans, which are covered by
TIL but are excluded from the SCCPC. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(9)-(10) (Cum. Supp.
1977). Loans and installment sales for personal, family, household, or agricultural pur-
poses secured by real estate mortgages but not within the coverage of the SCCPC, see id.
§§ 37-2-104(2)(b), 37-3-104(2), would also be subject to TIL disclosure requirements. See
Part I, section B(4)(d) infra for further elaboration of the complicated treatment of real
estate mortgages under the SCCPC. TIL disclosures would apparently not be necessary,
however, for transactions excluded from the coverage of TIL but covered by the SCCPC.
See Ad. Interpretation No. 3.301-7803, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1978) (no TIL disclosure
necessary for loans made subject to the SCCPC by agreement under S.C. CODE ANN. §
37-3-601 (Cum. Supp. 1977) unless such disclosure is mandated by TIL). The additional
15
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covered fully by the SCCPC, unless excluded by other provisions.
Except by mutual agreement of the parties,7 7 however, transac-
tions that do not meet the definitional tests for coverage are not
regulated by the SCCPC because they are not deemed to be
SCCPC consumer credit sales, leases, or loans.
These definitional tests are summarized below. All specified
criteria must be met for a particular transaction to be covered by
the SCCPC.
1. Consumer Credit Sales. -A consumer credit sale is a sale
or contract for the sale of goods, services, or a covered interest in
land that meets the following criteria: (a) The extension of credit
is by a person who is regularly engaged in the business of making
credit sales transactions of the same kind as the one in question;
(b) the purchase is primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes; (c) the sale is to an individual; (d) the debt is payable
in four or more installments or a credit service charge is made by
the creditor; and (e) except in the case of the sale of a covered
interest in land, the amount financed does not exceed $25,000. 7
In effect this definition covers all normal retail installment sales,
whether they are under an installment sales contract or pursuant
to a revolving charge plan.
Excluded from this definition are transactions without serv-
ice charges such as the normal thirty-sixty-ninety day charge
accounts utilized by many retailers, the normal thirty-day ac-
count utilized by many servicemen, like plumbers and electri-
cians, and the bills of professional people, like doctors and law-
yers. If by agreement, however, the bill in one of these transac-
tions can be repaid in four or more installments or if the buyer
has the option of either paying within a four-month period or
incurring a finance charge or the bill can be repaid in two or more
installments and a finance charge is imposed, or finally if a fi-
nance charge is imposed with or without the privilege of repay-
ment in installments, the transaction is covered under the
disclosures specifically required by the SCCPC would apply to such transactions, however.
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-302, -303, 37-3.302, -303, -305, 37-5-110 (Cum. Supp.
1977).
77. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-601 (1976), 37-3-601 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part 11,
section B(3) infra.
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-104(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The "payable in installment"
requirement is defined in § 37-1-301(12) (Cum. Supp. 1977). "Credit service charge" is
defined in § 37-2-109 (1976) and "amount financed" in § 37-2-111 (1976). These statutorily
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SCCPC as a consumer credit sale."
The SCCPC specifically excludes a credit sale of an interest
in land, "if the debt is primarily secured by a first lien which is
a purchase money security interest in land."' s Credit sales of
interests in land that do not meet this test, however, are con-
sumer credit sales, if the other criteria for SCCPC coverage are
met."'
2. Consumer Loans.-A consumer loan is a loan that has
basically the same characteristics as a consumer credit sale: (a)
The loan is made by a person regularly engaged in the business
of making loans; (b) it is made to an individual; (c) it is used
primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose; (d) it is
either payable in two or more installments, or a loan finance
charge is made; and (e) except, in the case of a secured interest
in real estate that is governed by the SCCPC rate structure, the
principal amount of the loan does not exceed $25,000.82
Like the definition of a consumer sale, the definition of a
consumer loan excludes a mortgage loan that is "primarily se-
cured by a first lien which is a purchase money security interest
in land."83 This type of mortgage is not a consumer loan even if
it meets all the other criteria specified above. As a consequence,
most typical first lien real estate home mortgage loans made by
banks, mortgage companies, and savings and loan associations
are exempt from the SCCPC. They are governed instead by other
state and federal statutes and by case law.8"
Nevertheless, the definition of a consumer loan covers practi-
cally every other type of individual loan made for family, house-
hold, or personal purposes. Thus, the SCCPC applies to a loan
to be used by the borrower to purchase a family automobile, to
buy a stove, or to finance a vacation. A loan to a corporation or a
partnership for any purpose and in any amount, however, is ex-
empt from the SCCPC, because it is a loan to an organization and
not to an individual.
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-301(12) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
80. Id. § 37-2-104(2)(b).
81. The legal significance of this distinction is explored in Part I, section B(4)(d)
infra.
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-104 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The term "loan finance charge,"
defined in § 37-3-109 (Cum. Supp. 1977), is the equivalent of "credit service charge" for
credit sales, defined in § 37-2-109 (1976), and is discussed in more detail in Part II, section
C infra.
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-104(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
84. See Part I, section B(4)(d); Part V, chart B(9) infra.
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3. Consumer Leases.-The SCCPC defines a consumer
lease as a lease of goods made by a lessor who is regularly engaged
in the business of leasing to an individual who uses the leased
goods primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, the
amount payable under the lease does not exceed $25,000, and the
lease term exceeds four months.15 Under this definition, long-term
leases of items such as pianos are covered, while short-term rent-
als such as daily or weekly Rent-A-Car contracts and tool equip-
ment rentals are excluded. This definition only applies to-leases
of goods and, therefore, real estate leases are not consumer leases
regulated by the SCCPC.11
If the lessee agrees under the terms of the lease to pay an
amount that substantially equals or exceeds the true value of the
goods, and the lessee, at the termination of the agreement, will
become, or has the option to become, the owner of the goods for
a nominal consideration or for no additional consideration, then
the transaction is treated as a consumer credit sale rather than
as a lease.8" This distinction is important since a consumer credit
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-106 (1976).
86. The term "goods" is only partially defined in the SCCPC. See id. § 37-2-105(1).
Despite this lack of a complete definition, the term "goods" in the SCCPC has the same
meaning as it has under the UCC, see id. §§ 36-2-105(1), -107. See also note 101 infra.
A consumer lease pursuant to a lender credit card or similar arrangement is a con-
sumer loan subject to the SCCPC loan rates and is not a consumer lease. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 37-2-106(2) (1976).
87. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-105(4) (1976). See Mid-Continent Refrigeration Co. v.
Way, 263 S.C. 101, 208 S.E.2d 31 (1974) (lease with option to purchase held to be an
installment sale). The test employed in many cases to determine whether the lessee can
become the owner for a nominal consideration is the economic reality test, which upholds
the transaction as a lease only if the option price bears some reasonable relation to the
anticipated market value of the leased property at the time the option is exercisable. See,
e.g., Hawkland, The Impact of the UCC on Equipment Leasing, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 446;
Peden, The Treatment of Equipment Leases as Security Agreements Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 110 (1971).
Most of the cases involving the construction of leases have been UCC Article 9 priority
cases and have turned on the issue of whether the lease in question was a disguised credit
transaction creating a security interest in the lessor. If a credit transaction is found and
no financing statement has been filed, then the security interest of the lessor is unper-
fected and subordinate to the perfected security interests of the lessee's creditors. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 36-9-301 (1976); UCC § 9-301.
A lessor in South Carolina, as well as a secured party, must file a UCC financing
statement to be protected against rights of subsequent creditors of the lessee. Id. § 27-23-
80 (1976); First South Leasing Co. v. Abrams (In re Bazen), 425 F. Supp. 1184 (D.S.C.
1977). Hence, the characterization of a lease as a credit transaction does not have the same
critical importance as it has in other states that do not require any public filing for true
leases. Nevertheless, the SCCPC authorizes higher permissible rates for consumer credit
sales (basic rate of 18%) than for consumer loans (12%, except for supervised or restricted
loans, and most lessors are not eligible to make such loans). Therefore, it is important
18
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sale is subject to many more provisions of the SCCPC than a
consumer lease. For instance, the SCCPC rate regulations do not
apply to consumer leases but do apply to consumer credit sales.
In addition, the disclosure requirements for a consumer credit
sale are quite different from those for a consumer lease."
4. Some Problem Areas. -The four aspects of these cover-
age definitions that are likely to cause the most serious difficul-
ties include the concept of a person "regularly engaged in the
business," the determination of whether a transaction involving
both personal and business attributes is for "personal, family or
household purposes," the application of the $25,000 limitation,
and the parameters of the provisions dealing with interests in real
estate."5
(a) The "Regularly Engaged in the Business" Test.-The
purpose of the "regularly engaged in the business" test for sellers,
under the SCCPC to determine whether a particular lease is a sale or a loan. This assumes
the transaction is a credit transaction and not a true lease. See Part H, section B for a
detailed discussion of the SCCPC rate structure. Unfortunately, S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-
105(4) (1976), which provides that a consumer lease with a nominal option to purchase is
a sale of goods under the SCCPC, has no counterpart in Article 3 of the SCCPC dealing
with loans. One possible interpretation of this statutory scheme is that all consumer leases
that are in fact credit transactions are to be construed as consumer credit sales and,
therefore, eligible for the higher credit sales rate in the SCCPC. The contrary argument
is that even though the SCCPC loan provisions do not specifically refer to leases, the
definition of a loan in § 37-3-106 (1976) is broad enough to encompass a consumer lease
that is in reality a loan and not a sale. Under this argument the rates for consumer loans
apply rather than those for consumer credit sales.
Courts in other states have construed lease agreements as loans for the purpose of
determining whether usury ceilings have been violated. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Stanley, 177 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (equipment lease agreement between
a South Carolina resident and a New York lessor held to be a usurious loan); McGaillard
v. Liberty Leasing Co. of Alaska, 534 P.2d 528 (Alas. 1975); DiLeo v. Parliament Funding
& Leasing Corp., [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,376 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1976). This
issue is much less likely to occur under the UCCC than under the SCCPC because the
UCCC rate structure for both consumer credit sales and loans is more uniform than it is
in the SCCPC.
88. Compare Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6-.8 with 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15, .1501-
.1503 (1977).
89. This is by no means an exhaustive list of problem areas. One situation that is
not discussed in the text and that has been the subject of considerable litigation involves
cases in which there is a hidden finance charge in connection with a sale of goods or
services but no installment payments. Usually a discount for early payment or other
indicia of the finance charge are present in these transactions. The courts have been fairly
successful in unmasking these schemes. See, e.g., Miller, Some Conundrums in an
Enigma: Three Latent Consumer Credit Transactions Under the Oklahoma Version of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 241 (1970); Miller, The Basic Exclusions
from the UCCC: A Roadmap for Traversing a New World with Oblique Guides, 43 U. COL.
L. REv. 269, 280-83 (1972); cf. Landers, Determining the Finance Charge Under the Truth
in Lending Act, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION REsEARcH J. 45, 84-93, 135-51.
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lenders, and lessors, also referred to as the professional creditor
test, is to exclude from the coverage of the SCCPC isolated, irreg-
ular transactions, such as an individual's sale of his residence or
car. The exclusion is based upon the idea that the burden of full
compliance would be excessive and unjustified in those cases.
Unfortunately, neither the SCCPC, the UCCC, nor TIL, all of
which utilize this requirement, contains any language specifying
the number of transactions required before someone is character-
ized as being in the credit or leasing business. Existing non-
SCCPC law also is not helpful.9" Most cases involving this ques-
tion can be resolved by applying the overall purpose of the re-
quirement. By focusing on the purpose, the courts will be able to
differentiate more easily between persons who engage with some
regularity in credit transactions and those who are only occasion-
ally involved in them. In doubtful cases in which the other cri-
teria for a consumer sale, loan, or lease are met, a creditor or
lessor would be well advised to consider the transaction as cov-
ered by the SCCPC.
(b) The Personal, Family, or Household Use Criteria.-A
second troublesome area in the SCCPC coverage definitions is
determining whether a transaction is primarily for "personal,
90. This is the rationale behind the same exclusion in TIL. Landers, The Scope of
Coverage of the Truth in Lending Act, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 565, 570.
While the cost of compliance, particularly with respect to TIL disclosures, is an important
consideration, the SCCPC provides an umbrella of consumer protection for all aspects of
covered consumer credit transactions. This protectionist philosophy should weigh heavily
in determining whether a borderline transaction ought to be brought within the ambit of
the SCCPC.
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1976); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-104(1)(a), 37-3-104 (Cum.
Supp. 1977), 37-2-106 (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(5) (1977); 1968 UCCC §§ 2.104(1)(a),
.106(1)(a), 3.104(1)(a). Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-230 (1976) (licenses to make high
interest restricted loans of up to $7,500 under Act 988 of 1966). This statute states that
all persons "engaged in the business of lending which includes any person making more
than ten loans per year, whether with or without security," must have a license to make
these loans. In Smith v. Bulman, 197 S.C. 357, 15 S.E.2d 635 (1941), the South Carolina
Supreme Court interpreted the term "banks, banking institutions and other lending agen-
cies" used in several non-SCCPC usury statutes, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-13-120 (1976),
to include all corporations, firms, and individuals involved in the lending of money in this
state, 197 S.C. at 361-62, 15 S.E.2d at 637, but the decision did not specify any minimum
number of transactions necessary to qualify under this holding. The standard of ten credit
transactions per year specified in Act 988 of 1966 seems somewhat high. See Eby v. Reb
Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 649-51 (9th Cir. 1974) (realtor with three credit transactions in
one year held to meet the creditor test for TIL disclosure purposes). For TIL purposes one
author has suggested a threshold test of five or more credit extensions per year involving
a total extension of credit in excess of $10,000. See Landers, supra note 90, at 571. See
also Ad. Interpretation No. 3.104-7511, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1975) ("regularly en-
gaged" means "as a regular course of business" as opposed to isolated transactions).
[Vol. 29
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family or household" purposes. The transactions that cause the
most difficulty are those involving a mixture of personal and
business purposes, such as a loan to an individual to buy a mobile
home which is subsequently leased to a third party. Courts and
regulatory bodies applying the identical language in TIL12 have
focused on the primary purpose of the transaction as far as the
debtor is concerned. 3 They have required no TIL disclosures if
the primary purpose of the transaction was determined to be
commercial or business, even though the debt may have been
secured by property used for personal purposes (for example, the
debtor's residence).
This test, however, does not really deal with the more diffi-
cult issue of determining what is a personal, as opposed to a
commercial or business, purpose. For example, is a loan to an
individual to purchase stock for investment a loan for personal or
business purposes?94 Logically, because the overall purpose of the
"personal, family or household" requirement is to provide maxi-
mum protection to individual consumers, the correct answer
would be that any such transaction would be primarily for a
personal purpose unless the transaction for which the credit in
question is to be used is a principal business activity of the
debtor. 5 Under this rationale, a loan to a teacher to purchase
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1976). As was previously pointed out, the UCCC and TIL,
but not the SCCPC, also include within their coverage credit of up to $25,000 for agricul-
tural purposes. See note 76 supra.
93. See, e.g., Sapenter v. Dreyco, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam,
450 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972) (mortgage on residence in
connection with a refinancing of a past due business property obligation held to be a
business transaction). The status of a credit transaction in which part of the proceeds are
needed for personal purposes and part for business purposes presents some special alloca-
tion problems. An example of this occurs when a debtor obtains a loan to pay for both a
dishwasher to be used in his home and a calculator for his business. One expert has
suggested that the characterization would have to be made on the basis of the primary or
principal use of the proceeds and that "no better guideline is possible." Miller, Basic
Exclusions, supra note 89, at 276.
94. A credit sale of securities, as opposed to a loan to purchase the same securities,
is definitionally excluded from the SCCPC since the definition of goods excludes
"instruments," S.C. CoDE ANN. § 37-2-105(1) (1976), which under the UCC includes
investment securities, id. § 36-8-102. In addition, TIL, but not the SCCPC, excludes all
transactions, sales, or loans involving the purchases of securities from registered broker-
dealers. All loans to purchase securities, however, are covered by the SCCPC, regardless
of whether the loan is from a registered broker-dealer in a margin account, a bank, or other
lenders, if the other criteria of a consumer loan are present.
95. This seems to be the thrust of the Federal Reserve Board's (FRB) TIL pronounce-
ments in this area. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226.302 (1977) (1970 interpretation that any
credit extended for a dwelling containing more than four family-dwelling units conclu-
sively would be for business purposes). Since issuance of this interpretation, the Board
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securities held for investment would be for personal purposes,
unless the teacher had a substantial stock investment business on
the side, while the same loan to a stockbroker to purchase stock
would be a loan for business purposes. The courts, however, have
not consistently followed this rationale," and many borderline
situations are bound to arise. One common example is credit
extended to a sole proprietor to purchase items like typewriters
or small calculators that can be used in both the home or busi-
ness. Another troublesome transaction involves the extension of
credit to an individual for investment when the debtor has invest-
ments such as rental real estate that produce substantial income
has consistently refused to make any definitive rulings in other types of situations. In FRB
Letter No. 918, [1974-1977 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GuDE (CCH) 31,252 (Aug.
19, 1975), the Board stated that a loan on an owner-occupied, three-unit dwelling was not
necessarily for business purposes and pointed out that its 1970 interpretation was based
on the assumption that anyone with enough assets to own a large multi-unit apartment
building did not really need the protection of the TIL disclosures. It also stated, however,
that in other cases the result would depend on the relation of the income from the invest-
ment to the owner's total income, the ownership of other investment property, and the
degree of personal management involved. This and other FRB letters further suggest that,
given TIL's purpose of protecting consumers, creditors would be well advised to make
disclosures unless the credit is clearly for business purposes. See, e.g., FRB Letter No. 808,
id. 31,130 (May 30, 1974). For further discussion of the appropriate test to distinguish
between a personal and business purpose, see Landers, supra note 76, at 671-74 and
Warren & Larmore, supra note 76, at 812-15.
96. A few cases interpreting TIL have adopted a position that allows exclusion for
business purposes if the credit is used for any substantial investment purpose without
requiring proof that the projected income from the investment is substantial in relation
to income from the debtor's regular employment. See, e.g., Puckett v. Georgia Homes,
Inc., 369 F. Supp. 614 (D.S.C. 1974) (a loan on a rental mobile home purchased by a
barber to supplement his income held to be for a business purpose as far as TIL disclosures
were concerned). See also Sapenter v. Dreyco, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. La.), aff'd per
curiam, 450 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 941 (1972) (a refinancing
transaction involving rental property was held to be for business purposes even though
the debtors owned one piece of residential property and one multifamily rental property).
The court in Sapenter stated: "While they may have had other, full-time occupations,
plaintiffs were nevertheless engaged in the 'business' of owning and renting real estate for
profit." 326 F. Supp. at 873-74.
The difficulty with applying the analysis in these cases to the SCCPC is that this
analysis would exclude from SCCPC coverage basically all credit transactions for invest-
ment purposes, including the loan to the teacher to purchase securities, an example
mentioned in the text. While such a broad exclusionary rationale might be justified in
cases in which the debtor is trying to recover against the creditor for a technical violation
of TIL, which was the case in both Puckett and Sapenter, it seems inappropriate when
the issue is whether the creditor or the debtor is bound by the comprehensive coverage of
the SCCPC. Something more substantial than a casual or small business endeavor ought
to be required to trigger the business purpose exclusion. Compare Sapenter and Puckett
with Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 176, (E.D. La. 1975) (loan used to
remodel a duplex, one side of which was occupied after the remodeling as debtor's resi-
dence, held to be for personal and not business purposes under TIL).
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compared to the individual's income from his or her occupation.
A creditor faced with one of these borderline cases would be well
advised to determine and document all the facts and to get the
debtor to indicate in writing whether the transaction is for per-
sonal or business purposes. While such a statement is not conclu-
sive, it might be successfully presented as an affirmative defense
or as grounds for estoppel against a later contrary claim by the
debtor. 7
(c) The $25,000 Limitation.-The third area of the cover-
age definitions that merits further discussion is the $25,000 limi-
tation on all SCCPC transactions except real estate transactions.
The basic premise of the dollar limitation is that an individual
rarely will be involved in a non-real estate consumer credit trans-
action or consumer lease involving more than $25,000, and even
when such cases do arise, the individual involved probably will
be sophisticated enough to protect himself adequately. 8 With
real estate, however, the $25,000 figure would be an unrealistic
cutoff point for providing protection to the average consumer
because of the rapidly increasing cost of housing. For this reason,
the dollar limitation is excluded from real estate transactions
The $25,000 limitation applies to the amount of credit ex-
tended or the total amount of rental payments called for in a lease
and not to the cash sales price of the property. Any down pay-
ment made by the debtor would be excluded in determining the
amount of credit.100 Thus, a $28,000 Rolls Royce Silver Shadow
97. See, e.g., Lakeview Meadows Ranch, Ltd. v. Bintliff, 36 Cal. App. 3d 418, 111
Cal. Rptr. 414 (1973) (debtor estopped to plead usury); Heubusch v. Boone, 213 Va. 414,
192 S.E.2d 783 (1972); Annot., 16 A.L.R. 3d 510 (1967). This whole problem is complicated
in South Carolina because of the complex interest rate structure. A creditor acting in good
faith after a reasonable investigation and relying upon a debtor's written statement that
the credit was for business purposes should be entitled to rely on this statement. Other-
wise, the creditor might be liable for TIL violations as well as possible penalties and
damages under the SCCPC because he guessed incorrectly. On the other hand, since the
permissible rates and charges under the SCCPC are higher in many credit transactions
than are those for non-SCCPC transactions, a creditor should again be able to rely on the
debtor's statement that the primary purpose of the credit was for personal use. One
exception, of course, is when proof exists that the creditor and debtor collusively stated
that the credit was for personal purposes to utilize the SCCPC rates when they were not
applicable under the true state of facts.
98. 1968 UCCC § 2.605, Comment.
99. See Miller, Basic Exclusions, supra note 89, at 296. See also Meyers, Real Estate
Transactions, Rates and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 23 OKLA. L. Rsv. 263 (1970).
Even though no dollar maximum is applicable, a real estate credit transaction is not
covered by the SCCPC unless it meets certain special definitional tests discussed in the
next subsection, Part I, section B(4)(d).
100. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-111 (1976) (definition of "amount financed" in a
19791
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purchased by an individual for his family's use and financed with
a down payment of $6,000 and an installment sale or loan of
$22,000, or leased under a true consumer lease calling for total
lease payments of less than $25,000, is covered by the SCCPC.
(d) Real Estate Transactions. -The most difficult aspect of
the coverage sections is the treatment of real estate transactions.
A credit transaction "primarily secured by a first lien which is a
purchase money security interest in land" is by definition not a
consumer credit sale or consumer loan. 10' Consequently, only real
estate mortgage transactions that are not "primarily secured by
a first lien which is a purchase money security interest in land"
and that meet all other criteria of consumer credit and consumer
loans are covered by the SCCPC.
The apparent intent of the quoted language is to exclude
from the coverage of the SCCPC most types of typical first mort-
gage transactions on improved and unimproved residential real
estate.' This same purpose is sought by the UCCC, which, how-
ever, utilizes a completely different approach. The UCCC ex-
cludes from the definition of a consumer credit sale and consumer
loan all real estate mortgages with interest rates below 12% per
annum.0 3 The theory behind the UCCC approach is that the 12%
consumer credit sale), 37-3-107(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (definition of "principal" of a loan).
101. Id. §§ 37-2-104(2)(b) (credit sales), 37-3-104(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (loans). Al-
though most real estate leases are excluded by definition from the operation of the SCCPC
(a consumer lease only includes leases of goods pursuant to § 37-2-106 (1976)), a lease of
real estate with an option to purchase, from which all or a substantial portion of the rental
is to be applied to the purchase price, is a sale of an interest in land. Id. § 37-2-105(6)
(1976). While this provision makes many typical lease-purchase contracts on houses sales
of interest in land, the transaction is still not covered by the SCCPC unless it involves a
credit transaction that is not primarily secured by a first lien purchase money security
interest. See notes 119-28 and accompanying text infra.
102. No record of the public debate exists from which the actual, as opposed to
apparent, intent of the South Carolina Legislature can be determined. Although the South
Carolina House and Senate Journals detail chronologically all debate and proposed
amendments to this legislation, see note 1 supra, unfortunately, the journals do not con-
tain the comments made by the proponents and opponents of the various proposals. With
the exception of the study committees, there are no typed minutes of the proceedings
before the various legislative committees that considered this legislation over the years.
Consequently, it is sometimes difficult to determine the intention of particular provisions,
especially those that are not part of the UCCC, which served as the model for the SCCPC.
The comments to the SCCPC try to fill this gap to the extent concrete evidence is avail-
able to substantiate the actual debate. The author was a member of the Joint Study
Committee that drafted the recommended legislation that ultimately became Act 686 of
1976 and, therefore, is reasonably familiar, on a firsthand basis, with the rationale behind
most of the provisions of this legislation.
103. 1974 UCCC § 1.301(12)(b)(ii), .301(15)(b)(ii).
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figure (10% in the 1968 UCCC text)104 would exclude most first
mortgages, which are highly regulated by non-Code law, and in-
clude most second mortgages, in which the need for consumer
protection against potential overreaching by unscrupulous credi-
tors is greater.105 Although the 1974 SCCPC incorporated the
UCCC approach,' this concept, apparently at the insistence of
real estate interest groups, was rejected in the course of enacting
the 1976 SCCPC Amendments."°7
A third attempt to deal with real estate transactions is made
in TIL, which exempts from certain disclosure provisions loans
that are "secured by a first lien on a dwelling made to finance the
purchase of that dwelling." If the dwelling is the principle dwell-
ing of the debtor and the credit is used to acquire or construct
that dwelling, the loan is exempt from the three-day right of
rescission as well."0 ' Regardless of whether the particular transac-
tion qualifies as a consumer credit transaction under the SCCPC,
TIL disclosures are required in all TIL real estate credit transac-
tions for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes.
The quoted language above affects only the type and extent of the
required disclosure." 9
Of these three tests, the SCCPC language may well be the
most difficult and uncertain to apply because of the dependence
in the SCCPC on the term "purchase money security interest,"
a concept lifted from section 9-107 of the Uniform Commercial
104. 1968 UCCC §§ 2.104(2)(b), 3.105.
105. See 1974 UCCC § 1.301(15), Comment. See also Miller, Basic Exclusions, supra
note 89, at 300.
106. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-104(2)(b), 37-3-104(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (enacted
as part of § 1 of the 1974 SCCPC).
107. This language first appears in § 13 and § 14 of S. 119, note 1 supra, introduced
in 1975 as technical amendments legislation. S. 119 was ultimately passed with major
amendments introduced in the 1976 legislative session as Act 686. The new real estate test
in § 13 and § 14 of S. 119, as well as the trailing amendments, §§ 16-19 of S. 119, were
incorporated into the combined final bill that passed the Legislature in 1976 without any
changes from the initial wording. See No. 686, 1976 S.C. Acts 1792, 1851-52, §§ 62-67.
108. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1635(c), 1638(a)(6), 1639(a)(4) (1976); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R.
§§ 226.8(b)(3), .8(k), .9(g)(1)-(2) (1977). For obscure reasons Congress did not attempt to
draw the line of demarcation between first and second residential mortgages as far as
disclosure is concerned. See Landers, supra note 76, at 679.
109. See note 76 supra. TIL disclosure is required for all real estate credit for personal,
family, or household purposes regardless of the amount of credit; however, less disclosure
is required in some types of real estate credit than in others and a three-day right of
rescission applies to some, but not all, real estate credit transactions. The transactions
exempted from rescission, however, do not precisely parallel the transactions requiring less
disclosure. See generally R. CLONTZ, TRUH IN LENDING MANuAL 5.01-.05 (4th ed. 1976).
1979] 743
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Code."' Another problem of the SCCPC is its failure to define
more precisely the remaining terms in the real estate exclusion.
Although the term "purchase money security interest" has a well
understood meaning when applied to the financing of personal
property, its application to real estate mortgages produces serious
legal problems, which are avoided by the simplistic test used by
the UCCC and the more traditional approach in TIL and Regula-
tion Z. Under section 9-107 of the UCC a security interest taken
as security for or in satisfaction of a preexisting claim or antece-
dent debt cannot qualify as a purchase money mortgage."' A
purchase money mortgage covering real estate given by a pur-
chaser to the seller at the time of the sale and a real estate mort-
gage in favor of a lender in which all proceeds of the loan are used
to acquire the real estate in question clearly qualify as purchase
money security interests. It is equally clear that any refinancing
of an existing permanent mortgage, even one that qualified ini-
tially as a purchase money security interest,' or a post-
acquisition mortgage on real estate that had no existing mortgage
would not qualify for purchase money status and would be gov-
erned by the SCCPC."3 In addition, the UCC purchase money
concept also seems to preclude any permanent mortgage that
pays off a construction mortgage from qualifying as a purchase
money mortgage,"' even if it is assumed that the construction
110. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-107 (1976) with id. § 37-1-301(21) (Cum. Supp.
1977).
111. See id. § 36-9-107, Comment 2 (1976). A purchase money security interest is
given a special priority status under Article 9. See Kimbrell's Furniture Co. v. Friedman,
261 S.C. 172, 198 S.E.2d 803 (1973); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-301(2), -302(c) to (d), -312(3)
to (5) (1976). If new value were not required as a prerequisite for purchase money status,
the super-priority status granted such security interests could not be justified.
112. See, e.g., Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel), 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir.
1975); Babcock Corp. v. Banks, (In re Norrell), 426 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Ga. 1977); In re
Brouse, 6 UCC Rep. 471 (W.D. Mich. 1969). But see the discussion in notes 125-28 and
accompanying text infra for a contrary position taken by the South Carolina Department
of Consumer Affairs.
113. See Declaratory Ruling No. 3.601-7712, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1977) (loan
proceeds to be used in a business secured by a mortgage on an existing lot and building
held not to be a purchase money loan); cf. FRB Letter No. 1179, [1974-1977 Transfer
Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,588 (Apr. 28, 1977) (a mortgage to pay off a prior
bond for title arrangement does not qualify as a mortgage to finance the acquisition of a
dwelling for TIL purposes). See also North Platte State Bank v. Production Credit Ass'n,
189 Neb. 44, 200 N.W.2d 1 (1972); In re Simpson, 4 UCC Rep. 250 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
See, however, notes 125-28 and accompanying text infra.
114. This is because the proceeds of the loan are not being used to acquire the real
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money mortgage could qualify as a purchase money mortgage.
This assumption, however, is questionable in many situations.
For instance, it is unclear whether a construction loan used in
part to pay off a prior purchase money mortgage in favor of the
seller ' 5 or a construction mortgage covering property that is sub-
115. The failure of the SCCPC to define the words "land" or "primarily" complicates
this situation as well as many other typical cases. Literally the term "land" can be
construed to mean only the raw, undeveloped real estate without any improvements.
Under this interpretation a construction money mortgage can never be a purchase money
security interest in land, since most of the loan proceeds will be utilized to acquire rights
in the improvements. If, on the other hand, the term "land" includes all improvements,
the construction loan can technically qualify as a purchase money mortgage to the extent
that the proceeds are utilized to pay for the improvements. The portion of the loan used
to pay off any prior mortgage on the land, however, cannot technically qualify for purchase
money status. See authorities cited notes 112-13 supra. Nevertheless, the wording of the
SCCPC real estate exclusion requires only that the debt be "primarily secured by a first
lien which is a purchase money security interest in land" (emphasis supplied). If the term
"primarily" refers to a purchase money security interest rather than to "first lien" or
"land," the entire mortgage qualifies for the exclusion, if, in addition, the portion of a real
estate mortgage loan that qualifies for purchase money status is significantly greater than
that portion of the loan that does not qualify. The result is that the full amount of a typical
construction mortgage will qualify under the SCCPC real estate exclusion only if: (1) the
term "land" includes improvements built on the land and (2) the purchase money portion
of the mortgage loan predominates over the non-purchase money portion. For a real estate
mortgage that is not a construction mortgage to qualify for the exclusion, these same
conditions will also have to exist. This is essentially the position adopted by the South
Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs in Regulation No. 28-31-3.104 (as revised Apr.
7, 1978). See notes 125-28 and accompanying text infra.
Although it would have been preferable either to have a definition of "land" or to have
used the term "real property," which clearly includes any improvements on the land,
BLACK's LAW DIcIONARY 1383 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968), the omission of a definition may not,
as a practical matter, cause much difficulty, except perhaps in the case of mortgages
covering condominiums, discussed in note 123 infra. This is for several reasons. First, the
terms "land" and "real property" have been used interchangeably in cases. See, e.g.,
Reynard v. City of Caldwell, 55 Idaho 342, 354-55, 42 P.2d 292, 296-97 (1935). Second, TIL
and Regulation Z consistently use the term "real property," see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1603,
1605(e), 1635 (1976); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(dd), (ee) (1977), but both the 1968
and 1974 UCCC use the term "land" in the same sense that TIL uses "real property,"
see, e.g., 1968 UCCC §§ 1.301(5), 2.104, .105(6), .202(1)(d), 3.105, .202(1)(d); 1974 UCCC
1.301(36). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws certainly
thought that the two terms were interchangeable, and even though the treatment of
"land" transactions covered by the SCCPC is different from that of the UCCC, it was
perfectly natural for the drafters of the SCCPC to utilize the term "land" since the basic
framework of the SCCPC is drawn from the UCCC. Third, existing South Carolina stat-
utes have used the terms "land," "real property," and "real estate" as though they were
coextensive in meaning. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-7-10 (form of conveyances for land
or real estate), 27-29-10 to -210 (Uniform Land Sales Practice Act), 29-1-10 (mortgage is
a lien on real estate), 29-3-20 (satisfaction by second mortgage of first mortgage in same
lands and tenements), 30-7-10 (recording of deeds conveying interests in lands), 30-7-20
(manner and form of recording liens on real property) (1976). But see the discussion of
condominiums in note 124, infra.
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ject to a prior or contemporaneous purchase money mortgage in
favor of a seller of the property would qualify as purchase money
security interests."6
Moreover, an interpretation of the SCCPC real estate exclusion that results in the
term "primarily" referring to either "first lien" or "land" rather than to "purchase money
security interest" appears to be unreasonable. For "primarily" to modify "first lien"
requires the illogical premise that a mortgage be both a first and a second lien at the same
time. On the other hand, if "primarily" modifies "land," the definition of land becomes
critical, and if "land" by definition includes improvements, it has no meaning. If "land"
does not include improvements, the only types of real estate mortgages that qualify for
the exclusion are those that are made to secure the purchase price of unimproved real
estate obtained by a consumer for personal, family, or household purposes. Finally, both
by the process of elimination and by logic it makes good sense to conclude that
"primarily" refers to the term "purchase money security interest," especially since a
number of typical real estate mortgages, including most real estate construction mort-
gages, technically contain both purchase money and non-purchase money elements.
116. The seller's mortgage in this last example in the text is now a second mortgage,
although it was originally a first lien. Does this change in status mean that the SCCPC
now applies to the mortgage if the purpose of the credit was for personal, family, or
household purposes? Fortunately, the interest rate structure under the SCCPC for credit
sales is high enough that no usury question is likely to occur, but other important issues
have to be resolved. For instance, if the SCCPC applies, the mortgagee has to give a
special notice and opportunity to cure before beginning foreclosure proceedings. S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 37-5-109 to -111 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
A related problem involves the status of a transaction in which a bank, mortgage
broker, savings and loan institution, or other lender purchases an installment sales con-
tract executed in connection with the sale of real estate by a developer to a consumer.
The installment sales contract is presumably exempt from any rate limitation as a credit
sale. See id. §§ 37-2-104(2)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977), -605 (1976). See notes 457-61, 474 and
accompanying text infra. The status of this transaction when the lender purchases the
installment sales contract, however, raises a serious legal problem. If the transaction is
characterized as a sale and is, therefore, exempt from any usury limitations, a lender can
indirectly avoid the interest maximums applicable to real estate mortgage loans by use
of the sales device. See notes 119-28 and accompanying text infra. As initially published
on April 7, 1978, paragraph 4 of revised Proposed Regulation No. 28-31-3.104 of the Rules
and Regulations to Implement the Consumer Protection Code, see notes 125-28 and ac-
companying text infra, characterized these installment sale-purchase transactions as
loans "primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money security interest in
land" rather than as sales. The result is that they are subject to the rate limitations for
non-SCCPC mortgage loans. Paragraph 4, however, was not approved by the Commission
on Consumer Affairs. The failure of the Commission to approve paragraph 4 does not
mean that there is no risk that these transactions will be characterized as loans rather
than sales. Banks and other mortgage lenders are in the business of lending money and
the general rule has always been that lenders are subject to usury laws. Two lines of
authority are pertinent. The first is cases holding that certain kinds of installment sales
are actually loans because of the close connection between the seller and the lender, who
takes assignments of chattel paper on a regular basis from a seller of goods. See notes 273,
458-59 infra. The second is the arguments involved in determining whether a bank or other
lender that bids in property at a foreclosure sale can sell the property to a third party on
a purchase money mortgage basis and charge a rate higher than that allowed for a mort-
gage loan in the same amount. See note 474 infra. On the basis of these authorities, there
is a strong possibility that a court would hold a purchase by a lender of the installment
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Another problem that arises because of the grafting of the
UCC concept onto real estate transactions concerns refinancing
transactions where new money is advanced to acquire additional
collateral. Several cases involving security interests in personal
property under the UCC have held that to the extent a refinanc-
ing transaction involves new money and new collateral, the secu-
rity interest might be a purchase money security interest on the
new property, but not on the original property even though the
entire original security interest qualified as a purchase money
security interest.1 7 Based on these cases, a real estate mortgage
given to a lender partially to refinance a prior purchase money
mortgage and partially to finance a home improvement project
would be a non-purchase money mortgage to the extent of the
balance prior to the refinancing and a purchase money mortgage
to the extent of the new money advanced for the home improve-
ment project. If this rationale is applied to these hybrid real
estate mortgage transactions, the next legal problem that would
have to be resolved would be to determine whether the appropri-
ate interest rate is the interest rate applicable to first lien pur-
chase money mortgages (non-SCCPC coverage), the rates appli-
cable to other types of mortgages (SCCPC coverage), or a com-
bination of the two. If combined rates are used, the purchase
money rate would be applied to the amount of the loan that
qualified for purchase money status and the non-purchase
money rate would be applied to the remaining portion."'
The determination of the applicable interest rates is the real
issue involved in this situation. First lien loans that qualify as
purchase money security interests in land generally will be sub-
ject to much lower interest rates than those that do not have this
status. For example, the maximum permissible rate in South
Carolina for nongovernmentally guaranteed or insured first lien
mortgage loans on real estate is 9% per annum on mortgage loans
sales contract to be, in effect, a disguised loan from the lender, particularly in situations
in which the. lender has purchased a number of these contracts from a developer of a
subdivision.
117. See, e.g., cases cited note 112 supra. But see In re Simpson, 4 UCC Rep. 243
(W.D. Mich. 1966); In re Simpson, 4 UCC Rep. 250 (W.D. Mich. 1966). Compare Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co. v. Staley (In re Staley), 426 F. Supp. 437 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (a
security interest arrangement involving subsequent purchases in which all the payments
received were applied to the first item purchased until it was paid for in full and released
as collateral qualified the security interest in the first item for purchase money status).
118. The problems involved in interpreting the terms "land" and "primarily" are also
important to the resolution of this issue. See the discussion in note 115 supra.
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up to $60,000, 10% per annum on mortgages over $60,000, but not
more than $100,000, 12% for mortgages above $100,000 but not
exceeding $500,000 and no maximum for mortgages above
$500,000.' '1 This rate structure applies to all nongovernmentally
guaranteed or insured mortgages that qualify as "primarily se-
cured by a first lien which is a purchase money security interest
in land"-the magic words used in the SCCPC.20 If the real es-
tate mortgage is not one "primarily secured by a first lien which
is a purchase money security interest in land," and the credit is
for a personal, family, or household purpose, then the transaction
is governed by the SCCPC regardless of the amount of the mort-
gage. In such a case the applicable rate varies with the type of
transaction and the status of the creditor involved, but the basic
maximum rate possible in every case is at least 12% per annum,
which is significantly higher than the above non-SCCPC rate
structure for all first mortgage loans below $100,000.121
Given this interest rate differential and the present high
market interest rates, real estate mortgage lenders can be ex-
pected to try to structure a mortgage so that it does not qualify
for exclusion under the purchase money first lien test, but instead
qualifies for the higher rates permissible under the SCCPC.121 Yet
the intent of the drafters of the 1976 SCCPC Amendments was
to ensure that almost all first mortgage real estate residential
loans would not be affected by the SCCPC but continue to be
governed by section 34-31-30, which sets the 9%, 10%, and 12%
limits discussed in the preceding paragraph.'1 Unfortunately,
119. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See the Addendum at the end
of this article for an explanation of the 1978 amendment to § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977)
that attempted to raise the ceiling on first mortgage loans of $60,000 or less from 9% to
10%.
120. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-104(2)(b), 37-3-104(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Government
guaranteed and insured mortgages are exempt from any state interest regulation. See id.
§§ 31-19-10 to .30, 34-25-150 (1976). See note 478 and accompanying text infra.
121. See Part II infra for further explanation of the SCCPC rate structure.
122. Pre-SCCPC statutes did not regulate the rates on credit sales of real estate, and
non-SCCPC real estate credit sales are still not subject to any rate limitations. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 37-2-605 (1976). Even if a credit sale involving real estate falls within the
coverage of the SCCPC, however, the SCCPC rates for credit sales are high enough (18%
per annum, id. § 37-2-201(2)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977)) that the actual rate on a credit sale
involving an interest in land will rarely be affected by SCCPC coverage. The main impact
of this issue falls on real estate lenders, whose rates are highly regulated.
123. Id. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The statement in the text is based on the
author's recollection of the discussions concerning the 1976 SCCPC Amendments in the
Committee to Study the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. The author was appointed by
the Governor as a member of this committee. No statement concerning this issue appears
[Vol. 29
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the language chosen to implement this objective falls far short of
accomplishing the intended result. Many types of typical first
mortgage real estate loans apparently cannot meet the technical
requirements of a purchase money security interest. The prob-
lems with the purchase money security interest test discussed
above are but some of the important legal issues raised by the
language used in the SCCPC to differentiate between covered and
noncovered real estate transactions. Some of the additional prob-
lems are discussed in the footnote below. 12
in the minutes of the Study Committee or in the House or Senate journals. See also note
102 supra.
124. Problems created by lack of a definition of the terms "land" and "primarily" in
S.C. CODE ANN. § § 37-2-104(2)(b) and 37-3-104(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977) are discussed in note
115 supra. Three types of fairly common transactions need additional comment.
The first involves the status of mortgages on condominiums. The South Carolina
Horizontal Property Act, id. §§ 27-31-10 to -300 (1976), differentiates between land and
property. "Property" is the broader term and includes any leasehold or fee interest in the
land, as well as any improvements, id. § 27-31-20(k). While the status of a construction
mortgage for a typical condominium project will not arise because the loan in all likelihood
will be for business purposes as far as the developer is concerned, the status of a mortgage
given by the purchaser of an individual condominium is important for SCCPC purposes.
Such a mortgage only covers the interior apartment itself and the purchaser's percentage
of undivided interests in the elements of common ownership. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-31-230
(1976). The elements of common ownership include the "land," foundations, flat roof,
elevators, hallways, and any basement. Id. § 27-31-20(f) (1976). Given the distinction
between property and land in the Horizontal Property Act, there is a serious question
whether a nonconstruction mortgage covering an individual condominium unit could even
qualify as one "primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money security
interest in land." (emphasis supplied) See note 115 supra.
The second involves security interests in mobile homes. If the security interest covers
only the mobile home and if the mobile home is for personal, family, or household pur-
poses, it is subject to the SCCPC rate structure as a security interest in goods. See id. §
36-2-105(1). This should be the result even if the mobile home is attached in some fashion
to land owned or leased by the debtor. In either case no security interest in land is involved
in the transaction so that the SCCPC definitional exclusion for certain types of real estate
mortgages does not apply. Cf. Rosen v. Hummel, 47 A.D.2d 782, 365 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-107(2) (1976) ("sale of things attached to realty and capable of
severance without material harm thereto. . . is a contract for the sale of goods . . ").
Security interests in mobile homes in South Carolina must be perfected by notation on a
certificate of title, which is further evidence of their status as personalty. See S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 56-19-210, -220(9), -630 to -650 (1976). See also id. § 36-9-302, S.C. Rptr. Com-
ment; In re Vinarsky, 287 F. Supp. 446 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) (security interest in a mobile
home perfected in same manner as motor vehicles); Albany Discount Corp. v. Mohawk
Nat'l Bank of Schenectady, 28 N.Y.2d 222, 269 N.E.2d 809, 321 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1971).
On the other hand, if the security interest covers both the mobile home and the land
on which the mobile home is situated, the situation has many of the same conceptual
problems as a condominium mortgage. If the real estate mortgage does not qualify as a
"first lien which is a purchase money security interest in land," the real estate mortgage
is eligible for the SCCPC rate structure, and the status of the mobile home as personalty
or realty is not significant for determining the applicable interest rate structure. If the real
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The Department of Consumer Affairs, which administers the
SCCPC, has attempted to remedy some of the confusion and
uncertainty by a proposed regulation.12s The key provisions are
estate mortgage, however, does qualify as "a first lien which is a purchase money security
interest in land," the mortgage is not eligible for the SCCPC rates, and, unless the mobile
home is financed independently of the mortgage on the real estate, the maximum rate is
governed by the non-SCCPC rate structure. As was pointed out in the text, the maximum
rate in these circumstances is considerably lower than if the SCCPC applied to the trans-
action.
A lender can avoid this problem and obtain the benefit of the SCCPC rate structure
by (1) financing only the mobile home, (2) financing the mobile home and the land in
independent loan transactions, or (3) financing the mobile home and the real estate in a
unitary transaction only if the real estate mortgage will not clearly qualify as a "first lien
which is a purchase money security interest in land."
An additional problem with mobile home financing is determining whether the mo-
bile home is a fixture. This issue affects the manner of perfecting a security interest in a
mobile home and the priority of the mobile home financer over persons claiming interests
in the real estate to which the mobile home is attached. It does not, however, affect the
maximum interest rate for which a mobile home can be financed. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§
36-9-302(1)(d), -313 (1976); Note, Housing-Mobile Homes-Some Legal Questions, 75
W. VA. L. REv. 382, 406-17 (1972-73). Compare George v. Commercial Credit Corp., 440
F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1971) (mobile home set on cement blocks and connected to a well, septic
tank, and electric power lines on real property owned by purchaser of mobile home held
to be a fixture subject to the lien of a mortgage on the real property) with Clifford v.
Epstein, 106 Cal. App. 2d 221, 234 P.2d 687 (1951) (mobile home attached to water and
electrical outlets and used as a combination home and office by the manager of the mobile
home park held not to be a fixture so that title to the mobile home did not pass under a
contract to sell the real estate).
A third troublesome transaction involves mortgages covering property held by the
mortgagor under a long-term ground lease. In addition to problems of whether the mort-
gage covers the "land" and the impact of the term "primarily," S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-
105(b) (1976) states that a "sale of an interest in land" includes a lease of real estate with
an option to purchase when a substantial amount of the lease payments are applied to
the purchase price; however, all other leases of real estate are excluded definitionally from
the concept of a sale of goods covered by the SCCPC. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-105(1),
-107 (UCC), 37-2-105(1) (SCCPC) (1976). Does this mean that no type of security interest
in a real estate lease except one which contains an option to purchase could ever be
covered by the SCCPC? Since most mortgages in South Carolina covering improvements
constructed by a mortgagor on leased real estate are for commercial or business purposes,
and are, therefore, exempt from the SCCPC, this question may not be very important from
a practical standpoint.
125. Proposed Reg. No. 28-31-3.104, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (as revised Apr. 7, 1978).
This proposed regulation has been approved by the Commission on Consumer Affairs, but
as of August 1, 1978, had not been submitted to the Legislature as required by the South
Carolina Administrative Procedure Act. The South Carolina General Assembly has ninety
days to review any regulations proposed by a state agency. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-120
(Cum. Supp. 1977). Since this proposed regulation was not submitted to the General
Assembly until after the close of the 1978 legislative session, the earliest this regulation
can become effective is April 1979. It could be approved or disapproved earlier than ninety
days after the beginning of the 1979 legislative session by a resolution adopted by the
General Assembly or amended or withdrawn by the Commission on Consumer Affairs.
Prior to the initial publication of this proposed regulation in July 1977, the Depart-
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paragraphs 1 and 2. Paragraph 1 defines the concept "primarily
secured by a first lien which is a purchase money security interest
in land" as a loan that "is made and used to enable the borrower
to acquire rights in or the use of land, is secured by an interest
in land, and the lien is not subordinate to a lien of another per-
ment of Consumer Affairs issued three Administrative Interpretations dealing with the
exclusionary language. The first, issued late in 1976, held that a construction loan to build
a dwelling on land already owned by the mortgagor was not a consumer loan governed by
the SCCPC because it fell within the language of the real estate exclusion in S.C. CoDE
AN . § 37-3-104(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977) as a purchase money security interest in land. Ad.
Interpretation No. 3.104-7706, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1976). This interpretation states
that the Legislature intended to exclude from the coverage of the SCCPC the same kinds
of transactions qualifying for special disclosure treatment under TIL and Regulation Z.
See note 108 and accompanying text supra. The problem with this rationale is that the
South Carolina Legislature did not use the same language as is utilized in TIL and
Regulation Z, which speak in terms of "a loan secured by a first lien or equivalent security
interest on a dwelling and made to finance the purchase of that dwelling." 12 C.F.R. §
226.8(3) (1977). Second, the purposes of the two types of provisions are quite different.
TIL is a disclosure act and the real estate transactions qualifying under the above lan-
guage are exempted from some but not all required disclosures. The purpose of the SCCPC
real estate provisions, however, is primarily to determine the applicable interest rate for
a given transaction. If the SCCPC applies, much higher interest rates are permissible than
if it does not. Compare FRB Letter No. 1179, [1974-1977 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED.
GuIE (CCH) 31,588 (Apr. 28, 1977) (mortgage to pay off a prior bond for title arrange-
ment does not qualify as a mortgage to finance the acquisition of a dwelling for TIL
purposes) with Ad. Interpretation No. 1.301-7701, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1977) (dis-
cussed infra). See also FRB Letter No. 1235 [1974-1977 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED.
Gum (CCH) 31,674 (Sept. 2, 1977) (purchase money mortgage at 12% held not
"equivalent to a first lien" since the property was sold subject to a prior development
mortgage at 8% interest).
The second ruling on this topic came in early 1977 when the Department of Consumer
Affairs issued an Administrative Interpretation holding that a purchase money mortgage
in land includes a conventional mortgage given to pay off a prior purchase money mort-
gage. Ad. Interpretation No. 1.301-7701, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1977). Whether or not
the prior mortgage was a construction mortgage is not specified. In this interpretation,
the Department abandoned the analogy of TI language and stated instead that the South
Carolina Legislature intended the scope of the SCCPC real estate provisions to be the
same as those in the UCCC, which exempts the ordinary first lien home mortgage. Id.
As is pointed out in the text, however, the language of the real estate exclusion in the
UCCC and in the SCCPC is obviously quite different.
The third Administrative Interpretation held that a second mortgage to purchase an
interest in the borrower's residence was not covered by the real estate exclusion and,
therefore, was a consumer loan subject to SCCPC rates. Id. No. 3.104-7705. No reference
to either the TIL or the UCCC real estate provisions was made in this ruling. Since the
initial publication of the proposed regulation, the Department of Consumer Affairs has
issued one additional relevant interpretation. It said that a- loan that is used in the
mortgagor's business and that is secured by a real estate mortgage on an existing lot and
building owned by the mortgagor is not made to purchase land and, therefore, is not
covered by the SCCPC exclusion. Declaratory Ruling No. 3.601-7712, S.C. Dep't of Cons.
Aff. (1977). Neither TIL nor the UCCC are referred to in this ruling. All the results in these
rulings would still be valid under the proposed regulation. See notes 126-28 and accompa-
nying text infra.
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son." Paragraph 2 exempts from the above definition a loan
"made and used to pay off a loan 'primarily secured by a first lien
that is a purchase money security interest in land'. . . if (a) The
original principal amount of the loan being paid off has been
reduced by at least 25% at the time of the refinancing, or (b) the
new money advanced is at least 50% of the refinanced loan
amount."' 2 1 The purpose of paragraph 1 is to expand the SCCPC
real estate exclusion to its broadest limits so that as many mort-
gages as possible will be excluded from the higher rates of the
SCCPC. Under the proposed regulation almost all first lien pur-
chase money mortgages on improved and unimproved real estate,
construction mortgages, and permanent mortgages used to pay
off prior construction mortgages '1 would be definitionally ex-
cluded from the SCCPC. Most refinancings, deferrals, or exten-
sions of all such mortgages, which do not qualify for the "safe
harbor" provisions of paragraph 2, would also be excluded. The
only types of real estate mortgage loans that clearly will not fall
within the exclusion as interpreted by the regulation are second
mortgages and first mortgages on property already owned by the
mortgagor where the property had no outstanding prior mortgage
or if a prior mortgage is refinanced at a time when the payoff
balance is less than 75% of the original principal amount or in a
transaction in which new money equal to at least 50% of the total
refinanced loan amount is advanced. Undoubtedly a considerable
number of refinancing transactions will not meet the "safe har-
bor" tests in paragraph 2 of the proposed regulation. When this
is the case, the prudent course of action would be to treat the
transaction as if it falls within the definition of a loan "primarily
secured by a first lien that is a purchase money security inter-
est." The proposed regulation is a good faith effort to overcome
126. Proposed Reg. No. 28-31-3.104, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (as revised Apr. 7, 1978).
127. If a prior construction mortgage does not qualify as a first lien purchase money
mortgage, the later permanent mortgage could not be a first lien purchase money mort-
gage under the definition in paragraph 1 of the proposed regulation. See note 114 and
accompanying text supra.
128. If the mortgage in question is determined to be one that is not subject to SCCPC
rates, the regular South Carolina usury penalty statute applies and the mortgagor can
collect twice the amount of any interest paid and need repay only the remaining principal
of the mortgage. S.C. CoDe ANN. § 34-31-50 (1976). A mortgage lender is really between a
rock and a hard place in this situation even if the lender believes in good faith that the
regulation is invalid because he knows from prior interpretations and the above discussed
regulation that the Department of Consumer Affairs will interpret the real estate exclusion
broadly, and, therefore, that there is little likelihood of getting a ruling favorable to the
lender's position in a borderline case. The advantages of such a ruling are discussed in
[Vol. 29
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some of the shortcomings of the SCCPC language and will be
effective unless the 1979 Legislature disapproves it. Given the
notes 430-31 and accompanying text infra. In addition, making a mortgage at SCCPC
rates in a situation in which the Department of Consumer Affairs has specifically ruled
that the transaction is not subject to SCCPC rates open& up the possibility of criminal
sanctions for willful violation of the usury statutes. See id. § 34-31-100.
The initial version of this proposed regulation, published in 1977, attempted to define
more generally the types of refinancing transactions that would not be "primarily secured
by a first lien which is a purchase money security interest in land." Paragraph 2 of the
initial proposed regulation stated that "[a] loan made and used to pay off a loan
'primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money security interest in land' is
also such a loan if the prior loan balance when paid off was substantially as great as the
amount of the new loan." Proposed Reg. No. 28-31-3.104, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1977)
(emphasis supplied). Apparently the idea behind this language was to treat all real estate
mortgages that are essentially equivalent to purchase money mortgages, in the sense that
the loan proceeds are used in part to acquire some rights in the land or the improvements,
as purchase money mortgages even though they do not technically qualify as purchase
money mortgages. This results in all these mortgages being subject to the non-SCCPC rate
structure for first mortgages on real estate, which, as was pointed out in the text, is the
presumed intent of the real estate provisions in the SCCPC. The initial proposed regula-
tion would have made refinancing of a prior first lien purchase money mortgage a purchase
money mortgage if the old loan was substantially as great as the new loan. Unfortunately,
the term "substantially" was not defined, but presumably meant that unless the new loan
is a great deal larger than the old loan, the new mortgage would be considered a purchase
money mortgage. A typical refinancing of a prior mortgage for the purpose of providing
some additional capital needed by the debtor for some purpose (for example, homne im-
provements) would be a common type of mortgage covered by this paragraph in the
regulation. Under the initial version of the regulation, this type of mortgage would qualify
as a mortgage "primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money security
interest in land" and, therefore, would be subject to the non-SCCPC real estate mortgage
rates, unless the amount of the new mortgage was "substantially" greater than the old
mortgage. The "substantially as great" test was criticized in the comments and hearings
on the regulation as being too indefinite. In response to this criticism, the latest version
of the proposed regulation, dated April 7, 1978, adopted the safe harbor provisions de-
scribed in the text. It does not provide, however, any guidance for mortgages that do not
qualify under the safe harbor provisions but, nevertheless, are not clearly "primarily
secured by a first lien which is a purchase money security interest in land."
Another problem with the proposed regulation is the lack of a definition of "land" or
"primarily." Although the language in the proposed regulation strongly suggests that the
word "primarily" is used to qualify "purchase money mortgage" rather than the other two
possibilities discussed in note 115 supra, problems relating to the lack of a definition of
these concepts continue to exist. An additional problem not dealt with in the final revision
of the proposed regulation is the status of a purchase money mortgage taken by a devel-
oper or other seller of real estate that is subsequently sold to a bank or other lender. See
note 116 supra.
Nothing in either the initial or current version of the proposed regulation prevents a
lender from taking a second mortgage instead of refinancing the initial mortgage, if the
lender has the authority to take second mortgages. Handling the transaction in this
fashion qualifies the loan for the higher rates permissible for second mortgages under both
the SCCPC and non-SCCPC rate structures. See Parts H and III infra. This possibility
has always existed. Paragraph 3 of the proposed regulation prohibits the splitting of a
single loan into multiple agreements to obtain higher rates, but would not affect the
type of second mortgage transaction discussed above.
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problems with the statutory language, a judicial or legislative
challenge to the regulation on the grounds that it unlawfully
broadens the types of real estate mortgages that qualify as
"primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money
security interest in land" is likely.
In retrospect, the drafters of the 1976 SCCPC Amendments
would have been well advised to insist on continuing the UCCC
language, which would make all real estate mortgages above 12%
per annum fully subject to the SCCPC and those below 12%
subject to non-SCCPC law. The UCCC test is easy to apply and
does not involve all the legal complications inherent in the
jsccpc language. But hindsight is always better than foresight,
and the SCCPC purchase money test is the law. Until this situa-
tion can be cleared up by court decision or further legislation,
mortgagees would be well advised to use caution in making high-
rate real estate loans based on a narrow, literal interpretation of
the purchase money security interest concept, especially in light
of the apparent legislative intent in enacting the 1976 SCCPC
Amendments, not to change radically the prior interest rate
structure governing real estate mortgages.
5. Summary List of Transactions Not Within the Defini-
tions of Consumer Credit Sale, Consumer Loan, and Consumer
Lease. -Any transaction not fitting the definitions of a consumer
credit sale, consumer lease, or consumer loan is not a consumer
credit transaction under the SCCPC. While the categories of
these transactions can be easily deduced from the preceding
discussion, the following summary may be helpful.
The definitions in the coverage sections implicitly place the
following credit transactions outside the scope of the SCCPC:
1. Credit sales, leases, and loans made by persons not regu-
larly engaged in these transactions;
2. credit sales, leases, and loans made to organizations, a
term broadly defined to include all types of business and govern-
mental entities except proprietorships; 9
3. credit sales, leases, and loans made primarily forbusiness
or commercial purposes;
4. credit sales and loans in which there is no requirement
for payment of a finance charge or for payment of the requisite
number of installments;
5. credit sales and loans, other than those involving covered
129. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-301(11) (1976).
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real estate transactions, in which the amount financed exceeds
$25,000;
6. leases in which the amount of the payments exceeds
$25,000;
7. leases in which the term is four months or less; and
8. a credit sale of an interest in land in which the debt is
primarily secured by a first lien that is a purchase money secu-
rity interest in land or a loan primarily secured by a first lien
that is a purchase money security interest in land.
Unless these transactions are made subject to the SCCPC by
mutual agreement of the parties, I" the permissible rates, charges,
and other aspects of these transactions would be governed by non-
SCCPC statutes and case law."'
These are not the only transactions excluded from the
SCCPC. In the next section other types of exclusions are dis-
cussed.
C. Total and Partial Exclusions
Three broad categories of transactions are not within the
coverage of some or all of the SCCPC. The first category consists
of transactions that do not fit the SCCPC definitions of a con-
sumer credit sale, lease, or loan and are therefore nonconsumer
credit transactions. Credit for business purposes is the clearest
example.'32 This type of exclusion was discussed in the preceding
section. The second category consists of transactions that are
totally excluded from the SCCPC by express provision. Loans,
sales, or leases made for agricultural purposes are examples.' M
The third category consists of transactions that are excluded from
some but not all of the provisions of the SCCPC. An example is
loans made by insurance premium service companies to finance
insurance purchases. These loans are exempt from the rate and
charge provisions of the SCCPC, but are otherwise subject to all
other sections.' The second and third categories of exclusion are
discussed in this section.
The rationale behind the three different categories is hazy.
The theory appears to be that transactions that do not involve an
130. See id. §§ 37-2-601 (1976), 37-3-601 (Cum. Supp. 1977). These provisions are
discussed in Part II, section B(3) infra.
131. See Part III infra.
132. See Part I, section B(5) supra.
133. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(8) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
134. Id. § 37-1-202(6).
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extension of credit or a lease of personal property to an individual
for personal, family, or household purposes ought not to be cov-
ered by a code that deals primarily with consumer credit.'5 Not
all consumer credit transactions, however, are fully included in
the SCCPC and not all nonconsumer credit transactions are ex-
cluded. Most transactions in the first and third categories and
many totally excluded transactions of the second category would
meet the definitional requirements for coverage by the SCCPC
except that they are specifically excluded from all or some of its
provisions.
A more realistic explanation for the different categories is
that these coverage and exclusion provisions are the result of
political compromises necessary to obtain approval of this legisla-
tion. Although evident in the drafting of the UCCC, 135 which pro-
vided the basic format for the SCCPC, this process was carried
to an extreme by the South Carolina Legislature'37 so that the
differences between the SCCPC and UCCC are greater in this
area than in any other. The direct and collateral legal conse-
quences of these differences are critical to a clear understanding
of the SCCPC.
Section 1.202 of the 1968 text of the UCCC contains four
partial or total exclusions.' 5 The equivalent section of the
SCCPC'39 contains these four plus an additional five for a total
of nine exclusions.
1. Debts of Governmental Bodies.-All extensions of redit
to governmental bodies, agencies, or instrumentalities are totally
excluded from all provisions of the SCCPC on the theory that
these transactions are not true consumer credit transactions. "'
135. See 1968 UCCC §§ 2.605, 3.605, Comments.
136. See generally authorities cited in note 5 supra. Compare these authorities with
Landers, The Scope of Coverage of the Truth in Lending Act, 1976 Am. B. FOUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 565 (contains an excellent discussion of the background and congressional
debate on the TIL coverage provisions, which in many important respects are similar to
those in the UCCC and the SCCPC).
137. But see note 102 supra.
138. 1968 UCCC § 1.202. The 1974 text of § 1.202, which substantially revised the
four exclusions in the 1968 text, contains six exclusions. One new exclusion is for securities
or commodities transactions with SEC registered broker-dealers and is identical to the
TIL exclusion from § 104(2) of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1603(2) (1976). This particular
exclusion was not included in the SCCPC. The second new exclusion in the 1974 UCCC
is an optional exclusion of the rate and loan maturity provisions for credit union loans.
The SCCPC totally excludes credit union loans. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(10) (Cum.
Supp. 1977). See Part I, section C(8) infra.
139. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
140. Id. § 37-1-202(1). This exclusion is partially derived from TIL. See 15 U.S.C. §
[Vol. 29756
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2. Sale of Insurance by an Insurer. "'-This exclusion is
much narrower than it appears at first glance. It applies only to
direct sales of insurance by insurers or their agents."' The financ-
ing of these sales is excluded from all provisions of the SCCPC,
except the provisions on cancellation of property and liability
policies.' Loans by a third party to pay for an insurance pre-
mium for personal, family, or household related insurance do
not fall within this exclusion because these transactions are not
sales by an insurer. Such third-party loan transactions are cov-
ered fully by the SCCPC, with the exception of loans by a li-
censed insurance premium service company. These loans are ex-
cluded from the SCCPC rate and charge provisions as explained
in the next subsection. In addition, any insurance written for a
consumer credit sale, lease, or loan, which is covered by the
SCCPC and financed as part of the consumer credit transaction,
is fully subject to the SCCPC. Thus, for example, premiums for
credit life, disability, and property insurance financed by a bank
as part of a loan to a consumer to purchase an automobile for his
wife's personal use are fully subject to the SCCPC.111
1603(1) (1976).
141. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The SCCPC insurance exclu-
sion is identical to that in the 1968 UCCC. See 1968 UCCC § 1.202(2).
142. Some transactions within the scope of this exclusion are technically not financ-
ing transactions because they do not involve the extension of credit, as defined in S.C.
CODE ANN. § 37-1-201(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977). For example, a three-year fire insurance
policy with a privilege of yearly payment of premiums, but with a right of cancellation at
any time by the insured, is not really a credit transaction. Since credit is involved in many
consumer insurance sales by insurers these transactions would be subject to the SCCPC
were it not for this exclusion. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-105(3)(c) (1976) (defines
"services" for purposes of a consumer credit sale under the SCCPC as "insurance provided
by a person other than the insurer"). For an excellent short analysis of the insurance
exclusion, see Miller, Basic Exclusions, supra note 89, at 290-94.
143. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-4-102(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
144. Borderline cases that will be hard to determine will obviously arise. For example,
suppose a consumer buys a life insurance policy and gives a note to the insurance agent
for the first year's premium. The transaction may technically still fit the definition of a
sale by an insurer, in which case the transaction would be excluded from the SCCPC; in
reality, however, it is no different from a loan by a third party to finance the premium, a
covered transaction. Whether it is or is not within the SCCPC could make a difference in
permissible charges and remedies. In addition, Article 4 of the SCCPC, S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 37-4-401 to -411 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977), extensively regulates the premiums and
other aspects of consumer credit life, disability, and property insurance. Since the primary
purpose of the SCCPC is to protect consumers, a court would likely construe this exclusion
nairowly, and creditors would be well advised to do likewise. See Miller, Basic Exclusions,
supra note 89, at 292-93. The 1974 UCCC revises the insurance exclusion considerably,
narrowing further the scope of the exclusion and eliminating much of the confusion that
results from the 1968 UCCC version incorporated into the SCCPC. The 1974 UCCC also
39
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3. Rates and Charges for Certain Insurance Premium
Loans."'45-This exclusion covers the permissible rates and
charges that can be made by insurance premium service compa-
nies, which are companies formed for the purpose of financing
insurance premiums on various types of insurance purchased by
individuals and businesses.4 The remaining aspects of any insur-
ance premium service company loan that qualified as a consumer
loan are governed by the SCCPC. Insurance companies desig-
nated by this section are permitted to charge a $10 nonrefundable
fee. 4  This fee produces a high actuarial annual percentage rate
for typical small insurance premium loans on automobile and
homeowner's policies when it is added to the permissible 9%
per annum interest rate.' Apparently, this high rate is the main
reason the insurance premium service companies requested ex-
emption from the SCCPC rate structure.'49 A proposed provision
for special high rates for this type of premium loan was considered
but rejected, as unnecessary, by the 1974 UCCC drafting commit-
tee.,5
0
This exclusion is also applicable to loans made by insurance
agents or producers of record to finance the premiums on automo-
bile, personal, family, or household insurance policies they sell.''
contains special provisions for insurance premium loan agreements, which are not in-
cluded in the SCCPC. See Miller & Warren, supra note 5, 629-30 (1975). Note that the
inclusion or exclusion from the SCCPC does not affect any disclosure requirements under
TIL. See note 76 supra.
145. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
146. Insurance premium service companies are authorized and governed by §§ 38-27-
10 to -140 (1976).
147. Id. § 38-27-90(d).
148. Id. § 38-27-90(e). A review of the annual reports of all licensed insurance pre-
mium service companies on file in the South Carolina Insurance Commission reveals that
the average premium loan in 1976 was $300.20. If the seven companies whose premium
loans average in excess of $1,000 are excluded, the average premium loan for the remaining
twenty-two licensees was $256.75. The statistics show figures for all states where these
companies are licensed, and the total amount of loans written in South Carolina is not
separately stated.
149. Insurance premium service companies are licensed by the South'Carolina Insur-
ance Commission. Id. § 38-27-30 (1976). If the insurance premium service company rates
were governed by the SCCPC, they would automatically be eligible to make loans at the
18% rate structure authorized for supervised lenders since they would qualify as super-
vised financial organizations. See id. § 37-1-301(17) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Without a license
to make supervised loans the maximum rate that could be charged, including the $10
nonrefundable fee, would be 12% per annum. See id. § 37-3-201 (explained in Part I,
section B infra.).
150. See Miller & Warren, supra note 5, at 630.
151. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See id. §§ 38-51-410 to -480
(1976).
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Originally doubt arose over the authority of agents to make loans
because the legislation permitting the loan could be construed to
limit the loans to automobile policies written under the South
Carolina Assigned Risk Plan.'52 This plan has been inferentially
repealed,'53 but a 1978 statute clears up this problem and raises
the maximum interest rate on such loans from 12% to 18% per
annum, or $1.50 per month, whichever is greater. 5' These loans
are exempt from the SCCPC rate and charge provisions, but like
loans by insurance premium service companies, are subject to all
other provisions in the SCCPC.
4. Certain Transactions With Public Utilities. -This exclu-
sion applies if "the charges for the services involved, the charges
for delayed payment, and any discount allowed for early pay-
ment" are specifically regulated by a state or federal agency.'55
On the other hand, if the charges in question are not specifically
regulated, then all provisions of the SCCPC apply, even though
the utility in question is generally supervised by a regulatory
agency. The concept behind this exclusion is the desirability of
avoiding dual and possibly inconsistent regulation. If no specific
152. Id. § 38-51-410 (1976) (authorizes these advances "[w]hen, pursuant to the
written or oral request of an insured or applicant for insurance, any insurance agent,
insurance agency or producer of record under the Assigned Risk Plan of the Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act shall advance all or any part of premium. . . ." Id. (emphasis
added)). See also id. § 38-51-450 (Insured's failure to repay the agent advancing the
premium will constitute grounds for cancellation of a policy insuring a private passenger
automobile pursuant to § 38-37-1310 (1976)).
153. See id. §§ 38-37-710 to -790, -910 to -950 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977) (establishing
a reinsurance pool to replace the assigned risk plan previously authorized by S.C. CODE
ANN. § 46-719 (1962 & Cum. Supp. 1975) (repealed 1974)); Note, The Automobile Reform
Act (Part II): Compulsory Insurance-A Synopsis and Appraisal, 27 S.C.L. REv. 919, 931-
37, 944-45 (1975).
154. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-51-410 (1976), as amended by No. 596, 1978 S.C. Acts
1746. No other charges can be made in connection with these loans. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 38-51-420 (1976). Ironically, for rates and other aspects of the transaction, insurance
agents might be better off with no special SCCPC rate exclusion. If the advancement of
premiums by agents is construed as a sale of insurance rather than as a loan, see note 144
supra, the transaction is totally exempt from the SCCPC. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-
202(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977). It is also exempt from any non-SCCPC rate limitations. See
id. § 37-2-605 (1976). Even if the transaction qualifies as a consumer credit sale, it is
eligible for the SCCPC rate structure, which authorizes a basic 18% per annum. See id.
§ 37-2-201 (Cum. Supp. 1977). On the other hand, even if these advancements were
loans governed by the SCCPC, the maximum rate that could be charged would be 12%
per annum, id. § 37-3-201, but the agent or producer of record could also make the addi-
tional permissible charges authorized by the SCCPC, id. § 37-3-202. If the agent or
producer obtained a supervised lender license, the charge could be 18% per annum plus
the authorized additional charges. See id. § 37-3-508.
155. Id. § 37-1-202(3).
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public utility regulations covering the charges within this exclu-
sion exist, however, the reason for the exclusion does not exist,
and it does not apply. ' Late payment fees charged by public
utilities operating in South Carolina appear to be the main type
of existing regulation that falls within this exclusion. '
5. Loans by Pawnbrokers. '-This exclusion applies only to
rates, charges, and disclosures of the rates and charges to the
extent that these items are regulated by other statutes, or ordi-
nances. In South Carolina the exclusion is limited to loans of
$50 or less.'50 The entire SCCPC, therefore, applies to all pawn-
broker loans about $50, and all of the SCCPC, except the rate,
charge, and most disclosure provisions, apply to pawnbroker
loans below $50. Because in all likelihood pawnbroker loans are
subject to the disclosure requirements of TIL, the purpose served
by the disclosure exclusion is dubious.'60
6. Government Supported Educational Loans Made to or
on Behalf of Students. 6'-These educational loans are totally
156. Cf. Iowa v. Town of LeGrand, [1976] 5 CoNs. CRD. GUID (CCH) 98, 034 (D.
Iowa Jan. 3, 1978) (10% late payment charge for nonpayment of a water bill was interest
subject to the Iowa usury law).
157. The South Carolina Public Service Commission has specifically authorized late
payment charges of 1/2% per month on unpaid balances for electric, gas, telephone,
sewer, and water utility bills that are in arrears. In all cases, except telephone bills, this
late payment charge cannot be made unless the bill remains unpaid for twenty-five days
after the billing date. The late charge for unpaid telephone charges is apparently added
to the bill at the time of the next succeeding billing date. See Rules and Regs. of the S.C.
Pub. Service Comm'n Nos. 103-339(3), -439(3), -532(2), -622(2), -732(2), S.C. CODE OF
STATE REGS. (1976). These regulations apply only to public utilities whose rates are regu-
lated by the South Carolina Public Service Commission and do not apply to utilities whose
rates are regulated by the Federal Power Commission. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 58-3-
140, -210 (1976) with 16 U.S.C. § 824(d)-(e) (1976).
158. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977). This exclusion is identical to
that contained in § 1.202(4) of the 1968 UCCC.
159. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-39-100 (1976). This statute authorizes a maximum charge
of $1 per thirty-day period for each $10 loaned (up to $50). This amounts to a rate of 120%
per annum calculated actuarially, as required by the SCCPC and TIL. For loans under
$10 a flat fee of fifty cents in lieu of interest is authorized. Id.
160. The effect of the disclosure exemption appears to be that failure to comply with
TIL disclosure rules would create a cause of action only under TIL, but not an additional
state remedy, as would be the case with transactions covered by the SCCPC disclosure
rules. See note 44 supra. The pawnbroker exclusion, however, technically exempts only
"disclosure of rates and charges," but TIL and SCCPC require disclosure of items other
than mere rates and charges, for example, security interests. If this exclusion is given a
narrow interpretation, a state cause of action for violation of these other disclosure items
arises. See generally Miller, The Perplexing Status of Pawnbrokers Under the UCCC, 24
OKLA. L. REv. 121 (1971).
161. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(9) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 421-
441 (1976) (pertains to student loans under the National Defense Education Act); S.C.
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excluded from all provisions of the SCCPC. These loans differ
somewhat from ordinary consumer installment loans because
they normally authorize longer than usual repayment periods,
payments of interest only for a period of time, or both.'6 2 It is
difficult, however, to justify a complete exclusion that has the
effect of preventing the many consumer protective devices and
remedies of the SCCPC from applying to any aspect of these
loans. Educational loans covered by this exclusion are governed
entirely by the non-SCCPC South Carolina usury statutes and
common law."' Loans for educational purposes that are not made
pursuant to "a government supported educational loan pro-
gram," however, are fully covered by the SCCPC. It seems
anomalous to have less protection for a government supported
loan than a similar nongovernment loan, particularly when the
SCCPC's overall purpose is protection of the consumer interest.
No other state that has adopted the UCCC has a similar exemp-
tion.
7. Loans, Sales, or Leases Made Primarily for Agricultural
Purposes. '"-This exclusion in the SCCPC, which is a total ex-
CODE ANN. § 34-13-40 (1976) (discussed in note 162 infra). See generally Jenkins,
Regulation of Colleges and Universities Under the Guaranteed Student Loan Program, 4
J.C. & U.L. 13 (1976).
162. Under S.C. ConE ANN. § 34-13-40 (1976), which will continue to apply to these
loans because of the educational loan exclusion in the SCCPC, the normal restrictions on
repayment terms on installment loans do not apply to loans "for the purpose of obtaining
higher education, however, the first payment on any such loan shall be made not later
than four years from the date of completion of the course of higher education for which
the loan was made." A similar provision in the SCCPC as an amendment to S.C. CODE
ANN. § 37-3-511 (Cum. Supp. 1977), which requires substantially equal installment pay-
ments over a limited period of time for supervised loans (those with interest rates in excess
of 12%) of $1,000 or less, appears sufficient to handle the special problems presented by
these loans. Representatives of the banking industry who appeared before the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code Study Committee insisted, however, that a complete exclusion be
granted, and this recommendation was included in the proposed statute submitted by the
Study Committee to the Legislature in 1976. See Committee on the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, Report to the General Assembly, 1976 S.C. HousE J. 914; 1976 S.C. SEN. J.
718. See also note 1 supra.
163. The permissible maximum rate will depend on the status of the lender. See Part
V, Chart B(8) infra. Many educational loans are made by banks and can be made at a
7% add-on rate (12.68% per annum for a twelve-month loan calculated actuarially as
required by the SCCPC and TIL). S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-13-120 (1976). Ironically, if not
excluded, banks could make such loans at the much higher rates authorized by the
SCCPC for supervised loans-base rate of 18%, and higher rates for loans of less than
$1,000, see id. § 37-3-508 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
164. Id. § 37-1-202(8). "Agricultural purpose" is very broadly defined; however, a
person dealing with agricultural products is engaged in an agricultural purpose only if the
person in question "cultivates, plants, propagates or nurtures" the products in question.
Id. § 37-1-301(4) (1976).
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clusion, is different from the exclusion provided by the 1968 and
1974 texts of the UCCC and TIL. Both the UCCC and TIL cover
agricultural credit of $25,000 or less to individuals involved in
agricultural endeavors"5 on the theory that credit of this amount
is mostly to individual small farmers and is more akin to con-
sumer credit than ordinary business credit."'6 This rationale was
apparently not persuasive to the South Carolina Legislature. The
result is that all credit for agricultural purposes is governed by
non-SCCPC statutes and case law, 67 and the permissible maxi-
mum rates and other charges depend on the status of the creditor
and the type of credit transaction involved. 6 '
8. Loans by Credit Unions. -All loans by credit unions are
completely excluded from the SCCPC.69 This exclusion was in-
serted at the insistence of the credit unions during the debate over
the 1976 SCCPC Amendments. 7 ' The rationale given for the ex-
165. See 15 U.S.C. § 1603(5) (1976); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.3(e) (1977); 1968
UCCC §§ 2.104 (consumer credit sale), .106 (consumer lease), 3.104 (consumer loan); 1974
UCCC § 1.301(12), (14)-(15). Leases, however, (but not sales or loans below $25,000) for
agricultural purposes are excluded from TIL disclosure requirements. Regulation Z, 12
C.F.R. § 226.2(mm) (1977).
166. See, e.g., Landers, The Scope of Coverage of the Truth in Lending Act, 1976 AM.
B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 565, 661-65; Warren & Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems
of Coverage, 24 STAN. L. REV. 793, 811, 815 (1972).
167. One possible exception, which is debatable under the present wording of the
SCCPC, see Part II, section B infra, is an agreement between a creditor and an agricul-
tural debtor to be bound by the SCCPC, in which case the SCCPC rate structure applies
and a 12% per annum actuarial rate is possible. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-601 (1976), 37-3-
601, .605 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
168. Depending on the type of creditor and the kind of transaction, the authorized
rates under the SCCPC might be higher or lower than non-SCCPC rates for the same
amount of credit. For example, the maximum permissible rate for a single payment
agricultural loan of $50,000 or less is 8% per annum; however, the same transaction can
be made for up to 12% per annum if it is subject to the SCCPC. On the other hand, if the
same loan is payable in three or more installments, the lender can charge up to 12.68%
per annum on a 12 month contract if the transaction is not governed by the SCCPC versus
12% if the transaction is governed by the SCCPC rate structure. See Part V, Chart B(8)
infra. The real issue, however, ought to be whether the exclusion adversely affects small
farmers by cutting down undesirably on the amount of credit available to them. If the
permissible rates do not justify the investment, a creditor-will simply not enter into the
transaction or will increase the credit requirements so that he lowers the risk factors. See
authorities cited notes 217 and 752-53 infra. To place small farmers on an equal basis with
large farmers, which is the result of the SCCPC exclusion, begs this issue. A great deal of
credit to large farmers, particularly in larger amounts, is subject to higher rate maximums
than are permitted for small credit transactions with small individual farmers because
of the many exceptions to the basic South Carolina usury statutory contract rate of 8%.
See Part III, section B(2) infra.
169. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(10) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
170. See 1976 S.C. HOUSE J. 2675. The 1976 UCCC Committee Report, supra note
162, did not contain any kind of exclusion for credit unions. Representatives from the
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clusion was the desire of credit unions to continue to make loans
at a maximum of 12% per annum as authorized by federal and
state statutes"' rather than at the higher rates authorized for
supervised lenders under the SCCPC. Many observers have spec-
ulated, however, that the real reason for the requested exclusion,
originally made by the credit unions at the time the 1968 UCCC
was drafted, was to prevent a wholesale conversion of federal
credit unions, whose rates are set at a 12% maximum by federal
statute, into state credit unions, if state credit unions could qual-
ify for the higher SCCPC rate structure.17 2 Federal credit unions
outnumber state credit unions by better than four to one in South
Carolina.' 3
South Carolina Credit Union League requested exclusion at a House Judiciary Committee
hearing on S. 119, which ultimately became the 1976 SCCPC Amendments, see note I
supra, but the Judiciary Committee reported out S. 119 without such an exclusion. The
amendment creating this exclusion was one of the few amendments approved during the
protracted debate over S. 119 in the 1976 legislative session.
171. 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5)(A)(vi) (Supp. 1977) (federal credit unions); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 34-27-70 (1976) (state credit unions). One major difference between the two is that the
12% limit authorized for federal credit union loans is by statute inclusive of all other
charges, whereas the 12% authorized for state credit loans is presumably exclusive of any
additional charges authorized by common law or applicable regulations.
172. See, e.g., Braucher, Consumer Credit Reform: Rates, Profits and Competition,
43 TEMP. L.Q. 313, 322-23 (1970); Miller & Warren, supra note 144, at 626 n.72. The
conversion problem could be avoided by amending the Federal Credit Union Act to au-
thorize federal credit unions to charge the same rates as state credit unions. A similar
statute allowing national banks to charge the highest rates authorized by state laws has
been in effect for many years. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976). The concern of credit unions over
their inclusion in the SCCPC rate structure is illogical. Being legally authorized to charge
higher rates does not mean that a lender has to, or actually would, charge the highest rates
permitted. Because of the cost advantages they have over banks and consumer finance
companies, credit unions would still be able to make profitable loans at rates below those
of their competitors even if they were fully covered by the SCCPC. See note 178 infra.
The only disadvantage in being authorized to lend under SCCPC rates is loss of the ability
to advertise that loans with interest rates in excess of 12% are not legally authorized.
Rationally, a consumer should be more interested in knowing that a loan from his credit
union carries an interest rate lower than the equivalent credit from someone else than he
is in knowing the difference between the interest rate he is being charged and the maxi-
mum legal rate.
173. See 1977 S.C. CRnErr UNION LEAGUE Y.B. 18-24. For multistate companies with
multiple credit unions, dealing with one federal supervisory agency, the Federal Credit
Union Administration, is far simpler than dealing with a multitude of state regulatory
agencies. In addition, a variety of other administrative and operational advantages are
available for operating as a federal credit union. Traditionally, the loan authority of
federal credit unions has been greater than that of state credit unions with the exception
of authority to make long-term real estate loans. In 1975 the South Carolina Legislature
enacted S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-1-110 (1976), which authorizes state-chartered credit unions
to have the same loan powers as federal credit unions pursuant to regulations issued by
the State Board of Financial Institutions. If the Board of Financial Institutions issues the
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No other state that has adopted the UCCC has a similar total
exclusion. The 1974 UCCC authorizes an optional exclusion for
"the ceilings on rates or limits on loan maturities" for credit
union loans, but all remaining provisions of the UCCC apply to
those transactions.' While a limited exclusion, such as the op-
tional exclusion in the 1974 UCCC, could be rationalized because
credit unions do not need or want the higher rates available under
the SCCPC, the complete exclusion is very difficult to justify.
Nationwide, credit unions are the fastest growing segment in the
consumer credit industry. Credit union loans increased nationally
from $9.8 billion in 1967 to $34.1 billion at the end of 1976. 17 In
South Carolina credit unions had outstanding loans of $350.2
million at the end of 1976. This figure represents an increase of
over $125 million in outstanding loans since the end of 1974.171
The total exclusion in the SCCPC carves out an enormous seg-
ment of consumer credit from many of the important SCCPC
consumer protective devices and remedies 177 and increases the
already substantial cost advantages credit unions have over their
appropriate regulations, state and federal credit unions would then have loan authority
on an equal basis. In 1977 the United States Congress passed major liberalizing amend-
ments to the Federal Credit Union Act. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1790 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
Included in these amendments are authorization for twelve-year maturities on all loans
except for first liens on mobile homes, which can have a fifteen-year maturity, and resi-
dential real estate acquisition loans for one to four family dwellings, which can have a
maturity of up to 30 years. For the first time federal credit unions will also be authorized
to extend lines of credit to members, lend to other credit unions, and enter into loan
participation agreements with other credit unions. Act of Apr. 19, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
22, 91 Stat. 49 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5) (1976)).
174. 1974 UCCC § 1.202(6).
175. 1977 CREDIT UNION NAT'L A.Y.B. 25-27.
176. Id. at 26; 1977 S.C. CREDIT UNION LEAGUE Y.B. 17.
177. Although the permissible interest rates under the SCCPC are higher than those
now authorized for credit unions, the other aspect of such loans are largely unregu-
lated-with the result that debtors with consumer loans from credit unions do not have
the same amount of protection as other consumer debtors. For example, in a credit union
loan no guaranteed right of cure before enforcement of a past due obligation exists as it
does under the SCCPC, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-5-110 to -111 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Nor would
a debtor be entitled by statute to all the notices and other consumer protective devices
guaranteed a debtor by the SCCPC. See INrERATED CODE, supra note 3, Introduction. In
addition, charges that are permitted state credit unions, other than interest, are subject
only to nebulous common-law limitations, and, at the present time, no statute imposes a
civil penalty or other remedy against a state credit union that levies excess charges and
interest. The only remedy is recovery of the excess charge. See Part II, section E infra for
further explanation of this issue. The statute regulating federal credit unions, however,
specifically provides for forfeiture of all interest and a right to recover any interest paid
in the event of excess charges. 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5)(A)(vii) (Supp. 1977).
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chief competitors, commercial banks and consumer finance com-
panies.1 8
9. Loans by Consumer Finance Companies Holding Licen-
ses Under Act 988 of 1966. ' 9-This is the most complicated of all
exclusions in the SCCPC; no other state that has adopted the
UCCC has similar provisions. Nevertheless, this exclusion pro-
duces a workable system that gives consumers with loans from
consumer finance companies qualifying for the exclusion more
rights and remedies than if the loans were governed by the
SCCPC.
The scope of this exclusion is the product of a carefully
worked out compromise between the small independent con-
sumer finance companies whose average loans are under $500 and
the remaining consumer finance companies and other lenders
authorized to do business in the state. Under this compromise,
consumer finance companies have a choice: they can maintain a
license under Act 988 of 1966 (Act 988),18o in which case all loans
will be subject to the rates and charges established by Act 988,
or they can obtain a license to make loans as a supervised lender
under the SCCPC, in which case all loans would be subject to the
SCCPC rate structure.18'
178. Credit unions have considerably lower operating costs than banks and consumer
finance companies. Their offices are often provided by the sponsoring employer rent free
or at minimal rental fee; they need few employees because of the relative simplicity of
their operation; their advertising costs are much less; their employees on the average are
paid less than competitors' employees; and the cost of their capital (interest rate on
depositor's savings accounts) is considerably less than the normal borrowing rate paid for
equity capital by their competitors, particularly consumer finance companies. Credit
unions also do not have to pay dividends to shareholders (other than dividends on savings
accounts) as do banks and consumer finance companies, which are profitmaking ventures.
In addition, credit unions, as cooperatives, are essentially nontaxable entities, unlike their
competitors. See, e.g., P. SMrnT, COST OF PROVIDING CONSUMER CREDrr 10, 16-19 (1962).
Furthermore, the in terrorem effect of being an employee of the sponsoring employer
naturally causes collections to be more prompt and less expensive than for banks and
consumer finance companies making the same loan to the same individual. In combina-
tion, these and other cost and risk advantages of credit unions account for their combined
ability to make consumer installment loans at rates substantially below those of banks
and consumer finance companies and in spite of existing interest rate market conditions,
to make a reasonable return on a 12% per annum maximum rate structure.
179. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
180. No. 988, 1966 S.C. Acts 2391.
181. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-3-500, -501(3) to (4), 37-9-102 (Cum. Supp. 1977). In
SCCPC terminology consumer finance companies with Act 988 licenses are designated
restricted lenders who make restricted loans, but consumer finance companies operating
under SCCPC licenses are supervised lenders who are entitled to make supervised loans.
See id. §§ 37-3-501 to -503.
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The Act 988 maximum rates ' are higher for small loans than
the SCCPC maximum rates for supervised loans. 's For example,
on a one-year loan for $400, the maximum rate that can be
charged under the SCCPC is 34.67% per annum,8 4 but the maxi-
mum rate under Act 988 is 36.33% per annum. If this twelve-
month loan was for $500, however, the maximum rate permitted
under the SCCPC is 33.03% per annum as opposed to a 32.38%
per annum maximum under Act 988; if the loan was for $1,000,
the maximum SCCPC rate is 28.05% per annum, as opposed to
a 24.39% per annum maximum under Act 988.' s1
This rate differential is the main reason the drafters expected
the consumer finance companies whose loan portfolios consisted
primarily of small loans under $500 to retain their Act 988 licen-
ses. The consumer finance companies whose loan portfolios con-
sisted in the main of larger loans, however, were expected to give
up their Act 988 licenses in favor of an SCCPC supervised lender
license. Since the effective dates of the 1976 SCCPC Amend-
ments, this bifurcation has occurred as expected. Presently ap-
proximately 55% of all licensed consumer finance companies have
SCCPC supervised lender licenses, and approximately 45% have
Act 988 licenses.' 86
This unique South Carolina "compromise" has important
collateral legal consequences. The exclusion for Act 988 li-
censees is unlike any of the other eight discussed in this section:
182. Id. § 34-29-140.
183. Id. § 37-3-508.
184. These figures are all computed on an equivalent actuarial basis, as required by
the SCCPC and TIL. The cited Act 988 rates include in their computation the authorized
initial fee that can be made in addition to the permitted finance charge. See id. § 34-29-
140. Inclusion of the initial fee for comparison purposes is appropriate since most charges
covered by the initial fee have to be included as part of the loan finance charge in a loan
subject to the SCCPC rate structure. See Part II, section D(1) infra.
185. The breaking point, at which the SCCPC rates become higher than those in Act
988 of 1966, varies with the maturity of the loan. For a loan with a twelve-month maturity,
the breaking point occurs at $475. For a loan with an eighteen-month maturity, however,
the breaking point is $375, and for a loan with a twenty-four month maturity, the breaking
point is $325.
186. See letter of Everett H. Whittler, Director, Consumer Finance Division Report
of the Board of Financial Institutions, 1976 Annual Report [hereinafter cited as 1976
Consumer Finance Division Annual Report]. As of December 31, 1976, 342 consumer
finance companies were licensed to make SCCPC supervised loans and 293 were Act 988
restricted lenders. Id. The average loan made by all consumer finance companies in 1976
was $684.37. Forty-four percent (252,734) of the loans made by all licensed consumer
finance companies in 1976 (573,479) were for $300 or less; but these loans accounted for
only 10.5% of the total loans made. Id. Consumer finance companies specializing in these
smaller loans are the ones that have Act 988 licenses.
[Vol. 29766
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not only does it specifically exclude the SCCPC rate and charge
provisions '87 and some, but not all, of the other provisions of the
SCCPC,55 but the SCCPC also contains a provision that states
that "any inconsistency or conflict between any provision of this
Act and Act 988 shall be resolved in favor of Act 988."'11 This
provision ensures that Act 988 licensees will continue to be sub-
ject to all of Act 988 except when the SCCPC specifically states
that the SCCPC is to apply to loans made by Act 988 licensees
or when Act 988 contains no applicable provision contained in the
SCCPC and the SCCPC does not prohibit the SCCPC provision
from applying to loans by Act 988 licensees.
The practical applications of this rather unusual and convo-
luted blending of two major pieces of regulatory legislation are
significant and far reaching. Consumer finance companies oper-
ating as Act 988 licensees are limited to loans of less than $7500, 11
as opposed to a no dollar limitation for consumer finance compa-
nies operating as SCCPC supervised lender-licensees; they are
able to charge Act 988 rates and charges, though, including the
late charges, deferral fees, and prepayment penalties specified by
Act 988.11 Loans by consumer finance companies having Act 988
licenses, however, are subject to the provisions of Act 988 voiding
loans if excess charges are made, instead of to the less strict
penalties in the SCCPC.12 In addition, the maximum maturity
rate provisions of Act 988 rather than the less restrictive provi-
sions of the SCCPC'5 3 apply, and the credit insurance provisions
187. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
188. See id. 44 37-3-200 (prevents Part 2 of Article 3 of the SCCPC, dealing with
permissible rates and other charges, from applying to restricted loans), 37-3-500 (with the
exception of one section, see note 204 infra, prevents Part 5 of Article 3 of the SCCPC,
dealing with supervised loans, from applying to restricted loans), 37-4-102(2) (with the
exception of the provisions on cancellation of consumer credit insurance, prevents Article
4 of the SCCPC from applying to restricted loans) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
189. Id. § 37-1-106. This section was § 60 of the 1976 SCCPC Amendments, which
modified an earlier version that was contained in § 5 of the 1974 SCCPC. If it were not
for this provision, which was deemed essential by the smaller independent consumer
finance companies, the higher rates they sought to protect could have been achieved either
by exempting very small loans from the SCCPC rate structure or by including a special
high rate section for very small loans in the SCCPC. The former was done, for example,
in the case of insurance premium service companies discussed supra. The latter alterna-
tive was the approach utilized in Oklahoma when it adopted the UCCC. See OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14A, § 3-508B (West 1972).
190. S.C. CODE ANN. 44 34-29-20 (1976), -140 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
191. Compare id. § 34-29-140 (Cum. Supp. 1977) with id. §§ 37-3-201 to -210, -508.
192. Compare id. § 34-29-140(e) with id. § 37-5-202.
193. Compare id. § 34-29-140(b) with id. § 37-3-511. The main difference is that Act
1979]
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of Act 988, rather than Article 4 of the SCCPC," 4 govern. Act 988
requires that both a husband and wife sign a security interest
covering household furniture,'9 5 but the SCCPC has no similar
provision. Finally Act 988 prohibits purchase money real estate
loans."' In all these instances, Act 988 governs the transaction
because it specifically covers the particular matter or the SCCPC
expressly defers to Act 988. On the other hand, the SCCPC provi-
sions apply to those aspects of a transaction that are not expressly
covered by Act 988 or excluded by the SCCPC. This includes
limitations on balloon payments'97 and wage assignments,"' and
authorization for debtors to assert defenses against lenders in
interlocking loans."9 On the same basis the Article 5 rights of
debtors and limitations of creditors, including the debtor's right
of cure2 ' and restrictions on events of default,"' also apply to
loans made by Act 988 licensees. The SCCPC penalty for excess
charges, however, will not apply since, as was pointed out above,
Act 988 contains its own penalty provision. 02 While this is not an
exhaustive list of the interaction between Act 988 and the
SCCPC, °3 it should serve the purpose of illustrating the appropri-
988 has maximum maturity dates for all permissible loans. See note 543 and accompany-
ing text infra.
194. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-160 (1976) with id. §§ 37-4-107 to -304 (1976
& Cum. Supp. 1977). Pursuant to § 37-4-102(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977), Article 4 of the
SCCPC, except the provision relating to cancellation of property and liability insurance,
see id. § 37-4-304 (1976), does not apply to loans made by Act 988 licensees. Determining
from the statutory language whether there will be any substantial difference in the cost
and other regulations of life, disability, liability, and property damage insurance between
Act 988 restricted loans and SCCPC supervised loans is difficult. Cf. Ad. Interpretation
No. 4.107-7612, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1976) (the SCCPC, unlike Act 988, does not
specify what retroactivity feature is permissible for consumer credit insurance).
195. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-150(e) (1976).
196. Id. § 34-29-140(h) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The SCCPC prohibits a security interest
in land for a supervised loan of $1,000 or less. Id. § 37-3-510. This limitation does not,
however, apply to Act 988 licensees making restricted loans. See id. § 37-3-500.
197. Id. § 37-3-402 (1976).
198. Id. § 37-3-403.
199. Id. § 37-3-410.
200. Id. 99 37-5-110 to -111 (Cum. Supp. 1977). These sections require that a
debtor be given a notice of default and a twenty-day right to cure before any consumer
credit obligation can be accelerated or foreclosed. Only one notice and right to cure is
required. If the debtor is subsequently in default, the creditor can proceed to enforce its
rights without any further cure notices.
201. Id. § 37-5-109. Under this provision, failure to make a required payment is the
only absolute event of default. Any other default must involve "significant impairment"
of the prospect of payment, performance, or realization of the collateral, and the burden
of proving "significant impairment" is on the creditor.
202. See note 192 and accompanying text supra.
203. Most sections that could apply for the SCCPC are in Parts 3 and 4 of Article 3
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ate result for many of the questions that are likely to arise.' "4
The exclusion for consumer finance companies operating
under Act 988 licenses is far more rational than the exclusion for
credit unions and some of the other exclusions discussed above.
This exclusion does not result in lack of regulation of many im-
portant aspects of consumer loans as does the credit union exclu-
sion. A consumer with a loan from an Act 988 licensee actually
has more rights than he would if the same loan were governed
totally by the SCCPC because the Act 988 exclusion serves to
blend the protective devices of both acts. The difference in the
treatment of consumer finance companies and credit unions is
brought into sharper focus when one considers they are competi-
tors in essentially the same market segment in South Carolina
and in Articles 5 and 6. In several instances, because of parallel provisions in both acts,
no specific exclusion applies. For example, both acts prohibit cognovit confession of judg-
ment clauses. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-170 (1976) with id. § 37-3-407. To the
extent there is any difference in wording in these parallel statutes it seems that the section
that provides the greatest protection to the consumer would apply since no "inconsistency
or conflict", in the sense of a direct conflict in statutory coverage appears and since such
an interpretation is consistent with the policy followed by courts in interpreting federal
and state statutes regulating the same subject matter. See note 18 supra. One possible
application of this rationale is in the prohibition contained in both acts against loan
splitting. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-28-110(d) (1976) with id. § 37-3-409. Violation of
the provision in Act 988 results in a void loan as opposed to much less stringent penalties
in the SCCPC. See note 192 and accompanying text supra. Therefore, the Act 988 provi-
sion should apply. There is some danger,'however, that the Act 988 provision violates the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (c) (1976), and Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §
202.8 (1977). See 1975 Op. S.C. ATr'Y GEN. No. 4209. If this proves to be the case, the
SCCPC prohibition against multiple agreements would apply since at that point no
"inconsistency" would exist because the Act 988 provision would not be effective.
204. Two additional aspects of the relationship between Act 988 restricted lenders
and SCCPC supervised lenders justify additional comments. First, S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-
3-512 (Cum. Supp. 1977), which restricts the types of business, other than the making of
loans, that can be conducted by a supervised lender, applies to Act 988 licensees rather
than the more vague Act 988 provision at § 34-29-130(a) (1976). See id. §§ 37-1-106, 37-3-
500 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Second, administratively, licensing and examination functions of
all consumer finance companies, whether they operate under SCCPC supervised lender
licenses or under Act 988 restricted lender licenses, are controlled by the State Board of
Financial Institutions. All consumer finance companies are, however, under the jurisdic-
tion of the Department of Consumer Affairs for administrative enforcement of violations
of the SCCPC and other applicable statutes dealing with consumer credit. See id. 88 37-
3-503 to -507 (Cum. Supp. 1977), 37-6-101 to -117 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977). While there
are some differences, the standards for granting and revoking licenses for both types of
consumer finance companies are essentially identical. Compare id. §§ 37-3-503 to -504
(Cum. Supp. 1977) with id. §§ 34-29-40 to -80 (1976). See also IrMEORATED CODE, supra
note 3, §§ 37-3-503, -504, Comments. Both statutes require a showing of "convenience and
advantage," contrary to the 1968 and 1974 UCCC, which eliminated the convenience and
advantage test because it had the effect of stifling competition among lenders. See 1968
UCCC § 3.503, Comments; 1974 UCCC § 2.302, Comments.
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and have an almost identical amount of consumer credit loans
outstanding.205
D. Conflict of Laws
A final area related to the coverage of the SCCPC that merits
discussion is the conflict of laws rules that determine when and
to what extent the SCCPC will apply to a multistate consumer
credit transaction.20 Many consumer credit transactions involve
more than one state so that it is necessary to determine "which
state's laws will apply to these transactions. For example, con-
sumer credit transactions are often handled by mail with receipt
of a catalog being the only part of the transaction taking place in
South Carolina. Many credit purchases of goods and personal
loans are also made through personal solicitations in South Caro-
lina by nonresident salesmen of companies that have no offices
or resident agents in this state. In both types of transactions, the
contract and other documents are typically mailed to the seller's
or lender's home office in another state where they are accepted
and the transaction is consummated. In addition, many credit
transactions in communities along the boundaries of South Caro-
lina will frequently be with creditors located in adjoining states.
South Carolina residents also will frequently enter into consumer
credit transactions while travelling through or temporarily stay-
ing in other states. Another typical situation presenting conflict
of laws problems involves individuals who were residents of an-
other state when the consumer credit transactions were entered
into, but who subsequently move to South Carolina. If a transac-
tion meets the SCCPC criteria of a consumer credit sale, con-
sumer loan, or consumer lease, the effect of having the laws of the
other state apply rather than the laws of South Carolina is the
same as if the transactions had been excluded by definition or by
a specific exclusion from the SCCPC.
In general, courts have been quite liberal in upholding
multistate contracts against claims of usury. The rule fol-
lowed by the South Carolina Supreme Court207 and most other
205. At the end of 1976 all consumer finance companies had $348.2 million in out-
standing loans in South Carolina. 1976 Consumer Finance Division Annual Report, supra
note 186, at 5. Credit unions had $350.2 million in outstanding loans. 1977 S.C. CREDrT
UNION LEAGUE Y.B. 17.
206. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-201 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
207. See, e.g., Columbian Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Rice, 68 S.C. 236, 47 S.E. 63 (1904);
British Am. Mtg. Co. v. Bates, 58 S.C. 551, 36 S.E. 917 (1900); Equitable Bldg. & Loan
[Vol. 29
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courts '08 is that in the absence of a contrary statute a credit
transaction that is usurious under the laws of one state but non-
usurious under the laws of another state having a significant
contact with the transaction will be held to be nonusurious.
South Carolina has two contrary statutes modifying this
rule.29 The first, which was enacted in 1898, states that "the rate
of interest allowed and in all other respects," on any mortgage on
real estate located in South Carolina will be governed by South
Carolina law.2"' This statute is limited to real estate mortgages
Ass'n v. Vance, 49 S.C. 402, 27 S.E. 274 (1896); Thornton v. Dean, 19 S.C. 583 (1883).
See also Savannah Bank & Tr. Co. v. Shuman, 250 S.C. 344, 157 S.E.2d 864 (1967),
discussed note 210 infra. A close reading of these and similar cases clearly indicates that
while the court rationalized its decisions on grounds that the contracts were to be made
or performed in the state whose laws were held to apply, the cases actually are basically
indistinguishable in their essential facts, and the state chosen was the state in which the
transaction was not usurious. In other types of contract cases the South Carolina Supreme
Court has fairly consistently applied the laws of the state where the contract was made,
regardless of the state designated as the place of performance. See, e.g., Columbia Weigh-
ing Mach. Co. v. Rhem, 164 S.C. 376, 162 S.E. 427 (1931).
208. See, e.g., Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955); Annot., 125 A.L.R. 482
(1940); Weintraub, Beyond Depecage: A "New Rule" Approach to Choice of Law in
Consumer Credit Transactions and a Critique of the Territorial Application of the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code, 25 CASE W.L. REv. 16 (1974); Comment, Usury in the Con-
flict of Laws: The Doctrine of the Lex Debitoris, 55 CAL. L. REV. 123 (1967). Many credit
contracts stipulate that the law of a particular state will apply. If the state specified has
some reasonable relation to the contract and no controlling statute specifies otherwise, the
stipulation will be upheld. This rule, codified in UCC § 1.105, S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-105
(1976), is really nothing more than an application of the broader rule applied by courts
even in the absence of such a stipulation. See authorities cited this footnote supra.
209. Theoretically, there is a third such statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 34-29-220 (1976),
that mandates that small loans of under $7,500 made by consumer finance companies
holding licenses under Act 988 of 1966 be governed by Act 988, but provides that Act 988
will not apply to loans valid under the laws of another state "with a regulatory consumer
finance law similar in principles to this chapter." Because of the unusual relationship
between Act 988 and the SCCPC, see Part I, section C(9) supra, this statute may still be
effective, but whatever its meaning may be, it applies only to a situation in which the
rates and other charges authorized by another state are greater than those authorized by
Act 988, a situation that is quite unlikely to occur.
210. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-60 (1976). This statute was most recently construed to
apply South Carolina law to a loan made to South Carolina residents secured in part by
a mortgage on South Carolina real estate. Savannah Bank & Tr. Co. v. Shuman, 250 S.C.
344, 157 S.E.2d 864 (1967). The loan was payable and all documents were accepted in
Georgia. One interesting aspect of the case is that the loan was usurious under Georgia
law as well as under South Carolina law, but under Georgia law a usurious loan of this
type is apparently totally void whereas under South Carolina law the creditor could still
recover the principal despite the usury. The South Carolina Supreme Court applied South
Carolina law to the entire transaction even though part of the collateral for the loan was
business equipment. In a case in which a transaction is usurious under the law of all the
states involved, a majority of courts will apply the usury laws of the state that imposes
the least penalty. See, e.g., Pellerin Laundry Mach. Sales Co. v. Hogue, 219 F. Supp. 629,
640 (W.D. Ark. 1963).
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and does not apply to security interests in personal property or
to unsecured credit. The second statute is the SCCPC conflict of
laws provision."' Although application of these statutes to all the
various facets of consumer credit transactions covered by the
SCCPC is complex,' rules regarding credit charges are quite
simple: (1) if the transaction is covered by the SCCPC and is
made to an individual who is a resident of this.state at the time
the credit is extended, then the creditor cannot collect credit
charges in excess of those authorized by the SCCPC;23 however,
(2) if the debtor was a nonresident at the time the credit was
extended, then, unless the transaction is secured by real estate
located in South Carolina, the rates and charges of the state
whose laws are deemed to be applicable to the transaction would
control, whether those rates are lower or higher than the SCCPC
rate structure.1 4 Under the first of these rules, a creditor cannot
recover any rates or charges in excess of those permitted by the
SCCPC in an action brought in South Carolina to enforce the
obligation, even though the entire transaction was handled by
mail with an out-of-state creditor or the South Carolina resident
211. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-201 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
212. See INTEGRATED CODE, supra note 3, § 37-1-202, Comments. Different parts of
the SCCPC apply depending on whether the credit is made in South Carolina and whether
the debtor was a South Carolina resident at the time the credit was granted.
213. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-201(1) to (5) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The impact of these two
rules is nicely illustrated by a recent Georgia case in which a consumer loan that was made
by a South Carolina consumer finance company to Georgia residents, who lived in or near
Augusta, and was secured by real and personal property located in Georgia, was held to
be governed entirely by South Carolina law even though for the purposes of the ruling the
loan was admitted to be usurious under Georgia law. Clark v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 142
Ga, App. 389, 236 S.E.2d 135 (1977). This is the traditionally acceptable court resolution
to this type of problem. See notes 207-10 and accompanying text supra. If this transaction
had been made to South Carolina residents by a Georgia lender after the effective date of
the 1976 SCCPC Amendments, the SCCPC would automatically apply regardless of
whether the note or mortgage specified that Georgia law would apply and even if the
transaction were in excess of the maximum SCCPC rates but less than the maximum rates
authorized by Georgia law. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-201 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Thus, for
debtors who are residents of South Carolina at the'time the credit is extended, the rule in
§ 37-1-201 (Cum. Supp. 1977) effects a significant change in prior law.
214. Id. § 37-1-201(3) to (5). Presumably, in cases falling within the second rule, the
courts will uphold a stipulation that the laws of one of the original states having a signifi-
cant contact with the transaction will apply. See note 208 supra. Such a stipulation would
not, however, be upheld in a transaction falling within the first rule. See note 213 supra,
The UCCC has specific provisions invalidating such stipulations for debtors who are
residents of the UCCC state at the time credit is extended. See 1968 UCCC § 1.201(9)(a);
1974 UCCC § 1.201(8). Unfortunately, these provisions were omitted from the SCCPC,
but the same result can be reached by application of the statutory language that was
adopted.
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entered into the consumer credit transaction while travelling or
visiting in another state."1 5
E. Summary
Despite the many types of transactions that are excluded
either wholly or partially from the SCCPC, most types of credit
transactions that traditionally have been classified as consumer
credit transactions usually are covered by some provisions of the
SCCPC or equivalent legislation. The major exceptions consist of
certain types of real estate mortgage transactions, loans by credit
unions, and governmentally supported educational loans. To the
extent that a transaction is not covered by the SCCPC, it will be
governed by other South Carolina statutes, federal laws, or both.
The maximum rates and other charges that can be made in such
transactions are discussed in Part ]II. The rates and other charges
that can be made in transactions whose rates are governed by the
SCCPC are analyzed in Part II of this article.
PART II. SCCPC RATE STRUCTURE
A. Comparison With UCCC Rate Structure
The rationale behind the composition of the SCCPC rate
structure is the same as that behind the UCCC. Open, effective
competition among creditors, rather than inflexible interest max-
imums, is felt to better assure an adequate amount of credit for
all segments of society at a reasonable price.2"6 The draftsmen of
215. Although legitimate arguments can be made that the full application of the first
rule to the two situations mentioned in the text constitutes an unlawful restraint on
interstate commerce or a denial of due process, the courts so far have upheld similar
provisions regulating consumer credit. See, e.g., Aldens, Inc. v. LaFollette, 552 F.2d 745
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977) (constitutionality of Wisconsin Consumer Act
provision applying Wisconsin rates to revolving credit transactions between Wisconsin
residents and out-of-state mail-order creditor upheld); Aldens, Inc. v. Ryan, 571 F.2d 1159
(10th Cir. 1978) (Oklahoma Consumer Credit Code held applicable to a mail-order trans-
action between a resident of Oklahoma and an out-of-state catalog company). See also
Buerger, Revolving Credit and Credit Cards, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 707, 709 (1968);
Weintraub, supra note 208, at 30-43. But see Ad. Interpretation No. 1.201-7506, S.C. Dep't
of Cons. Aff. (1975) which holds that the SCCPC only applies to a creditor who mails
information soliciting open-end credit from a place in South Carolina.
216. For detailed discussion of the UCCC rate structure and the theory behind it, see,
e.g., Braucher, Consumer Credit Reform: Rates, Profits and Competition, 43 TEMP. L.Q.
313 (1970); Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Installment Credit, 66
MICH. L. REv. 81 (1967); Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Economist's
1979]
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the UCCC imposed rate maximums on consumer credit transac-
tions on the theory that maximums are politically necessary be-
cause state legislatures are reluctant to give up their ultimate
control over rates; however, the rates are set high enough to make
a reasonable amount of credit from legitimate creditors available
to all segments of society. 17 As a trade-off for these rates, how-
ever, UCCC creditors engaged in consumer credit transactions
are required to accept increased competition resulting from less
restrictive licensing requirements 8 and a number of limitations
View, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1969); Smith, Some Reflections on Free Entry and the Rate
Ceilings Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 7 U. RICH. L. REv. 235 (1972); Warren,
Consumer Credit Law: Rates, Costs, and Benefits, 27 STAN. L. REv. 951 (1975).
217. A number of studies have indicated that artificially low rate ceilings that do not
allow creditors a reasonable rate of return in exchange for possible risks have the effect of
driving creditors out of the market. Low ceilings also foster creditor subterfuge to collect
a reasonable rate, for example, by alteration of the type of credit being extended and
alteration of the eligibility requirements. This is done to reduce the risks to a level in
which the creditor will be able to make a profit under the given rate ceilings. See, e.g., E.
KOHN, C. CARLO, & B. KAYE, THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK'S USURY CEILING ON LOCAL MORT-
GAGE LENDING AcTIvITY (1976) (reaching the conclusion that low interest rate maximums
caused mortgage lenders in New York to raise their eligibility and down payment require-
ments, which consequently resulted in significantly fewer residential mortgage loans than
other states with higher rates); CONSUMER FINANCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 91-147; Note,
An Empirical Study of the Arkansas Usury Law: "With Friends Like That ... , " 1968
U. ILL. L.F. 544 (commentary on an Arkansas study demonstrating that a 10% limit on
credit sales had resulted in higher cash prices, greater credit insurance, and higher service
charges than adjoining states with higher authorized rates).
The available evidence indicates that the pretax profit of consumer credit lenders is
surprisingly uniform, which is further proof that creditors usually operate at a level in
which they make a reasonable profit regardless of the rate structure. See, e.g., R. SHAY &
J. CHAPMAN, THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY: ITS CosTs AND REGULATION (1967); Benfield,
Interest Ceilings and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 56 A.B.A.J. 946 (1970); Felsen-
feld, Consumer Interest Rates: A Public Learning Process, 23 Bus. LAW 931 (1968).
The UCCC rates for smaller transactions were based on the prevailing market rates
and on recently enacted modern small loan statutes. See Shay, The Impact of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code Upon the Market for Consumer Installment Credit, 33 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 752, 754 (1968). Despite the general rise in interest rates since the late
1960's when the UCCC was drafted, credit rates in states that have adopted the UCCC
have been below the established rate ceilings for most types of credit transactions, indicat-
ing that the Code's rate theory, and subsequent increased competition, are working well
in practice. See 1974 UCCC, PREFATORY NOTE, at xx-xxi. For very small loans and revolv-
ing credit, however, the prevailing rates have traditionally been near the established
ceilings. The PREFATORY NOTE to the 1974 UCCC suggests this is because the UCCC rates
in these areas were set too low given the risks and costs involved. Id. The UCCC rate
ceilings were not, however, raised in the 1974 UCCC. See note 323 and accompanying text
infra,
218. Increased competition under the UCCC is fostered by eliminating the conve-
nience and advantage test as the basis for a license to make high-rate supervised loans
by consumer loan companies. The absence of any licensing requirements for lenders mak-
ing loans at rates not in excess of 18% or for sellers engaged in making credit sales,
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on traditional rights and practices." 9
To implement this policy of open competition, the UCCC has
a unitary rate structure that places all consumer creditors on an
regardless of the rate charged, also encourages competition. The convenience and advan-
tage test, which requires a positive showing by an applicant that existing credit needs are
not being met in a given area, is replaced by a more liberal test of "financial responsibility,
character and fitness." 1968 UCCC § 3.503; id. at Comment 1. The SCCPC requires both
a showing of convenience and advantage and proof of financial responsibility ($25,000
worth of assets per location) before a license to make supervised loans by a consumer
finance company will issue. Licenses for all loans in excess of 12% (versus 18% for the
UCCC) are required. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-503 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Compare the similar
requirements for consumer finance companies proposing to operate under a license
granted pursuant to Act 988 of 1966, in § 34-29-40 (1976). The SCCPC, however, does
incorporate the nonlicensing requirements of the UCCC for consumer credit sales and
consumer loans of 12% or less. Compare 1968 UCCC § 3.501-.502 with S.C. CODE ANN. §
37-3-501 to -503 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The existing requirements for banks and other
"supervised financial organizations," § 37-1-301(17) (Cum. Supp. 1977), are not affected
by either the UCCC or SCCPC licensing requirements. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-1-
70 (1976) (charters issued to state banks and building and loan associations only upon
proof that the operation "would serve the public interest. . ."). Compare 1968 UCCC §
3.502 with S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-502 (Cum Supp. 1977). Further explanation of the
SCCPC licensing requirements can be found in notes 231-32 and accompanying text infra.
219. For example, a creditor in a consumer credit sale with a cash price of $1,500 or
less ($1,750 in § 5.103 of the 1974 UCCC) must forego the right to a deficiency judgment
if the collateral is repossessed. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-103(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977). A credi-
tor in a consumer credit sale or loan must give the debtor a one-time notice and oppor-
tunity to cure after default before proceeding to accelerate or foreclose on the collateral.
Id. §§ 37-5-110, -111 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See also notes 35-39 and accompanying text
supra; INTEGRATED CODE, supra note 3, at INTRODUcTION gives a complete list of these
provisions. The SCCPC includes most but not all of the UCCC consumer protection
provisions with variations. For example, the SCCPC unconscionability section is not as
broad as the equivalent provision in the 1974 UCCC. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-
108 (Cum. Supp. 1977) with 1974 UCCC § 5.108. The SCCPC does not include some of
the restrictions in the UCCC, such as the provisions relating to venue and stay of enforce-
ment of default judgments, and the provisions prohibiting the right to repossess household
goods covered as collateral in a nonpurchase money credit transaction unless certain
protective measures are fulfilled. See 1974 UCCC §§ 5.113-.116.
While all these limitations are undoubtedly necessary and beneficial to consumers,
they do increase the cost of consumer credit, particularly in high-risk categories. See, e.g.,
White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 Wis. L.
REv. 503; Whitford & Laufer, The Impact of Denying Self-Help Repossession of Automo-
biles: A Case Study of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 607; Note, A Case
Study of the 'Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the
Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969). Compare Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repos-
session: An Economic Analysis, 47 S. CALIF. L. REv. 82 (1973) with Dauer & Gilhool, The
Economics of Constitutionalized Repossession: A Critique of Professor Johnson, and a
Partial Reply, 47 S. CALIF. L. REV. 116 (1973). The final article in this sequence is Johnson,
A Response to Dauer and Gilhool: A Response of Self-Help Repossession, 47 S. CAUF. L.
REV. 151 (1973). See also Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Reme-
dies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. Rav. 807 (1975). These cost increases
were taken into account by the drafters of the UCCC in establishing the UCCC rate
structure. See generally authorities cited note 216 supra.
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equal footing, whether they are sellers or lenders, by authorizing
them to charge the same rates. In addition, all the rates are
calculated on a uniform actuarial basis that conforms to the spirit
and substance of TIL, which makes it easier for consumer credi-
tors and debtors to determine and to compare rates. Competition
is also encouraged by eliminating many of the traditional barriers
to free entry into the credit market, such as the restrictive con-
venience and advantage test.25
Although the SCCPC rates and licensing requirements are
based on the UCCC, they are significantly different in many im-
portant respects. The major differences between the two are listed
below:
(1) The SCCPC has more exclusions from coverage than does
the UCCC, so that a significant portion of consumer credit is not
governed by the SCCPC rate structure. A comparison of the
UCCC and SCCPC exclusions is presented in Part J.221
(2) Unlike the UCCC, sellers and lenders under the SCCPC
are not on an equal footing in certain transactions. For closed-end
credit transactions (for example, installment sales and loans note
made on a revolving credit account), the SCCPC has a rate maxi-
mum of 18% per annum for credit sellers and 12% per annum for
lenders, as opposed to 18% for both in the UCCC.222 Also signifi-
cant are differences between the two in the rate maximums ap-
plicable to open-end or revolving credit.
2
2
(3) The SCCPC has special rate provisions for credit sales of
automobiles 2 14 and for small loans by consumer finance compa-
nies licensed under Act 988 of 1966.22 The official texts of the
UCCC do not contain either type of special rate structure.
(4) The SCCPC does not affect the rate structure of non-
SCCPC transactions to the same extent as the UCCC. The latter
effectively repeals all rate limitations on noncovered transac-
220. See note 218 supra for an explanation of the convenience and advantage test.
221. See Part I, sections B and C supra.
222. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-201, 37-3-301 (Cum. Supp. 1977) with 1968
UCCC §§ 2.201, 3.301. See Part II, section B(1) infra for further discussion of the SCCPC
closed-end rate structure.
223. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-207 (1976), 37-3-201, -515 (Cum. Supp. 1977)
with 1968 UCCC §§ 2.07, 3.201, .508. See Part II, section B(2) infra for further discussion
of the SCCPC open-end rates.
224. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-211 (1976). See Part II, section B(1)(b) infra.
225. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part I, section C(9) supra
for further discussion of the interrelation between Act 988 of 1966 and the SCCPC; Part
I1, section B(2)(b)(ii) infra for further discussion of the Act 988 rate structure.
[Vol. 29
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tions.2 21 The SCCPC does eliminate rate maximums on noncov-
ered credit sales;27 the existing non-SCCPC rate structure, how-
ever, continues to apply to most noncovered loan transactions
below $50,000 and to most real estate mortgage transactions, in-
cluding those mortgages made to build or to purchase a residence
for personal, family, or household purposes and those secured by
business property.28
(5) The SCCPC does not contain the UCCC provision that
adjusts the dollar amounts to which the various rates apply to
compensate for inflation. 2 19 The UCCC provides for the dollar
amounts to automatically adjust in 10% increments on July 1 of
every even-numbered year if the Consumer Price Index has in-
creased at least 10% from the preceeding period. If the Index
increased 12% during a particular two-year period, the dollar
amounts on which the rates are applied are adjusted by 10%. For
example, a 36% per annum charge is authorized by the UCCC on
the unpaid portion of a closed-end credit sale or supervised loan
that is $300 or less. Based on 12% increase of the Index this 36%
rate could, after the effective date of the adjustment, be applied
to $330 of the unpaid balance. Besides offsetting the effects of
inflation, this provision substantially reduces the likelihood that
creditors will have to seek legislative approval for rate increases
in times of rising interest rates. Legislators have traditionally
resisted requests for rate increases for political reasons, no matter
how justified the increases were.
(6) As a prerequisite for the issuance of a license to consumer
finance companies to make supervised or restricted loans at a rate
above 12% per annum,231 the SCCPC continues the convenience
and advantage test, which requires proof by the applicant that
226. 1968 UCCC §§ 2.605, 3.605; 1974 UCCC § 2.601(1). The 1968 UCCC contains
special rate provisions for transactions designated as "consumer related" credit sales and
loans. The principal application of these provisions was to certain noncovered transac-
tions, for instance, a transaction made by a nonprofessional creditor or to an organization
and secured by a security interest in a one- or two-family dwelling occupied by an individ-
ual who was a principal in the organization. 1968 UCCC §§ 2.602-.604, 3.602-.604. These
provisions were dropped from the 1974 UCCC. See Miller & Warren, supra note 5, at 626-
27. They were not included in either the 1974 or 1976 versions of the SCCPC.
227. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-605 (1976).
228. Id. §§ 37-3-601, -605 (Cur. Supp. 1977). See Part Ell; Part V, Chart B(8) and
(9) infra. But see Part 11, section B(3) infra for a discussion of the provisions in the SCCPC
authorizing the parties to a transaction other than a consumer credit sale or loan to agree
to be bound by the SCCPC.
229. See 1968 UCCC §§ 1.106, 2.201(7), .207(5), 3.508(6).
230. See id. § 1.106, Comment (case 2).
231. See note 218 supra.
1970]
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existing credit needs are not being met in a given area. The UCCC
eliminates the convenience and advantage criteria because it has
been used to artificially keep down the number of licensees mak-
ing high-interest consumer loans.
2
2
(7) A lender who is licensed to make supervised loans is not
allowed by the SCCPC to transact sales of goods in the same
building where the loans are being made.m This so-called "brick
wall" provision was rejected by the drafters of the UCCC, but has
been adopted by several UCCC states as a nonuniform provi-
sion.2s4 The motivation behind this provision is the fear that a
combined selling-lending operation gives retailers, particularly
large operations like Sears or J.C. Penney's, an unfair competi-
tive advantage over lenders who traditionally have been re-
stricted to operating a lending business in a licensed location.2
Sellers of goods can still obtain a license to make loans, but a
consumer who wants to obtain a loan under these conditions must
go to premises other than the licensee's retail operation to obtain
the loan.
The net effect of these differences is that a much less compre-
hensive unitary rate structure covers consumer credit transac-
tions in the SCCPC than in the UCCC. Additionally, SCCPC
competition, although based on the free-entry concept of the
UCCC, is not as fully operative as it is under the pure UCCC.
Despite differences between the two, however, the SCCPC does
implement the rationale of the UCCC of free competition and
reasonable rates, albeit in a most convoluted fashion, and compe-
tition among consumer creditors will increase as a result of its
enactment. 0
232. See note 218 and accompanying text supra. Even the pure UCCC does not
authorize sellers of goods and services to make loans at supervised lender rates unless they
have a supervised lender license or are otherwise qualified to make supervised loans. Thus,
the UCCC competition provisions do not really establish true "free entry," although they
do promote more competition than is possible under traditional licensing restrictions. See
Shay, The Impact of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Upon the Market for Consumer
Installment Credit, 33 LAw & CoNTrMP. PROB. 752, 763-64 (1968).
233. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-512 (Cum. Supp. 1977). This section applies to both
SCCPC supervised lenders and Act 988 consumer finance company licensees making
restricted loans under the SCCPC. See id. §§ 37-1-106, 37-3-500, -515(1) (Cum. Supp.
1977).
234. See, e.g., COLO. Ray. STAT. § 5-3-512 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1976); O1aA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14A, § 3-512 (1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70B-3-512 (Supp. 1977).
235. See Miller & Warren, supra note 5, at 641.
236. The SCCPC authorizes banks and other supervised financial lenders to make
personal and installment loans at rates above the 7% add-on rate (APR of 12.68% per year
on a 12-month contract) authorized by S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-13-120 (1976). These organiza-
[Vol. 29'778
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B. SCCPC Rate Ceilings
The SCCPC rate ceilings vary according to whether the
credit is extended by a seller or a lender and whether the transac-
tion is classified as closed-end or open-end. The distinguishing
feature between open and closed transactions is that open-end
credit is a continuing transaction, that is, a line of credit or re-
volving credit, whereas closed-end credit consists of a single
credit transaction. Regardless of whether the credit is an open or
closed sale or loan, all of the varying SCCPC rates, like those in
the UCCC, are calculated on the same actuarial basis. The rates
include all charges for the credit except those charges specifically
authorized to be excluded from the calculations. 5 The SCCPC
also regulates delinquency and deferral charges, prepayment re-
bates, refinancing and consolidation transaction charges, and
charges made by a creditor on behalf of a debtor for advances on
items like insurance."9
The SCCPC rate ceilings will be discussed in this section.
The mechanics of calculating these rates will be discussed in the
next section, and the remaining rate regulations will be dealt with
in section D. Finally, the SCCPC remedy and penalty provisions
will be discussed in section E.
1. Closed-End Transactions.-
(a) Consumer Credit Sales of Goods or Services Other Than
Motor Vehicles.-In a closed-end consumer credit sale of goods
or services covered by the SCCPC rate structure, other than one
involving motor vehicles, the seller can impose a credit service
charge that must not exceed the greater of either of the following:
(a) The total of (i) Thirty-six percent per year on that part
of the unpaid balances of the amount financed that is three
hundred dollars or less; (ii) Twenty-one percent per year on that
tions are automatically eligible to make high-rate SCCPC supervised loans, see Part II,
section B infra, at rates previously authorized only for consumer finance companies.
Banks especially can be expected to compete with consumer finance companies in this
high-rate market. See Shay, supra note 232, at 763-64.
237. The only regulation of rates and charges for consumer leases is contained in S.C.
CODE ANN. § 37-2-406 (Cum. Supp. 1977), which prevents the final payment for a con-
sumer lease from exceeding three times the average monthly payment. This provision
prevents large "balloon payments" at the end of the lease. The 1974 SCCPC limited the
final payment to no more than two times the monthly payment. Id. § 37-2-406 (1976). If
the "lease" is in reality a disguised consumer credit sale or consumer loan, then the
SCCPC rate ceilings apply. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
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part of the unpaid balances of the amount financed that is more
than three hundred dollars but does not exceed one thousand
dollars; and (iii) Fifteen percent per year on that part of the
unpaid balances of the amount financed that is more than one
thousand dollars; or
(b) Eighteen percent per year on the unpaid balances of
the amount financed.
240
In lieu of making a credit service charge, the seller can contract
to receive a minimum fee of $5 when the amount financed does
not exceed $75, and $7.50 when the amount financed exceeds
$75.21 The flat fee is used most often in very small transactions
with a short repayment period when the applicable flat fee yields
a return in excess of the 36% per year authorized for amounts
financed of $300 or less.
242
(b) Consumer Credit Sales of Motor Vehicles.-The
SCCPC contains a special rate section covering certain motor
vehicle sales243 that is not included in the UCCC. The section was
lifted verbatim from the South Carolina Vehicle Sales Finance
Act.24 It governs only installment sales of motor vehicles used
primarily on public highways and sold to individuals for personal,
household, or family use; for example, automobiles, motorcycles,
and trucks.2 45 Mobile homes purchased for personal, family, or
household purposes are governed by the rate ceilings for other
closed-end credit sales246 unless they are self-propelled. Credit
sales of mobile homes and motor vehicles for business use are free
from any rate limitation.2 4 The rates specified in this section are
as follows:
240. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-201(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The SCCPC prohibits the
splitting of a single transaction into two or more contracts in order to increase the yield.
For example, a creditor could not require a debtor to split a credit sale with an amount
financed of $600 for a color television set into two $300 contracts in order to charge 36%
on the full $600. The resulting excess amount of credit service charge is considered "excess
charges" under the SCCPC remedial provisions. Id. § 37-2-402 (1976).
241. Id. § 37-2-201(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
242. In addition, id. § 37-2-210(2) allows the creditor to retain all of this flat fee
charge in the event of prepayment. Rebates of unearned credit charges are due for precom-
puted transactions in which these flat fees are not made. See Part H, section D(3) infra.
243. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-211 (1976).
244. See id. § 56-17-20.
245. Id. § 37-2-211(1). While this section makes consumer credit sales of motor
vehicles subject to special rates, all other aspects of these sales, including the charges
that can be made in addition to the credit service charge, are covered by the remainder
of the SCCPC.
246. See id. § 37-2-201(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
247. Id. § 37-2-605 (1976). See notes 457-61, 474 and accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 29
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(1) New motor vehicles-$7 per $100 per year (12.68% per
annum for a 12-month contract);
(2) One-year old new or used motor vehicles-$8 per $100 per
year (14.45% per annum for a 12-month contract);
(3) Two-year old motor vehicles and new motor vehicles with
three or fewer wheels (for example, motorcycles)-$10 per $100
per year (17.97% per annum for a 12-month contract);
(4) Three-year old used motor vehicles-$15 per $100 per year
(26.63% per annum for a 12-month contract);
(5) All other used motor vehicles-$16 per $100 per year
(28.32% per annum for a 12-month contract).
248
Although the 1974 SCCPC specifically provided that this
rate structure was the only available one for motor vehicle sales
that fell within its coverage,249 this exclusivity provision was re-
pealed by the 1976 SCCPC. 20 While this action was probably the
result of legislative oversight,211 the existing legislative history
does not help to determine whether this is true.212 Consequently,
the South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs, which ad-
ministers the SCCPC, has issued an administrative interpreta-
tion2s3 holding that a seller has the option of either using this
special rate statute or the rate statute that governs other closed-
end credit sales. Whether the maximum rates authorized by this
section are higher or lower than those authorized for other closed-
end credit sales depends upon the age of the vehicle and the
amount financed. Based on the average price of motor vehicles,
the rate ceilings for new and one- or two-year old "previously
used" motor vehicles should be lower under this section than for
other closed-end credit sales. The rate ceilings authorized by this
248. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-211(2) (1976). All rates are based on 12-month contracts
and are calculated on the actuarial method required by the SCCPC and TIL.
249. See id. § 37-2-201(2)(c) (1976) (repealed 1976).
250. No. 686, 1976 S.C. Acts 1850.
251. The 1976 UCCC Study Committee Report contained provisions that would have
repealed S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-211, -201(2)(c) (1976) on the basis that motor vehicle
sales should be covered by the regular SCCPC rate structure. CoMMrrrEE REPORT §§ 57-
58, supra note 162, at 69.
During the debate on S. 119, which became Act 686 of 1976,. § 2.211 was successfully
restored to the Bill, primarily at the insistence of used car dealers. No. 686, 1976 S.C. Acts
1792. See INTEGRATED CODE, supra note 3, § 37-2-211, at Comment 1. Section 2.201(2)(c)
was not reinstated, however, leaving open the argument that § 2.211 is not the exclusive
rate section for motor vehicles.
252. The absence of any record of the legislative debate on this point makes it impos-
sible to prove that the Legislature did not intend to give automobile dealers a choice
between the two rate sections. See note 102 supra.
253. Ad. Interpretation No. 2.211-7801, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1978).
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section for older used cars, however, might be higher on the aver-
age than for other SCCPC closed-end sales transactions. A seller
of motor vehicles who grants credit in a consumer credit sale
governed by the SCCPC at rates in excess of this special rate
statute for motor vehicles runs the risk of having to repay the
excess in the event this administrative interpretation is success-
fully challenged in a court action.2s4
Litigation on this issue will not occur, however, if the rates
imposed for new cars do not exceed 12.68% per annum for a 12-
month loan and if used car rates do not exceed 14.45% per annum
for a 12-month loan since rates to these levels are clearly autho-
rized under either statute.2ss
(c) Consumer Loans.-Two sets of rate ceilings are estab-
lished for closed-end consumer loans. One is applicable to super-
vised loans,2se which are defined as loans above 12% per year
made by supervised lenders.257 The other is for nonsupervised
loans. 15 Supervised lenders are financial institutions such as
banks and savings and loan associations that are authorized to
receive deposits and to make loans and other persons who are
specially licensed to make supervised loans under the SCCPC.19
These other licensees are mainly consumer finance companies.
260
The rate ceilings for closed-end supervised loans are the same
as for closed-end credit sales other than motor vehicles, that is:
the greater of (1) 18% per year on the unpaid balance of the
principal, or (2) the total of (a) 36% per year on the unpaid
balance of the principal that is $300 or less, (b) 21% per year on
the unpaid balance of the principal that is over $300 but is less
than $1,000, and (c) 15% per year on the unpaid balance of the
principal that is more than $1,000.21 The rate ceiling for nonsu-
pervised closed-end loans is 12% per annum.
22
254. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-6-104(4), -506(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See notes
429-30 and accompanying text infra for further explanation of these provisions.
255. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-211 (1976).
256. Id. § 37-3-508 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
257. Id. § 37-3-501(l)-(2).
258. Id. § 37-3-201.
259. Id. §§ 37-1-301(17), 37-3-501 to -502.
260. See Part I, section C(9) supra; Part II, section B(2) infra. Insurance premium
service companies also qualify as supervised lenders. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-301(17).
261. Id. § 37-3-508(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See note 240 and accompanying text supra.
As is the case with consumer credit sales the SCCPC prohibits the use of split loans in a
single credit transaction as a device to increase the overall yield on the loan. S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 37-3-409 (1976), -509 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
262. Id. § 37-3-201(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The UCCC has an 18% per year limit for
nonsupervised loans. 1968 UCCC § 3.201. One reason the SCCPC contains a lower rate
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The SCCPC special rate structure for motor vehicles, dis-
cussed above, only covers credit sales; therefore, a loan to pur-
chase a motor vehicle for personal, family, or household purposes
is governed exclusively by the standard closed-end loan rate ceil-
ings.21 3 Additionally, unlike the practice in closed-end credit
sales, no minimum fee in lieu of the authorized credit charges is
permitted in any closed-end consumer transaction.",
2. Open-End Transactions.-The SCCPC, like the UCCC,
has different rate maximums for open-end credit sales and
loans.25 Open-end credit sales are primarily266 made pursuant to
a credit card issued by the seller for the purpose of purchasing or
leasing goods and services from the issuer or a subsidiary or fran-
chisee of the issuer. Open-end consumer loans are most often
than the UCCC is that S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-3-601, -605 (Cum. Supp. 1977) allow the
parties to a transaction other than a consumer loan to agree to be bound by the SCCPC,
in which case the SCCPC rate ceiling for nonsupervised loans applies. See Part 1I, section
B(3) infra. The UCCC 18% rate was thought to be too high a rate in comparison to the
normal maximum contract rate of 8% in South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-30 (Cum.
Supp. 1977), to be salable to the Legislature. The 12% figure represented an acceptable
compromise.
263. See notes 241-42 and accompanying text supra. Pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. §
37-3-210(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977), however, a lender can contract for a minimum fee not
exceeding $5.00, if the loan is $75.00 or less, or not more than $7.50, if the loan exceeds
$75.00. In the event of early prepayment, the lender can retain the excess of the fee over
the amount of loan finance charge actually earned on the transaction. Therefore, the
actual difference between consumer credit sales and consumer loans on this point is less
than it may appear to be.
264. See Part II, section B(1) supra.
265. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-207 (1976) (credit sales), 37-3-201,-515 (Cum.
Supp. 1977) (revolving loans) with 1968 UCCC §§ 2.207, 3.201, .508; 1974 UCCC §§ 2.202,
.401. The UCCC rates for open-end credit are higher than the SCCPC rates. For credit
sales, the UCCC authorizes 2% per month on the first $500 and 11/2% per month on all
amounts above $500, versus the SCCPC authorized rates of 112% on amounts up to
$1,000 and 1% per month above $1,000. For revolving loans the UCCC authorizes the same
rate structure as applied to closed-end transactions, 18% for nonsupervised loans and
36%:21%:15% or 18% for supervised loans, versus the SCCPC rates of 12% for nonsuper-
vised revolving loans and a maximum of 18% for supervised revolving loans under the
SCCPC. The SCCPC rates are basically in line with similar rates in other states. The
drafters of the UCCC concluded that their higher rates were justified to allow the creditor
to make a reasonable profit on revolving credit. See 1974 UCCC, PREFATORY NOTE, at xix-
xxi. See also note 273 infra.
266. The rates for open-end consumer credit sales are applicable to any consumer
credit sale made "pursuant to a revolving charge account . . ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-
207(1) (1976). It is possible to have a revolving charge account without the use of a credit
card. The definition of "seller credit card" in the SCCPC is not restricted to credit cards,
but includes any "arrangement pursuant to which a person gives to a buyer or lessee the
privilege of using a credit card, letter of credit, or other credit confirmation or
identification primarily for the purpose of purchasing or leasing goods or services from that
person. . . ." Id. § 37-1-301(16) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
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made with a lender-issued credit card, but other arrangements
are possible."8 7 The SCCPC differentiates between sales and loans
by means of the mutually exclusive terms "seller credit card" '
and "lender credit card or similar arrangement.""2 9 Typical exam-
ples of seller credit cards are department store and gasoline credit
cards. A card can be used for credit purchases at other establish-
ments and still be a seller credit card so long as the purpose of
the card is to purchase or lease goods or services from the issuer
or one of its affiliates. Bank credit cards, such as Master Charge
and Visa (Bank Americard), and travel and entertainment
cards,20 such as American Express or Diner's Club, are typical
examples of lender credit cards. A bank overdraft loan plan is the
most common type of a "similar arrangement." A letter of credit
agreement for a bank customer with third parties and the pur-
chase by a bank of the accounts receivable from, for example, a
doctor, would also be an arrangement similar to a lender credit
card, assuming that the underlying transaction is a consumer
credit transaction covered by the SCCPC.271
(a) Consumer Credit Sales Pursuant to a Seller Credit Card
267. Like the rates on open-end consumer credit sales, the SCCPC rates for open-end
consumer loans, other than supervised loans, are applicable to any consumer loan "made
pursuant to a revolving loan account." Id. § 37-3-201(4). See also id. § 37-3-515(1) (estab-
lishes an 18% per annum maximum for supervised loans, those at rates over 12% per
annum, made "pursuant to a lender credit card or similar arrangement.") It is possible
to have a revolving loan account without the use of a lender credit card. An example is a
note authorizing an open-end line of credit with a bank. In addition, the definition of
lender credit card clearly contemplates non-credit card transactions. The term " 'lender
credit card or similar arrangement' means an arrangement or loan agreement, other than
a seller credit card, pursuant to which a lender gives a debtor the privilege of using a credit
card, letter of credit, or other credit confirmation or identification in transactions out of
which debt arises. . . ." Id. § 37-1-301(9) (emphasis added). This definition harmonizes
the difference in language used in the two SCCPC sections that establish rates for open-
end loans.
268. Id. § 37-1-301(16) (1976).
269. Id. § 37-1-301(9) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The definition of a "lender credit card or
similar arrangement" specifically excludes a transaction pursuant to a "seller credit
card."
270. In the 1974 UCCC, travel and entertainment cards are treated as seller credit
cards. 1974 UCCC § 1.301(39)(b). The SCCPC utilizes the approach taken in the 1968
UCCC, however, classifying these cards as lender credit cards.
271. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-301(9) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The growth in the number
of bank credit cards during the past decade has been phenomenal. At the end of the first
quarter of 1977, an estimated 75 million cards were issued with more than $11 billion of
outstanding credit. In South Carolina approximately 595,000 Visa (Bank Americard) and
Master Charge cards were outstanding with $76 million in credit extended as of the end
of 1976. F. Ingram & 0. Pugh, Financial Services: Household Attitudes and Practices -
A Consumer, Panel Approach 47-50 (1977).
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or Revolving Charge Account.-The maximum permissible rate
for consumer credit sales executed pursuant to a revolving charge
account is 18% per year on unpaid balances that are $1,000 or less
and 12% per year on the unpaid balances that are over $1,000.
2
These maximums apply to all consumer credit sales made with
the use of a seller credit card governed by the SCCPC rate struc-
ture, and to all other credit sales made pursuant to a revolving
charge account with a credit seller of goods and services.23
(b) Loans Pursuant to a Lender Credit Card or Similar
Arrangement.- As is true with closed-end transactions, the rate
ceilings for lender credit card loans differ depending on whether
the lender is qualified to make supervised loans. If the lender is
so qualified, 27' then the permissible rate is 18% per year on the
unpaid balance.N5 In all other cases, the maximum rate is 12% per
272. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-207 (1976).
273. Id. § 37-1-301(16). See note 266 supra. This rate provision, which was adopted
as part of the 1974 SCCPC, was the subject of considerable controversy. In 1968 the South
Carolina Legislature passed legislation that authorized banks and other lending institu-
tions to charge up to 11/2% per month or 18% per year on revolving credit plans. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 34-13-120 (1976). Retail merchants were not included in this authorization,
although they had for many years charged approximately 1V2% per month for revolving
credit. The assumption was that credit charges by sellers of goods and services were
exempt from any rate maximums under the time-price doctrine. See, e.g., Brown v.
Crandall, 218 S.C. 124, 61 S.E.2d 761 (1950). In the late 1960's and early 1970's a few state
supreme courts, however, held that these merchant revolving charge accounts were in
reality "loans" subject to the state's usury statutes and, that, therefore, the time-price
doctrine did not apply. See, e.g., State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wisc.2d 125, 179 N.W.2d
641 (1970); Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 682 (1972). An attempt to clarify this issue in South
Carolina by special legislation, similar to that enacted for banks, was attacked by many
legislators as an attempt to circumvent the usury laws. The amount of the rate was also
controversial. Several proposed amendments were made to lower it. 1974 S.C. Housa J.
1377-79, 1539-44, 1568-70, 1881-90. The 1974 SCCPC was attached as an amendment to
this special item of proposed legislation during the final debate in the Senate. See note 1
supra; 1974 S.C. SEN. J. 1877.
Studies have shown that retailers actually lose money when charging 11/2% per
month or 18% per year authorized by the SCCPC and by the statutes of most states. See,
e.g., CONsuMER FINANcE REPORT, supra note 5, at 107. The most recent survey confirming
these losses (3.71% of sales) was made in 1972 involving 17 retail stores of all kinds in New
York State. One reason for the losses is the high percentage of persons who either did not
make any charges or used revolving credit, but paid off the balance before any finance
charge was imposed. The retailers, however, also lost money when a finance charge was
made and collected. See R. SHAY & W. DUNKELBERG, RnrAM STOR CRaorr CARD UsE IN
Naw YORK 9, 11, 72-73 (1975). The 1968 and 1974 UCCC authorize 2% per month or 24%
per year on the first $500, and 11/2 % per month or 18% per year on all amounts over $500.
See note 263 supra. See also Part II, section C infra for a discussion of the various methods
of calculating the rate in open-end loan accounts.
274. See notes 257, 259-60 and accompanying text supra.
275. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-515 (Cur. Supp. 1977). Because banks are automatically
eligible to make SCCPC supervised loans and were already authorized to make open-end
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year on the unpaid balance of the principal. 271
3. Nonconsumer Credit Transactions Made Subject to the
SCCPC by Mutual Agreement. -Parties involved in a sale or loan
other than a consumer credit sale or loan may agree in writing
that the transaction in question will be subject to the SCCPC. 27
If the parties enter into such an agreement, then the rate ceilings
and other provisions of the SCCPC apply to the transaction, with
the exception that any such loans are subject to the 12% per
annum ceiling for nonsupervised loans and are not eligible for the
higher rates available for supervised loans. A loan (but not a sale)
primarily secured by a first lien that is a purchase money security
interest in land is specifically excluded from being subject to
these agreements.27
The idea behind these provisions is that as a result of the
agreement the debtor receives greater protection of his rights
under the SCCPC than he .can under the non-SCCPC law ordi-
narily applicable to the transaction. This benefit is considered to
be a sufficient setoff for the higher credit charges authorized by
the SCCPC. The requirement that the agreement be in writing
and signed by both parties also provides reasonable protection
against any overreaching by a creditor or misunderstanding by
the debtor.279
While the rationale behind these provisions is clear, the ac-
tual scope of their application is not easily delineated. The provi-
sions apply to sales and loans "other than" consumer credit sales
or loans. This language could mean that the agreement may be
credit at an 18% rate by § 34-13-120 (1976), this provision actually only authorizes them
to charge what they had authority to charge for credit prior to the 1976 SCCPC Amend-
ments. Section 34-13-120 is still available to banks and other lending institutions for non-
SCCPC transactions. See notes 516-21 and accompanying text infra.
276. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-201 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
277. Id. §§ 37-2-601 (1976), 37-3-601 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
278. Id. See Part I, section B(4)(d) supra for a detailed discussion of the exclusion of
this type of real estate transactions from the SCCPC. Credit sales, as opposed to loans,
primarily secured by a first lien that is a purchase money security interest in land, are
not excluded from the category of transactions eligible for agreement. Real estate credit
sales have always been exempt from any rate limitation under the time-price doctrine and,
therefore, any agreement to make a particular transaction subject to the SCCPC rates is
imposing a legal restraint on a creditor that did not previously exist. See, e.g., Wheeler v.
Marchbanks, 32 S.C. 594, 10 S.E. 1011 (1890). Loans secured by real estate mortgages,
however, have traditionally been subject to strict rate limits. See Part III, section B(2)(a)
infra.
279. See 1968 UCCC § 2.601, Comment. The precise kind of writing required is not
specified, but a creditor should have the debtor sign a separate form in which he agrees
that the SCCPC will apply to the transaction.
[Vol. 29
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made in any transaction that is not a consumer credit sale or
consumer loan because the transaction does not fit the definition
of a consumer credit sale or consumer loan, or is specifically ex-
cluded from the SCCPC, or both. Alternatively, it could mean
that only transactions outside the definition of a consumer credit
sale or loan could be made subject to the SCCPC, but transac-
tions specifically excluded from the SCCPC could not be the
subject of such agreements. 8 '
The difference between these two interpretations may have
important practical implications. If the second, narrower inter-
pretation is correct, then the only types of transactions that could
be subject to an agreement to be bound by the SCCPC are credit
sale or loan transactions made by a nonprofessional creditor, or
made for a business purpose, or made to an organization, or credit
sales secured by real estate mortgages, regardless of the amount,
or non-real estate credit sales or loans in excess of $25 ,000.211
280. The first alternative is based on the assumption that these provisions were
meant to apply to any transaction whose rates and charges were not otherwise governed
by the SCCPC. It in effect reads the "other than" language to mean "other than" a
transaction whose rates and charges are covered by the SCCPC. The language in S.C.
CODE ANN. § 37-3-601 (Cum. Supp. 1977) excluding loans primarily secured by a first lien
that is a purchase money security interest in land from eligibility for an agreement sup-
ports this position. Since these transactions are already definitionally excluded from the
coverage sections, the inclusion of this language in § 37-3-601 is unnecessary unless the
drafters felt that the first alternative was the correct one. In addition, the differences
between the types of transactions excluded from the SCCPC coverage definitions and
those specifically excluded by statute are based on convenience more than necessity. The
real estate exemption, see Part I, section B(4)(d) supra, is an example of one item that
technically belongs in the exclusion section, if exclusions are defined as transactions that
would be consumer credit transactions under the coverage definitions except for the statu-
tory exception.
The second alternative is based on the assumption that the Legislature could have
easily extended the benefit of these transactions to definitionally excluded transactions
as well as specific statutory exclusions, if they had wished to. The absence of this authori-
zation justifies a narrow interpretation of the terms consumer credit sale and consumer
loan.
Unfortunately no written legislative history exists that can shed light on which inter-
pretation was intended. The language used in these provisions comes from the equivalent
sections of the 1968 UCCC. The official comments to § § 2.601 and 3.601 of the 1968 UCCC
do not touch on this problem. 1968 UCCC § 2.601, Comment; id. § 3.601, Comment. The
1974 UCCC utilizes almost the same language in its "agreement by the parties" section,
which covers sales and loans. 1974 UCCC § 2.601. The examples used in the official
comment are illustrations of transactions that are excluded definitionally from the UCCC.
Id., Comment. Nothing in this comment, howgver, indicates that the list of illustrations
is intended to be exclusive or exhaustive. In addition, fewer definitional and specific
exclusions appear in the 1968 and 1974 UCCC than in the SCCPC, so the practical
importance of a narrow interpretation of the "other than a consumer credit sale or loan"
language is much less critical in a pure UCCC state than in South Carolina.
281. See Part I, section B(5) supra. See also note 278 supra.
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Under this interpretation, credit transactions whose rates and
charges are specifically excluded from the SCCPCs2 would not be
eligible for these agreements. If the alternative interpretation is
adopted, however, then those credit transactions specifically ex-
cluded from the SCCPC could also be eligible to be fully subject
to the SCCPC by agreement. The four types of transactions most
likely affected by this difference in interpretation are insurance
premium service company loans, agricultural credit, government
supported educational loans to students, and credit union loans.
In many of these transactions, the non-SCCPC rates will be as
high or higher than the permissible SCCPC rate ceilings; but
there undoubtedly will be cases in which the SCCPC rate will be
higher or for some other reason the parties will want the SCCPC
to apply.23 Nevertheless, until this matter can be cleared up by
regulation, legislation, or litigation, creditors would be well ad-
vised to take the second, narrower position in cases affected by
the dichotomy between the two interpretations of the language in
question.
C. Calculating the Credit Service Charge
and the Loan Finance Charge
The SCCPC rate ceilings described in the preceding section
282. See Part I, section C supra.
283. Under S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-13-120 (1976), banks and other lending institutions
are authorized to make installment loans at a 7% add-on rate which translates into an
actuarial rate of up to 12.68% per year on a 12-month contract. This is higher than the
12% per year authorized under § 3.601 of the SCCPC. Id. § 37-3-601 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Credit unions were already authorized to make loans at 12% per year. Id. § 34-27-70 (1976)
(state-chartered credit unions); 12 U.S.C. § 1757(b) (1977) (federal credit unions). Non-
SCCPC credit sales are exempt from any rate regulation under the SCCPC. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 37-2-605 (1976). Therefore, as a practical matter, the only types of credit that
might be affected by this difference in interpretation are loans by insurance premium
service companies and single payment agricultural and educational loans. But see id. §
38-27-90(b) (1976), which states: "[a] premium service company shall not charge, con-
tract for, receive, or collect a service charge other than as permitted by this chapter." The
rate ceiling established by this section is three-fourths of 1% per month-or 9% per year
plus a $10 nonrefundable fee. Id. § 38-27-90(d) to (e) (1976). An argument for authorizing
insurance premium service companies to take advantage of the agreement process under
§ 37.3.601 (Cum. Supp. 1977) is that the SCCPC was enacted after the Insurance Prem-
ium Service Company Act, and the normal rule in South Carolina is that the last legisla-
tive expression on a particular subject controls and impliedly repeals any prior inconsist-
ent statute even though no specific repeal or reference is made of the prior statute. See,
e.g., Garey v. City of Myrtle Beach, 263 S.C. 247, 209 S.E.2d 893 (1974); Independence
Ins. Co. v. Independent Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 218 S.C. 22, 61 S.E.2d 399 (1950); South
Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 215 S.C. 193, 54 S.E.2d
777 (1949).
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may appear to be quite high. Closer study, however, reveals that
these ceilings are similar to existing South Carolina rates in many
consumer credit installment transactions, and, in some cases, the
maximum rates allowed by the SCCPC will be lower than those
legally permitted in transactions whose rates are not governed by
the SCCPC.2' The effective rates are lower because charges that
can be tacked onto the maximum permitted rates are few in
number and highly regulated. In addition, the SCCPC's maxi-
mum rates are defined by concepts much more inclusive than the
ones they replaced, the concepts of time-price differential 5 and
interest.25
Three steps are involved in calculating SCCPC rates. The
first is the determination of the amount of credit to be extended.
The second is the determination of the applicable rate. The third
is the application of the rate to the amount of credit on an ac-
tuarial basis.
1. Determination of the Amount of Credit.-The starting
point in calculating the actual rate for an SCCPC transaction is
the determination of the "amount financed ' ' 7 for a consumer
credit sale and the "principal"s for a consumer loan. The
amount financed and the loan principal are the base amounts
upon which the rate to be charged is applied. Essentially, both
terms define what in laymen's language is referred to as the ac-
tual amount of credit extended, however, the terminology is
slightly different because of the peculiarities of the definitions of
credit sale and loan.219 In a consumer credit sale, the amount
284. See Parts 11 and V infra. The most prominent example of permissible rates
under the SCCPC being lower than non-SCCPC rates governing the same type of con-
sumer credit transaction is the rate structure for consumer finance companies licensed
under Act 988 of 1966. See Part I, section C(9); Part MI, section B(2)(b)(ii) infra.
285. The difference between the cash price and credit price of goods and services sold
on credit has traditionally been characterized as the "time-price differential." This is to
distinguish it from the "interest" charged for a loan. Interest is subject to usury statutes,
but the time-price differential has traditionally been considered as exempt from such
statutes. This is the foundation for the doctrine that credit sales are not subject to usury
limitations. See, e.g., Brown v. Crandall, 218 S.C. 124, 61 S.E.2d 761 (1950). See Part II,
section A infra.
286. The term "interest" is not defined by any South Carolina statute. See Part I,
section C(1) infra.
287. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-111 (1976).
288. Id. § 37-3-107(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
289. The SCCPC definitions of "amount financed" and "loan principal" are harmo-
nious with the term "amount financed," the equivalent TIL term. See Regulation Z, 12
C.F.R. §§ 226.2(d), .4(d), .8(c)(7), (d)(1). The 1974 UCCC combines these concepts into
a single definition designated "amount financed." 1974 UCCC § 1.301(5). This amalgama-
tion is part of the merging of Article 2 (sales) and Article 3 (loans) in the 1974 UCCC,
1979]
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financed is the cash price less any down payment plus any
amount required to discharge a prior lien on any traded-in prop-
erty. Added onto the cash price are amounts the seller is to pay,
which are not included in the cash price but are being financed
as part of the transaction, 9 ' for example, registration, certificate
of title or license fees, and additional charges specifically autho-
rized by the SCCPC.211 The principal of a consumer loan whose
rates are governed by the SCCPC is the net amount paid to or
on behalf of the debtor plus amounts paid by the lender on behalf
of the debtor for registration, certificate of title or license fees,
and any additional charges specifically authorized by the
SCCPC, to the extent that these charges and fees are being fi-
nanced by the lender as part of the transaction.29 2 Advance pay-
justified by the similarities between the two types of credit, and because merger makes
the entire code easier to work with and more harmonious with TIL. While the SCCPC
incorporates many of the concepts in the working and final drafts of the 1974 UCCC, the
dichotomy between Articles 2 and 3 in the 1968 UCCC was utilized by the South Carolina
Legislature in 1974 and 1976.
290. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-111 (1976). See Part II, section D(1) infra.
291. If the debtor pays these costs directly or gives a check or cash to the seller to
pay them, then they are not included in the amount financed. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-
111(3)(c) (1976) specifically authorizes sales, use, excise or documentary stamp taxes to
be included in the amount financed if paid by the seller. Since these taxes are authorized
additional charges under § 37-2-202(1)(a), however, this particular subsection is unneces-
sary. See Part II, section D(1) infra for further discussion of these charges.
292. As in the case of cash sales, if the debtor pays for additional items with cash or
a check, the amounts paid for are not part of the loan principal. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-
107(3)(b) (1976) states that the principal includes "any discount excluded from the loan
finance charge" by § 37-3-109(2) (1976). These two sections mean that the principal of a
consumer credit loan made pursuant to a lender credit card arrangement includes the full
dollar amount of the charge even though the lender actually pays the seller on a dis-
counted basis. For example, in a transaction involving a $100 charge for purchase of goods
from a retailer on a bank credit card, the bank will pay the retailer $95, assuming that
under the terms of the contract between the bank and the retailer the bank agrees to
purchase the retailer's accounts receivable for 95% of their face value. The amount fi-
nanced is $100 and not $95. The basis for this result is that (1) the card holder presumably
would have paid $100 for the item if he had paid cash, and (2) the contractual arrangement
between the bank and the retailer is independent of the sale between the cardholder and
the retailer. The merchant discount is also excluded from the credit service charge and
loan finance charge. One authority estimates that as much as 23% of all profit from bank
credit cards and similar arrangements comes from these merchant discounts, which range
from 2% to 8% depending on the credit standing of the merchant. Upshaw, Banking in
the Consumer Protection Age, 5 U.C.C.L.J. 232, 274 (1973). This problem does not arise
in a two-party transaction made with a seller credit card.
The discount charged by lenders to merchants for what is actually the purchase of
their accounts receivable needs to be distinguished from two other types of discounts. One
is a cash discount given by merchants to customers who paid cash instead of using a credit
card. Pursuant to the TIL amendments adopted in 1976, any discount of this type that
does not exceed 5% of the price will not be considered part of the finance charge for TIL
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ment of any finance charge, prepaid interest, or the amount of
any required compensating balance the debtor must maintain are
examples of items that are deducted from the gross amount of the
loan to determine the net amount of principal because these mon-
ies are not actually available for use by the debtor.
93
2. Determination of the Applicable Rate. -The next step is
the calculation of the "credit service charge '294 for a consumer
credit sale and the "loan finance charge '295 for a consumer loan
whose rates are covered by the SCCPC. As is explained more fully
below, the amount of the credit service charge is applied to the
amount financed to determine the actual SCCPC rate for a con-
sumer credit sale and the loan finance charge is applied to the
principal for the actual rate for an SCCPC consumer loan.9 6
A clear comprehension of the terms credit service charge and
loan finance charge is critical. The following example illustrates
this point. Assume that a debtor borrows $100 for 12 months, and,
under the applicable rate statute, the lender is allowed to charge
disclosure purposes or state law usury statutes. The discount must also be offered to all
prospective buyers; and this fact must be conspicuously disclosed. TIL §§ 167(b), 171(c),
15 U.S.C. § 1666(0, (1) (Supp. 1977); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(i) (1977). This
discount is, under these provisions, excluded from the credit service or loan finance charge
under the SCCPC. A cash discount in excess of 5% or a premium charged for use of a credit
card, however, is part of the finance charge under TIL and the SCCPC. Premiums or extra
charges for use of credit cards are specifically prohibited by TIL § 167(2), 15 U.S.C. §
1666(f) (Supp. 1977). See Landers, supra note 89, at 69-70; cf. FRB Official Staff Interpre-
tation No. FC-0139, 43 C.F.R. 3898 (1978) (the TIL preemption of state usury laws for
the purpose of this cash discount extends to consumer and business credit obtained with
credit cards). The 5% cash discount is apparently not being utilized as widely as its
proponents expected. See Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1977, at 1, col. 6. A third type of discount
is one given by a merchant for early payment, for example, a 2% discount for payment in
10 days. This type of discount is clearly a credit service charge. It is also part of the finance
charge for TIL disclosure purposes. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(o) (1977).
293. This is a codification of a well-established common-law rule that, for usury
purposes, calculates the effective interest rate by applying the total amount of interest
collected to the amount of money actually subject to the control and use of the borrower.
See, e.g., Tri-County Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lyle, 280 Md. 69, 371 A.2d 424 (1977);
Capparert v. Bierman, 339 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1976). Cf. Grundel v. Bank of Craig, 515
S.W.2d 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (interest on loan used to purchase a $5,000 interest free
certificate of deposit added to interest on revolving loan on grounds that the certificate of
deposit was a prerequisite to an additional line of credit under the revolving loan agree-
ment). See also note 617 and accompanying text infra. These problems do not arise in
credit sales.
294. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-109 (1976).
295. Id. § 37-3-109 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
296. See notes 317-22 and accompanying text infra. The calculations involved are
essentially the same as those involved in calculating the annual percentage rate under
TIL.
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at the rate of $8 per annum per $100 of principal.297 In addition
to this $8, an additional $4 charge is made by the lender for some
legitimate purpose. If the additional charge must be included in
the loan finance charge, then the total loan finance charge is $12
and the rate of the loan finance charge is 21.46% per year, as
calculated on the actuarial method. If the $4 charge can be ex-
cluded from the loan finance charge and consequently included
in the principal as a permissible additional charge, however, then
the amount financed is $104, the finance charge is $8, and the rate
of the loan finance charge is 13.91% per year. Of course, as the
amount of credit rises, the difference between including or ex-
cluding a small charge in the loan finance charge is less drastic
than in the above illustration. For example, if the loan had been
for $1,000 rather than $100, and the lender charged $8 per $100
plus the $4 charge, the inclusion of the $4 in the loan finance
charge results in a rate of 15.16% per year. Although less dra-
matic, the difference is still significant. In a borderline case, a
creditor should include a charge in the credit service charge or
loan finance charge. The SCCPC remedies for excess charges can
be triggered when a creditor mistakenly excludes an item from
the credit service charge or the loan finance charge with the result
that the correct calculation required by the SCCPC shows that
the rate charged exceeds the applicable SCCPC rate ceiling.'"
Courts have always strictly enforced statutes regulating credit
rates and unless a mistake is solely attributable to a clerical
computational error, courts have held creditors to be in violation
of a rate statute even though the charge in question amounted to
a dollar or less and the creditor was acting in good faith.
2
11
The credit service and loan finance charges include all
297. This is the typical way add-on rates are expressed. Under the SCCPC, this is
the applicable maximum rate that could be charged for a one-year old motor vehicle
bought for personal, family, or household purposes. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-211(2)(b)
(1976).
298. See Part II, section E infra.
299. See note 429 infra. The SCCPC, like the UCCC and TIL, relieves a creditor from
any liability for violations of the rate and charge provisions "if the creditor shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a
bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedure reasonably adapted to
avoid the error." S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-5-202(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (general penalty
section), 37.5.203(1) (1976) (disclosure violations). The cases interpreting similar lan-
guage have all involved TIL. These decisions have consistently construed the similar TIL
provisions to exculpate a creditor from liability only in those rare cases in which a simple
clerical mathematical error has occurred. See, e.g., Foundation Plan, Inc. v. Breaux, 345
So. 2d 955 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 29
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charges imposed by the creditor with the exception of charges
specifically excluded or authorized by statute. The loan finance
charge for consumer loans is defined as
the sum of (a) all charges payable directly or indirectly by the
debtor and imposed directly or indirectly by the lender as an
incident to the extension of credit, including any of the following
types of charges which are applicable: interest or any amount
payable under a point, discount, or other system of charges,
however denominated, premium or other charge for any guaran-
tee or insurance protecting the lender against the debtor's de-
fault or other credit loss; and (b) charges incurred for investigat-
ing the collateral or credit-worthiness of the debtor or for com-
missions or brokerage for obtaining the credit, irrespective of the
person to whom the charges are paid or payable, unless the
lender had no notice of the charges when the loan was made.
The term does not include charges as a result of default, addi-
tional charges [§ 37-3-202], delinquency charges [§ 37-3-203],
or deferral charges [§ 37-3-204].11
The definition for credit service charge is substantially the same
as that for loan finance charge."'
The SCCPC concepts of credit service and loan finance
charge are identical to those same terms as used in the 1968
UCCC, and, with minor exceptions, are the same as the term
"finance charge" used in TIL.302 Under all three statutes the es-
sential test for determining whether a particular charge is in-
cluded or excluded is the "but for" test.33 Unless a specific stat-
ute exists to the contrary and if the particular charge is not im-
posed on a cash customer, then the charge in question is part of
the credit service or loan finance charge because the charge would
not have been imposed "but for" the extension of credit. The
credit service and loan finance charge concepts are much more
inclusive than the traditional concepts of interest and time-price
differential. As a result, the SCCPC definitions of credit service
and loan finance charges include many types of charges and fees,
generally covering any charge or fee imposed on the debtor by the
creditor, whether the charge is retained by the creditor or is paid
by the creditor to third parties performing services for the trans-
300. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-109 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
301. Id. § 37-2-109 (1976).
302. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1976). See also Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4 (1977); note
306 infra.
303. See Landers, Determining the Finance Charge Under the Truth in Lending Act,
1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 45, 57-58.
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action."' Some specific examples are origination, commitment,
and stand-by fees," 5 appraisals, credit investigation charges,0 ,
brokerage fees (unless the creditor has no knowledge of the bro-
kerage fee), discount points taken with real estate mortgages,"'7
and charges for insurance (unless specifically authorized as
"additional charges"). The initial fees traditionally charged with
small loans and some types of retail installment purchases are
also considered in the calculation of the charge.
Pre-SCCPC South Carolina cases had treated some "extra
charges" in loans as interest, except when disallowed by stat-
ute."' In credit sales these charges, if properly disguised as part
of the time-price differential, had been thought to be permissible
without limitation under the well-established time-price doc-
trine, which exempts all charges made in a credit sale from the
usury laws.3"9 From a technical standpoint, therefore, the
304. Charges kept by the creditor have a greater risk of being found to be part of the
credit service or loan finance charge than do reasonable charges that are paid to third
parties for services rendered. See Part III, section C(2) infra. Retained charges are often a
means by which a creditor is trying to indirectly cover overhead expenses, thereby increas-
ing the actual yield on the transaction.
If a particular charge is included in the credit service or loan finance charge, it can
be amortized over the life of the obligation for rate determination and disclosure purposes
under the SCCPC and TIL. To the extent that obligations are prepaid, however, the actual
yield to the creditor is higher than the disclosed rate because the creditor has already
collected many of these front-end charges in full and has no obligation to return them.
This increase in actual yield has its greatest impact in real estate mortgages in which,
although the average maturity is 20 to 30 years, the average life in only 8 to 12 years. See
Landers, supra note 303, at 66.
305. See Ad. Interpretation No. 1.202(7)-7602, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1976) (hold-
ing that an origination fee is part of the credit service or loan finance charge and consti-
tutes an excess charge if made in addition to the maximum authorized rate for a transac-
tion).
306. TIL excludes from the finance charge appraisal fees and credit report fees in-
curred in real estate transactions. These exclusions, which clearly violate the "but for"
test, were purposely not included in the UCCC or the SCCPC. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§
37-2-109 (1976), 37-3-109 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Compare id. §§ 37-2-202(1)(d), 37-3-
202(I)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1977), 15 U.S.C. § 1605(e)(5)-(6) (1976) with TIL § 106(e), Regula-
tion Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(e) (1977).
307. The language in the definitions of credit service and loan finance charges is
broad enough to cover points paid by either the buyer or the seller. Since any points
imposed on the seller as a condition of a loan to the purchaser are going to be recovered
by the seller from the purchaser through a higher purchase price, they are indirectly
payable by the debtor and indirectly imposed by the creditor "as an incident to the
extension of credit." The SCCPC requirements for inclusion in the credit service and loan
finance charges are, therefore, met. S.C. CODj ANN. §§ 37-2-109 (1976), 37-3-109 (Cum.
Supp. 1977). The inclusion of seller points under TIL is not as clear cut. See Regulation
Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.406 (1977); Landers, supra note 303, at 66-68.
308. See Part I, section C(2) infra.
309. See, e.g., Brown v. Crandall, 218 S.C. 124, 61 S.E.2d 761 (1950). See also note
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SCCPC's rate structure will have its greatest impact in South
Carolina on calculation of rates on consumer credit sales that
previously had not been subject to rate limits, with the exception
of installment sales under the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act.110
It is well known, however, that many lenders in South Carolina,
particularly in the past few years, have been imposing a variety
of front-end fees and service charges in addition to the maximum
interest rates allowed. This is a calculated risk on their part;
because of the tight credit situation, a debtor is unlikely to chal-
lenge extra charges. Thus, from a practical point of view, the
impact of the SCCPC's rate structure on South Carolina con-
sumer credit lenders may be just as great as on retail creditors.
Two important conditions limit the all-inclusiveness of the
credit service and loan finance charges:
(a) The "directly or indirectly" language in the definitional
sections " require that the charge must have been imposed by the
creditor on the debtor for the credit in question. If the charge is
imposed on someone unconnected with the debtor or is made by
a third party not acting as the agent of the creditor, then the
normal rule is that the charge in question can be excluded from
the credit service and loan finance charge. Brokerage fees, how-
ever, are treated in a special manner and can be excluded only if
the creditor had no knowledge of any such fees when the credit
was granted.313 If the creditor knew brokerage fees were being
paid, the amount must be included in the credit service and loan
finance charge even though the broker is retained and paid by the
debtor.
(b) Certain charges are specifically authorized to be excluded
from the credit service and loan finance charge. The exclusions
286; Part I, section A infra.
310. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-17-40 (1976) (incorporated into id. § 37-2-211 (1976)). See
notes 243-55 and accompanying text supra.
311. Id. §§ 37-2-109(1) (1976), 37-3-109(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
312. In addition, see note 292 supra, which discusses the exclusion of some types of
discount charges.
313. Id. §§ 37-3-109(2) (1976); 37-3-109(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Charges for credit
reports and investigation of any collateral must also be included in the credit service or
loan finance charge unless the creditor had no knowledge of the charges. Id. Such charges
are invariably made at the request of the creditor. Debtors do on occasion, however, retain
their own mortgage brokers and the requirement that brokerage fees be included in the
credit service or loan finance charge if the creditor learns that a broker is involved even
though the broker is not acting as the agent of the creditor is contrary to the common-
law rule that still applies to transactions not governed by the rate and charge provisions
of the SCCPC. See Part II, Section C(2) infra.
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mentioned in the definitions of credit service and loan finance
charges fall into two categories: (1) "additional charges"314 and
(2) default, delinquency, and deferral charges. The difference
between a prepayment rebate calculated on the actuarial basis
and one calculated on the Rule of 78's also falls into the latter
category. 3 5 Certain other charges also are excludible charges.
These authorized charges will be discussed in Part II, section D.
In summary, in the absence of a specific statutory exclusion,
any charge made by the creditor for the credit in a transaction
governed by the SCCPC rate structure that meets the "but for"
test36 must be included in the credit service and loan finance
charge. A strong presumption exists that all charges are included
and the burden is on the creditor to prove exclusion was proper.
3. Calculation of Rate on Actuarial Method.-The third
major computation is the calculation of the rate of the credit
service charge and loan finance charge by the actuarial method.
This method requires the credit service charge to be applied to
the amount financed and the loan finance charge to be applied
to the principal in a manner so that each payment is allocated
first to the accumulated credit service charge or loan finance
charge at the monthly rate, and second to the remaining unpaid
balance of the amount financed or principal, which is reduced
accordingly.317 The net result under the actuarial method is that
the same dollar amount of credit service charge or loan finance
charge for a given amount of credit will yield the same rate of
credit service charge or loan finance charge per year regardless of
whether the transaction is characterized as being handled on a
precomputed basis, that is a transaction in which the debt is
expressed as a single amount that includes all credit charges, 38
and regardless of whether the permissible rate is expressed in
terms of so many dollars per $100 of credit, add-on, discount,
314. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-202 (1976), 37-3-302 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part II,
section D(1) infra.
315. See Part II, section D(3) infra for further discussion of prepayment rebates. The
difference in the amount of the rebate between the actuarial method and Rule of 78's or
"sum-of.the.digits" method has been argued to be a "penalty" that is subject to special
disclosure under TIL. The Federal Reserve Board has issued an official interpretation
specifically holding that a rebate calculated under the Rule of 78's is not a penalty.
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.818(6) (1977).
316. See note 303 and accompanying text supra.
317. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37.1-301(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
318. See id. §§ 37-2-105(7) (1976), 37-3-107(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977). This is the usual
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simple or compound interest, or in any other manner.319
By regulation, 30 the method of calculating the actuarial
method under the SCCPC is the same as that for computing the
annual percentage rate under TIL's Regulation Z.311 This method
provides parity between the rate of credit service and loan finance
charges and the TIL annual percentage rate in accordance with
the intent of the UCCC, from which it was adopted, and eases the
problems of calculation for creditors. The rate calculations under
the SCCPC, like those under TIL, are based on a 365-day year
(366 during a leap year) and not the 360-day year that has been
traditionally utilized by creditors.322 Although the difference is
slight, in a situation in which a creditor charges per diem inter-
est calculated on a 360-day table an excess charge claim might
result under the SCCPC remedial provisions.
Special considerations are involved in the calculation of the
appropriate charges for open-end credit transactions, such as re-
volving charge accounts. Different considerations arise because of
the varying way creditor practices treat purchases and payments
within a billing cycle. Many creditors will not impose any credit
service or loan finance charge if the prior month's bill is paid
before the next month's bill is prepared. Some creditors tradition-
ally allow this "free ride" only if the prior month's bill is paid in
full. Others, however, will give credit for partial payments. Still
others do not allow any free ride and impose a credit service or
loan finance charges on the amount owing as of the ending day
of the billing cycle.
Two principal methods are used to calculate the amount of
credit to which the appropriate credit service or loan finance
319. The many different methods of calculating credit charges authorized by state
statutes and the inability of consumers to compare on a rational basis the actual rates of
the charges made under the various methods were important factors in the development
of both TIL and the UCCC. See generally Landers, supra note 76, and authorities cited
note 5 supra.
320. Rules and Regs. of the S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. 28-28-1.301, S.C. CoDE OF STATE
REas. (1976).
321. The various formulas and other technical data for computing the annual percen-
tage rate are contained in Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(6) (1977).
322. Ad. Interpretation No. 3.508-7702, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1977). This modifies
prior South Carolina law. See Merchants & Planters' Bank v. Sarratt, 77 S.C. 141, 57 S.E.
621 (1907) (which approved the use of a 360-day year for interest calculations). See also
Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 842 (1954). The continued use of a 360-day table is apparently
authorized in transactions whose rates are governed by the SCCPC. See note 473 and
accompanying text infra. But see American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Ore., 511 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975).
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charge will be applied in open-end credit transactions. Each has
several variations.
One mode of calculation is based on the average daily bal-
ance in the account during the billing cycle. Under this method
the finance charge is computed on the sum of the balances out-
standing each day during the billing cycle, divided by the num-
ber of days in the cycle. Purchases during the cycle may or may
not be included in the daily balances from the day they are made,
and an optional feature may or may not permit the customer to
avoid a credit charge for payment before a given date.
The second method is to calculate the credit charge on the
unpaid balance of the account as of the last day of the cycle.
Three principal variations of this second method are used. The
oldest and easiest to understand is the ending balance method,
in which the credit service or loan finance charge is calculated on
the balance of the account on the last day of the billing cycle,
taking into account all purchases and payments through the last
day of the cycle. This method does not give the debtor any free
period during which payment can be made without any credit
charge being due. A second variation is the previous balance
method, under which the credit service or loan finance charge is
computed on the ending balance, but the charge is not payable
if the full amount of the balance is paid before a particular date.
If the prior ending balance, or "previous balance," is not paid in
full by the particular date specified, then the credit service or
loan finance charge is applied to the full amount of the ending
balance. Under this method, which is still apparently the one
most widely utilized, purchases, partial payments, and credits
during the current billing cycle do not affect the amount of the
credit charge because the charge is based on the previous balance
or ending balance at the end of the prior billing cycle. These
purchases and partial payments are taken into account in deter-
mining the ending balance for the next billing cycle. A third
variation, the adjusted balance method, is similar to the previous
balance method except that partial credits and payments during
the current cycle are deducted from the prior ending balance
before applying the credit charge.3
323. For a more detailed explanation of these and other calculation methods used in
open.end accounts, see 1974 UCCC, PREFATORY NOTE, at xxx-xxxiii; R. SHAY & W,
DUNKELBERO, supra note 273, at 72-75, 113-14; Higgs, Rate Limitations, Interest and
Usury, 33 Bus. LAw. 1043, 1051-54 (1978); Miller & Warren, A Report on the Revision of
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 27 OKLA. L. Rlv. 1, 17-20 (1974).
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Both the previous balance and adjusted balance methods
give the debtor a free period during which payment can affect the
amount of the credit charge that has been initially deferred. The
chief difference between them is that, under the previous balance
method, only a full payment or credit during the free period will
affect the amount of the credit charge, whereas a partial payment
or credit computed under the adjusted balance method will re-
duce the balance to which the credit charge is applied. Several
lawsuits have been brought charging that the failure of the pre-
vious balance method to take into account partial credits or pay-
ments during the current billing cycle is illegal. Creditors have
prevailed in all but one324 of these suits, primarily on the grounds
that free periods are not legally required, and, therefore, as long
as the actual return to the creditor does not exceed the yield
derived from the ending balance method, the creditor is not mak-
ing any unlawful charge. 25 Because the amount of the credit ser-
324. Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975). This case can be
distinguished from the other cases, see note 325 infra, on the basis of the peculiar wording
of the controlling state statute.
325. Seibert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 120 Cal. Rptr. 233, 45 Cal. App. 3d 1 (1975);
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc: v. Pasco, 275 So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Johnson
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 14 Ill. App. 3d 838, 303 N.E. 2d 627 (1973); Zachary v. R.H.
Macy & Co., 31 N.Y.2d 443, 293 N.E.2d 80, 340 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1972). A recent study
showed that although the actual yield to the creditor on the typical previous balance and
average daily balance methods is greater than the adjusted balance and similar methods,
the ending balance method produces a greater average yield than any of the other stan-
dard methods. The actuarial method, computed on the actual amount of credit outstand-
ing, eliminates any "free periods" and provides the highest yield of all methods.
Assessment Percent of
Percent Rate Previous
Per Year Assessment Method Balance
18 Previous balance 100
18 Adjusted balance 86
18 Ending balance 109
18 Average daily balance (ADB) 100
18 ADB, excluding purchases 94
18 True actuarial 114
R. SHAY & W. DUNKELBERG, supra note 273, at 74. Since the actuarial method is the
approved method of computing all rates under the SCCPC and a debtor has no right to
any free period, a strong argument can be made that any calcuation method that yielded
the same or less return than the true actuarial method, with all free periods eliminated,
should be allowed. See In re Romine, 556 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1977) (the court amortized
the interest rate charged a dealer by a manufacturer over the entire period of the credit,
including a substantial free period in which the dealer could repay the obligation without
any interest obligation. If the free period had been excluded, then the obligation would
have been usurious under Arkansas law). See also Higgs, supra note 323, at 1054 (stating
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vice or loan finance charge is applied to the prior month's ending
balance under the previous balance method, the maximum yield
to the creditor can never exceed the yield under the ending bal-
ance method. The SCCPC and UCCC specifically authorize the
use of the unpaid balance and average daily balance methods,
regardless of whether the method in question involves a free pe-
riod.3s2 The choice of method is left to the creditor. The average
daily balance methods, as a general rule, require more sophisti-
cated computer methodology than the unpaid balance methods,
and the extra costs involved make the average daily balance
methods impracticable for many creditors.3 No matter what bal-
ance method is utilized, however, the rate applied to the resulting
balance cannot exceed the rate authorized in the SCCPC for the
type of open-end credit in question.rs For example, assume a
debtor with a revolving charge account has a previous balance of
$1,100 and makes payments of $110 during the month, but makes
no new purchases. Under the previous balance method the seller
would be in violation of the SCCPC if the debtor was charged 1
/2% per month or 18% per annum on the full $1,100, which would
be the amount of the indebtedness to which the credit service
charge is applied under this method since the balance was not
paid in full. The maximum charge that could properly be im-
posed in this situation would be 18% on $1,000 and 12% on the
that most New York banks have recently decided to eliminate the interest free period in
all cases). This position may have particular relevance in South Carolina because of S.C.
CODE ANN. § 37-2-207(6) (1976), which specifies that in a revolving charge account gov-
erned by the SCCPC "no rate charged pursuant to this section shall exceed eighteen
percent per annum." No explanation of the intent of this section, which is not in the
UCCC texts, exists in the legislative history of the SCCPC. See notes 1, 102 supra. This
section was approved as an amendment to H. 2356 of 1974, a bill that originally was
limited to authorizing a 1'/2% per month rate for retail merchants and that eventually
became the 1974 SCCPC in a spirit of compromise. 1974 S.C. HousE J. 1884-85. See also
notes 1, 273 supra. This particular provision was introduced by Rep. Moss of Beaufort who
had previously introduced an amendment that would have prohibited the use of the
"previous balance" method. 1974 S.C. HousE J. at 1881-82. Ad. Interpretation No. 2.207-
7707, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1977) states that this language was simply meant to make
certain that the monthly rate of 11/2% authorized by S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-207(3) (1976)
for accounts of $1,000 or less, meant the same thing as 18% per annum. Another plausible
explanation is that this language could refer to 18% per annum calculated on the actuarial
method. Such an interpretation would give merchants maximum flexibility to structure
a balance method that suited their particular needs.
326. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-207 (1976), 37-3-201, 37-3-515 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See
also 1968 UCCC §§ 2.207, 3.201, .508; 1974 UCCC § § 2.202, .401. These SCCPC and UCCC
sections also authorize the use of a single rate applied to a limited range (8% variance from
the median) of outstanding credit under either type of method.
327. See authorities cited in note 323 supra.
328. See Part II, section B(2) supra.
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remaining $100. 311 If the creditor had used the adjusted balance
method, however, the payment during the month would have
been taken into account in computing the amount onto which the
rate is applied and an 18% credit service charge on the full
amount would have been proper, since the ending balance would
have been $990.
Finally, with revolving charge accounts, the SCCPC requires
that the credit service charge made in any billing cycle not exceed
42% of the scheduled minimum payment for the billing cycle. 3 1
The purpose of this provision is to ensure that a reasonable
amount of the principal balance is paid each month. This is to
prevent the situation in which essentially all of a debtor's pay-
ment is used to pay the credit service charge, and, consequently,
the account is never paid off. No parallel restriction is in the
provisions dealing with open-end loans.31
D. Additional and Other Charges, Rebates,
Refinancings, and Consolidations
1. Additional Charges.-The SCCPC specifically autho-
rizes certain charges to be excluded from the credit service and
loan finance chargeg. The first category of excluded charges is
designated "additional charges." The provisions for these addi-
tional charges are the same for the original SCCPC consumer
credit sale332 and consumer loanm and for deferral and refinancing
transactions.3 34 Unless specifically authorized by the SCCPC, "31
any other charge or any charge in violation of or in excess of those
permitted 336 must be included in the credit service or loan finance
charge.3 37
329. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-207(3) (1976). Partial payments and credits are not
taken into account in the previous balance method.
330. Id. § 37-2-207(5) (1976).
331. The SCCPC open-end rate sections autfiorize the creditor to charge a 50¢ mini-
mum charge if any balance is due in the account. This charge helps to defray some of the
overhead costs in maintaining these accounts. No minimum charge can be made in a
revolving loan account, however, if the lender has charged an annual fee for use of the
account. Compare id. § 37-2-207(4) with id. §§ 37-3-201(4)(c), -515(1)(c) (Cum. Supp.
1977).
332. Id. § 37-2-202.
333. Id. § 37-3-202.
334. Id. §§ 37-2-204(5), 37-3-204(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (deferrals), 37-2-205(2) (1976),
37-3-205(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977), (refinancing transactions).
335. See id. §§ 37-2-109, 37-3-109 (1976).
336. This is the result of the definitions of credit service charge and loan finance
charge. Id. §§ 37-2-109 (1976), 37-3-109 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
337. Consumer finance companies licensed under Act 988 of 1966 can make a sub-
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The permissible additional charges are as follows:
(a) Official Fees and Taxes.-Included within this category
are filing fees for perfecting security interests, license fees, certi-
ficate of title and registration fees, insurance fees paid in lieu of
perfecting a security interest, documentary stamps, and tax pay-
ments (for example, sales, excise, and use taxes) .3
(b) Insurance Premiums.-
(1) Property damage and liability insurance can be excluded
from the credit service or loan finance charges, when the insur-
ance was obtained from or through the creditor, if the creditor has
clearly disclosed the cost of this insurance to the debtor and has
given the debtor the option of choosing the person from whom the
insurance is to be obtained3 9 When vendor's single interest insur-
ance is utilized, two additional requirements must be met for
exclusion: (a) The insurer can have no right of subrogation
against the consumer, and (b) the insurance cannot duplicate
other insurance under which any loss is payable to the creditor
when a separate charge to the consumer is made for the other
insurance.
(2) Credit life and disability insurance premiums can be ex-
cluded from the credit charges if the insurance is not required as
a prerequisite for obtaining the credit and the debtor voluntarily
gives his written consent to the insurance after written disclosure
stantial initial charge covering all the expenses incurred by the lender, including many
types of expenses that are not permissible additional charges under the SCCPC and,
therefore, are part of the loan finance charge if the loan was governed by the SCCPC rate
structure. Id. § 34-29-140(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977). This initial charge cannot be made by
consumer finance companies licensed as supervised lenders under the SCCPC. The ability
to exclude this initial charge from the finance charge is one of the reasons why the actual
yield on very small loans is higher under Act 988 than under the SCCPC. See Part I,
section C(9) supra. These intial charges are a substantial source of income for Act 988
licensees. In 1976 initial charges accounted for 20.34% of the total income of all such
companies. 1976 Consumer Finance Division Annuat Report, supra note 186, at 2.
338. S.C. ConE ANN. §§ 37-2-202(1)(a) (credit sales), 37-3-202(1)(a) (Cum. Supp.
1977) (loans). These charges are excluded from the determination of interest under pre-
SCCPC South Carolina cases. See Part III, section C(2)(a) infra. If the creditor purchases
nonfiling insurance, instead of perfecting a security interest or a real estate mortgage by
filing the required documents, the maximum exclusion is the amount of the official filing
fee that would be due if a financing statement or mortgage had been filed. Any premiums
above that amount would be part of the credit service or loan finance charge. Ad. Interpre-
tation No. 1.301-7618, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1976).
339. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-202(1)(b), (2) (credit sales), 37-3-202(1) (b), (2) (Cum.
Supp. 1977) (loans). Consumer finance companies licensed under Act 988 can exclude
property and liability, as well as life and disability, insurance from the loan finance charge
even if it is required. Id. § 34-29-160 (1976). The premiums many require for life and
disability insurance, however, would have to be disclosed as part of the finance charge
and Annual Percentage Rate under the TIL. TIL § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1976).
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of the cost. If these conditions are not met, however, then the cost
of the insurance must be included in the credit service or loan
finance charge, which results in the creditor getting a lower effec-
tive return than usual because the premiums (less commissions
and rebates) are paid to third parties. These provisions are essen-
tially the same as the insurance provisions in TIL and Regulation
Z. 340
If the statutory requisites are met, the exclusion applies to
the full amount of the premiums even though the creditor re-
ceives a commission or rebate on any insurance purchased
through the creditor, assuming the commission or rebate is rea-
sonable and standard for the type of insurance in question. 31' In
addition, although the SCCPC and TIL also require that, for the
premiums to be excluded from the credit service and loan finance
charge, the purchase of credit life and disability insurance and
choice of insurance agent be voluntary, approximately 95% or
more of all debtors are estimated to "voluntarily" purchase insur-
ance through the creditor."' The commissions and rebates from
this insurance provide a significant amount of additional income
to creditors. For example, in 1976, 8.4% of all income earned by
consumer finance companies licensed in South Carolina came
from this source. 33
(c) Annual Fees for Use of Credit Cards. -An annual charge
340. See id. § 1605(b)-(c); 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a)(5)-(6) (1977).
341. See, e.g., Landers, supra note 303, at 113-35. This continues the common-law
rule, which has been followed in South Carolina. See Part I, section C(2)0) infra. Cf.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-4-108(2)(c) (1976) (creditor not required "to account to the debtor
for any portion of a separate charge for insurance because . . . [t]he creditor pays or
accounts for premiums to the insurer. . ."). The type, amount, charges, and rebates for
insurance are regulated by Chapter 4 of the SCCPC. Id. § 37-4-101 to -304. (1976 & Cum.
Supp. 1977). A charge exceeding these regulations is considered an excess charge for
purposes of the SCCPC remedies provisions. Id. § 37-4-104(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Credit
life and disability insurance premiums must be calculated to produce a loss to a premium
ratio of "approximately fifty percent." Id. § 37-4-203(4) (1976). Act 988 of 1966, which
governs consumer finance companies licensed to make small loans under that Act, states
that the premium to loss ratio must not be "less than fifty per cent, and rates producing
a lesser loss ratio shall be deemed excessive." Id. § 34-29-160. Whether any difference in
the effective rates for the two acts was intended is not revealed in the legislative history
of the SCCPC. See also note 539 and accompanying text infra. Section 4.203 of the 1968
and 1974 UCCC texts only require that the rates not be "unreasonable in relation to the
benefits provided."
342. See Landers, supra note 303, at 121.
343. 1976 Consumer Finance Division Annual Report, supra note 186, at 2. In some
states, the amount of this income is even greater. For example, in Kansas insurance
commissions and rebates accounted for 40% of consumer loan profits in 1973. Landers,
supra note 303, at 115 n.151.
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for the privilege of using a seller credit card, lender credit card,
or other similar arrangement can be excluded from the credit
service and loan finance charge if the arrangement entitles the
consumer to purchase goods and services from a minimum of 100
persons unrelated to the issuer."' This exclusion applies to bank,
travel, and entertainment credit cards, and bank over draft
plans. In most cases, however, an annual fee imposed by a retail
store on its own credit cards would have to be included in the
credit service charge because these cards usually can be used only
to purchase or lease items from the issuer, or its affiliates and
franchises and, therefore, could not meet the "100 persons not
related to the issuer" requirement.3 45 The exclusion of the annual
fee from the credit service charge can make a significant differ-
ence in the applicable rate. For example, if the average monthly
balance of an open-end account qualifying for the exclusion is
$200 and the creditor charges 11/2% per month or 18% per
annum, then a $15 annual fee results in an effective yield of
25.5%, even though the rate for the purposes of the SCCPC and
TIL is 18%. This is because the annual fee is excluded from the
calculation of the credit service or loan finance charge.
346
(d) Real Estate Closing Costs.-If real estate closing costs
"are bonafide, reasonable in amount, and not for the purpose of
circumvention or evasion" of the SCCPC, they can be excluded
from the credit service and loan finance charges. 347 If all the prere-
quisites are fulfilled, the following costs can be excluded from the
credit service and loan finance charges:
344. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-202(1)(c) (seller credit cards), 37-3-202(1)(c) (Cum.
Supp. 1977) (lender credit cards and similar arrangements). In the absence of specific
statutory authorization, the status of this fee is doubtful. But see Key v. Wortham Bank
& Tr. Co., 543 S.W.2d 496 (Ark. 1976) (annual membership fee of $12 held to be a
permissible additional charge).
345. If an annual fee is required, the issuer of a seller credit card can make a 50¢
minimum charge on any account in which a balance is due. An issuer of a lender credit
card cannot make this minimum charge. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-207(4) with id.
§§ 37.3-201(4)(c), -515(1)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
346. Landers, supra note 303, at 72 nn.50-51. A recent survey of urban middle class
households in South Carolina showed that the average balance on different types of credit
cards varied considerably. For example, the average balance was $76.24 on an Exxon card,
$106.88 on a J.C. Penney card, $158 on an American Express, $251 on a Master Charge,
and $281 on a Visa credit card (Bank Americard). F. Ingram & 0. Pugh, supra note 271,
44-63 (1977). The median level for these cards was considerably lower than the average.
For example, the median account for Bank Americard accounts was $159.50. Id. at 51
table 20.
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(i) Fees or premiums for title examination, abstract of title,
title insurance, surveys, or similar purposes,
(ii) Fees for preparation of a deed, settlement statement, or
other documents, if not paid to the creditor or a person related
to the creditor,
(iii) Escrows for future payment of taxes, including assess-
ments for improvements, insurance, and water, sewer and land
rents, and
(iv) Fees for notarizing deeds and other documents if not
paid to the creditor or a person related to the creditor. 4
Some normal real estate closing costs do not fall within this exclu-
sion. For example, appraisal fees and credit report charges are
specifically included in the credit service and loan finance charge
definitions. 49 Inspection fees charged for construction loans also
must be included in the credit service and loan finance charge. 50
This exclusion only applies when the transaction involves a
credit purchase in land that is governed by the SCCPC.3' Most
real estate mortgages are not covered by the SCCPC and the
treatment of these closing costs in excluded mortgage transac-
tions is controlled by non-SCCPC statutes and cases. 352
(e) Other Charges Approved for Exclusion by the SCCPC
Administrator. -The SCCPC gives the Administrator of the De-
348. A considerable amount of recent litigation by consumer advocates has been
brought over escrow accounts. They claim that the "lost" interest, or interest earned by
the creditor on these escrow balances, ought to be included in any finance charge calcula-
tion, disclosed as such under TIL, or both. The decisions to date have been in favor of
the creditor's position. See, e.g., Moore v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 513 F.2d 688 (9th
Cir. 1975); Stravrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Pa.), affl'd,
487 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1973); Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C.
1973).
349. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-109 (1976), 37-3-109 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See also Ad.
Interpretation No. 3.202-7613, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1976). TIL includes appraisal fees
and credit reports in the list of permissible additional charges in real estate transactions.
TIL § 106(e)(5)-(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1605(e)(5)-(6) (1976); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §
226.4(e)(5)-(6). Depending on the amount involved and the term of the loan, this differ-
ence in treatment may be enough to cause the actual rate of the credit service or loan
finance charge to be mathematically higher than the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) for
disclosure purposes. See note 306 supra. TIL, consistent with the UCCC and the SCCPC,
does exclude the cost of appraisal and credit reports from permissible additional charges
in non-real estate mortgage transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) (1976); 12 C.F.R. §
226.4(a)(4) (1977).
350. See FRB Letter No. 1212, [1974-1977 Transfer Binder] 5 CoNs. CRnD. GUIDE
(CCH) 31,651 (July 11, 1977) (holding that inspection fees are not within the definition
of appraisal fees and, therefore, are to be included in the finance charge for TIL disclosure
purposes).
351. See Part I, section B(4)(d) supra.
352. See Part I, section C(2) infra.
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partment of Consumer Affairs authority to designate by rule
other additional charges that can be excluded from the credit
service and loan finance charges. 53 The statutory guidelines re-
quire that the benefits be of value to the consumer debtor, and
that the charges be reasonable in amount and of "a type that is
not for credit." '354 At the time this article was written, the Admin-
istrator had issued no rules under this authority, but does possess
the flexibility to deal with specific issues as they arise.
2. Other Charges and Fees Excluded From the Credit Ser-
vice and Loan Finance Charges.-In addition to permissible
"additional charges" the SCCPC and the UCCC authorize other
charges and fees to be excluded from the credit service and loan
finance charges. These are (1) delinquency charges, (2) deferral
fees, (3) certain post-default attorneys' fees, (4) default charges,
and (5) advances by a creditor to perform a debtor's obligation
to insure or preserve the collateral.
If the prerequisites for exclusion are not met, the charge must
be included in the credit service and loan finance charge and will
trigger the SCCPC remedies for refunds, civil penalties, costs,
and attorneys' fees if the charge in question when added to the
other credit or loan finance charges made exceeds the permissible
rate ceiling authorized for the particular type of transaction. 55
The SCCPC rules governing excluded charges differ from prior
South Carolina law in many respects. A clear understanding of
the parameters of the applicable sections is important.
(a) Delinquency Charges. 5'-In a transaction whose rates
and charges are governed by the SCCPC, a delinquency charge
353. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-202(1)(e) (credit sales), 37-3-202(1)(e) (Cum. Supp.
1977) (loans).
354. Id. The apparent purpose of this language is to require that the charge be for a
service to the debtor, rather than part of the credit charge or normal overhead of the
creditor.
355. See id. § 37-5-202; cf. Ad. Interpretation No. 1202(7)-7602, S.C. Dep't of Cons.
Aff. (1976) (origination fee would be an excess charge if made in addition to the maximum
rate authorized). Amounts in excess of those authorized may trigger the penalty provisions
of § 37-5-20(1) even though the excess would not, when added to the other credit service
and loan finance charges imposed in the transaction, exceed the maximum authorized
amount. This would be the case with, for example, excess attorneys' fees and default
charges. Id. See Part II, section E infra for further explanation of the SCCPC remedies
provisions.
356. See S.C. CODE ANN. § § 37-2-203 (1976), 37-3-203 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The general
common-law rule is that a delinquency charge, assuming it is reasonable, is not part of
the finance charge because it is not imposed on the debtor as part of the credit, but rather
is a charge the debtor voluntarily incurs for failure to make a timely payment. See Annot.,
63 A.L.R.3d 50 (1975); Part m, section C(2)(h) infra.
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can be made only in a precomputed transaction, that is, one in
which the debt is expressed in a credit sale as a sum of the
amount financed plus the credit service charge, or in a loan as the
principal plus the loan finance charge. 57 The usual precomputed
transactions are calculated on an add-on or discount basis in
which the credit charge is added to the amount of credit extended
to create the total debt. Most typical closed-end installment
credit transactions are handled this way. The reason behind the
authorization of a delinquency charge in precomputed transac-
tions is to prevent the unfairness to the creditor that would result
from the absence of income for the period of delay in the absence
of a late payment charge. In effect, a prohibition of a delinquency
charge in a precomputed transaction would amount to an interest
free loan to the debtor.35 In a nonprecomputed transaction, how-
ever, the delinquent payment is added back to, and continues to
be, a part of the total debt to which the credit service or loan
finance charge is applied. Unlike the precomputed transaction,
the creditor is, therefore in effect, being compensated for the late
payment. Typical examples of nonprecomputed transactions in-
clude open-end credit, including revolving charge accounts and
bank credit card accounts, most real estate mortgages, direct
reduction loans when the credit service or loan finance charge is
calculated monthly on the unpaid balance of the indebtedness,
and simple interest installment loans made by banks.
If the transaction is precomputed, the creditor can collect a
single delinquency charge on any payment including any deferred
payment that is not paid in full within 10 days of its due date.
The amount, which must be authorized in the contract between
the creditor and the debtor, cannot exceed the greater of (a) 5%
of the installment or $5, whichever is the lesser, or (b) the permis-
sible deferral charge359 that is due for the period the installment
is delinquent.
31
To prohibit a creditor from forcing multiple delinquencies by
allocating a portion of any subsequent payment to a prior delin-
quency, the SCCPC requires the creditor to first apply any subse-
357. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-105(7) (1976), 37-3-107(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Ad.
Interpretation No. 3.107-7710, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1977).
358. This is because the total credit charge is included in the payment and no addi-
tional amount of credit charge for the period of the delinquency would be collectible. See
INTEGRATED CODE, supra note 3, § 2.203, at Comment 2.
359. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-204, 37-3-304 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See also Part II,
section D(2)(b) infra.
360. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-203(1) (1976), 37-3-203(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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quent payment received to the current month's payment. This
prevents any of the amount currently paid from being applied
against the delinquent payment, unless the total amount paid
exceeds the current month's payment."'
In a precomputed loan a lender has the option of converting
the transaction to one in which the loan finance charge is based
on unpaid balances after two or more installments are in default
for ten or more days.3"2 This conversion right is advantageous to
the lender because it avoids some of the administrative head-
aches involved in assessing delinquency fees. As a prerequisite for
converting the account, however, the lender must rebate the por-
tion of the unearned loan finance charge required by the SCCPC
for prepayments. 3" This conversion option is not available in the
case of a consumer credit sale.
(b) Deferral Charges. -As with delinquency charges, deferral
charges are only authorized in precomputed transactions.3" The
primary distinction between a deferral and delinquency fee is
that the former is the credit charge made on a payment that, by
agreement, can be made at a time other than the scheduled pay-
ment date, whereas a delinquency fee is a penalty charge made
for a late payment. Deferral and delinquency charges are mu-
tually exclusive. A creditor can, however, make a deferral charge
on an installment in which a delinquency charge was originally
made, if the delinquency charge is deducted from the total defer-
ral charge." 5 The agreement by the debtor to pay a deferral fee
361. Id. §§ 37-2-203(3) (1976), 37-3-203(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
362. Id. § 37-3-203(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Ad. Interpretation No.3.203-7611, S.C.
Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1976).
363. See Part I, section D(3) infra.
364. Id.; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-204, 37-3-204 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See note 357 and
accompanying text supra. Delinquency and deferral charges are a significant source of
income for creditors. In 1976, 6.26% of the total income of consumer finance companies
licensed in South Carolina came from these charges. 1976 Consumer Finance Division
Annual Report, supra note 186, at 2. Considerable differences exist between the size of
delinquency and deferral fees that can be charged by consumer finance companies li-
censed as supervised lenders under the SCCPC and those licensed under Act 988. In many
instances, the charges permitted under Act 988 will be higher. For example, under Act
988 a delinquence charge of 5% of the total payment due (versus $5 maximum under the
SCCPO) can be collected on any installment delinquent for 5 or more days (versus 10 days
under the SCCPC). Act 988 also authorizes a deferral charge of 2% per month on loans
less than $500 and 1% per month on loans exceeding $500. Whether the Act 988 deferral
charge is higher or lower than the corresponding charge under the SCCPC depends on the
method of calculation and the rate of the credit sevice or loan finance charge in a particu-
lar contract. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-203 (1976), -204, 37-3-203, -204 (Cum.
Supp. 1977) with id. § 34-29-140(e)-(f) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
365. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-204(3) (credit sales), 37-3-204(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977)
(loans). See also id. §§ 37-2-203(2) (1976), 37-3-203(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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can be made either before or after default of a scheduled pay-
ment."' The contract between the creditor and debtor can specify
that a deferral fee will automatically be made on any payment
not made within 10 days of its due date."7 A deferral fee, however,
cannot be made once the maturity of the transaction has been
accelerated by the creditor. 6
The SCCPC authorizes two methods for calculating the de-
ferral fee. The first method, designated the "standard deferral,"
is calculated by determining the portion of the total finance
charge attributable to the payment being deferred and multiply-
ing that figure by the number of months the payout period is
extended.3 9 The second method is the more traditional; the total
deferral fee cannot exceed the fee calculated by applying the
annual percentage rate charge disclosed in the original agreement
(the annualized credit service or loan finance charge) 70 to each
amount deferred for the period of the deferral. Under either
method, 37' the authorized additional charges applicable to the
amount deferred may be collected from the debtor or added to the
amount being deferred.
32
Two additional facts about the SCCPC deferral provisions
are worth noting: (1) Generally, a standard deferral fee will be
slightly lower than the maximum nonstandard deferral fee for the
same transaction; and, (2) if a nonstandard deferral is utilized in
a particular contract, a creditor must compute the rebate of un-
earned credit service or loan finance charge in a full prepayment
situation on the actuarial basis rather than under the Rule of 78's,
which is the standard method for calculating prepayment re-
bates. 73 Because the actuarial method will result in a higher re-
366. Id. §§ 37-2-204(2), 37-3-204(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
367. Id. §§ 37-2-204(6), 37-3-204(6).
368. Acceleration negates any possibility of deferring one or more payments. To allow
a creditor to add a deferral fee to an accelerated credit transaction amounts to authorizing
the collection of unearned credit charges in violation of the prepayment rebate provisions
of the SCCPC. See id. §§ 37-2-210, 37-3-210 (discussed in Part H1, section D(3) infra).
369. Id. .§§ 37-2-204(3), 37-3-204(3).
370. Id. §§ 37-2-204(4), 37-3-204(4).
371. A comprehensive example illustrating the mechanics of calculating deferral fees
under both methods is contained in the SCCPC Comments. INTERATED CoDE, supra note
3, §§ 37-2-202, 37-3-304, at Comment 2.
372. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-204(5), 37-3-204(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
373. See id. §§ 37-2-210(5)(a), 37-3-210(5)(a); Ad. Interpretation No. 2.204-7704, S.C.
Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1977). See notes 395-401 and accompanying text infra for further
discussion of the difference between these two methods of calculating prepayment rebates.
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bate to the debtor than is payable under the Rule of 78's,374 the
net effect is to encourage creditor use of standard deferrals.
(c) Creditors' Post-Default Attorneys' Fees.-The agreement
between the creditor and debtor may provide for the payment by
the debtor of reasonable attorneys' fees not to exceed 15% of the
unpaid amount after default. The attorneys' fees must be payable
to an attorney who is not a salaried employee of the creditor. No
such attorneys' fees are collectible in the absence of a stipulation
for payment in the note or other contract evidencing the obliga-
tion. This position is consistent with existing South Carolina law
disallowing attorneys' fees in the absence of a statute or contrac-
tual agreement. 77 In addition, no attorneys' fees can be collected
for a supervised loan (one in which the loan finance charge* ex-
ceeds 12% per year) in which the original principal is $1,000 or
less. 75 Any agreement in violation of these provisions is unen-
forceable and constitutes a specific violation of the SCCPC.76
Except insofar as attorneys' fees qualify under the special
exemption for certain real estate closing costs,378 attorneys' fees
charged or collected at the inception of a transaction are included
in the credit service or loan finance charges because they are not
authorized by statute.
(d) Other Default Charges.-In addition to delinquency, de-
ferral, and attorneys' fees in default situations, the SCCPC also
authorizes the collection of "reasonable expenses incurred in real-
374. See notes 395-97 and accompanying text infra.
375. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-413 (1976) (credit sales). 37-3-404, -514 (Cum. Supp.
1977) (loans). One alternative of Item 8 in the proposed FTC Rule on Unfair Credit
Practices prohibits a creditor from collecting any attorneys' fees in a consumer credit
transaction by making all agreements of this type an unfair trade practice. 40 Fed. Reg.
16,347 (1975). The other alternative is consistent with the SCCPC provisions, which in
turn were derived from the UCCC. Id. See 1968 UCCC §§ 2.413, 3.404, .514 (alternative
B); 1974 UCCC § 2.507 (alternative B). If the first alternative in the Proposed FTC Rule
is adopted, it supercedes the SCCPC attorneys' fees provisions under the federal preemp-
tion doctrine. See note 18 supra. Attorneys' fees for debtors are mandatory, however, when
the creditor is found to have violated the SCCPC in any particular. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-
5-202(8) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The amount of recovery is not controlling in determining the
amount of the fee awarded. Id.
376. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-413 (1976), 37-3-404, -514 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Allowable
creditors' attorneys' fees are based on the amount that the creditor can legally collect from
the debtor, taking into account any rebates due the debtor, and not on the total amount
due on the contract at the time of the default. Id. § § 37-2-210(7), 37-3-210(7) (Cum. Supp.
1977); Ad. Interpretation No. 3.404-7510, S.C. Dep't of Cons. Aff. (1975).
377. See, e.g., Hertzog v. Spartanburg Bonded Warehouses, Inc., 184 S.C. 378, 192
S.E. 397 (1937).
378. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-202(1)(d)(ii), 37-3-202(1)(d)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (dis-
cussed in Part II, section D(1)(d) supra).
810 [Vol. 29
92
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss5/3
CONSUMER PROTECTION CODE
izing on a security interest.""37 The expenses incurred under these
provisions, which includes all reasonable expenses for reposses-
sing, storing, and selling the collateral, are specifically excluded
from the calculation of the amount of credit service or loan fi-
nance charge. 39 An agreement to collect any type of default
charge other than those specifically authorized is unenforceable
and would trigger the SCCPC remedy provisions.38'
(e) Creditor Advances on Behalf of a Debtor.-The agree-
ment between the creditor and debtor may require the debtor to
perform certain duties pertaining to insuring or preserving collat-
eral (for example, payment of taxes, public assessments, and
other similar charges). If the debtor fails to fulfill his part of the
contract and the creditor pays the charge pursuant to authoriza-
tion in the agreement, the creditor may make a separate credit
service or loan finance charge for the amounts involved, provided
he has complied with certain disclosure requirements . 2 The
charge cannot exceed the original annual percentage rate dis-
closed to the debtor in the agreement. In the case of revolving
accounts, the amount advanced is simply added to the unpaid
balance and is subject to a credit service or loan finance charge
at the same rate as the remaining unpaid amount.srs
3. Prepayment Rebates.-The general rule, which is fol-
lowed in South Carolina, 384 entitles the creditor to the full amount
of interest or credit charge. Therefore, no rebate is legally due
upon prepayment by a debtor. This rule has been modified by
statute in many situations, particularly in consumer credit trans-
actions, to require a rebate of some or all of the unearned credit
charges.385 One reason for these statutory rules is to prevent a
creditor from "flipping," that is, increasing the yield significantly
379. Id. §§ 37-2-414 (1976) (credit sales), 37-3-405 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (loans).
380. Id. §§ 37-2-109 (1976), 37-3-109 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Realization on collateral is
governed by Article 9 of the UCC. See id. §§ 36-9-207, -501 to -507 (1976).
381. See id. §§ 37-2-414 (1976), 37-3-405, 37-5-202(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
382. Id. §§ 37-2-208 (1976) (credit sales), 37-3-208 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (loans). South
Carolina has-similar statutes covering advances for real estate mortgages. Id. §§ 29-3-30
to -40 (1976) (advancement of taxes, insurance premiums, and public assessments and
repairs). These statutes are discussed in note 699 and accompanying text infra.
383. See INTEC.RATED CODE, supra note 3, § 37-2-208, at Comment.
384. See, e.g., Barringer v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 493 (E.D.S.C.
1935); Cooke v. Young, 89 S.C. 173, 175, 71 S.E. 837 (1909). See also Part III, section
C(2)(j) infra.
385. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (prepayment re-
bates under Act 988 are limited to the Rule of 78's, with the exception that pro rata rebates
are required when the loan is refinanced within 90 days of inception).
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by frequently refinancing prior credit transactions and including
in the amount refinanced the unearned charges from the original
transaction and any prior refinancing.
86
The SCCPC, utilizing provisions from the UCCC, exten-
sively regulates prepayment rebates when a covered consumer
credit transaction is prepaid in full, whether the prepayment is
voluntary, by means of a refinancing or consolidation transaction,
or involuntary, by means of consumer credit insurance or a judg-
ment entered against the debtor on the debt."7 The following
material briefly summarizes the SCCPC prepayment rebate pro-
visions:
(a) No rebate is due in the case of any partial prepayment,
which can be made only with the express consent of the creditor
and under terms agreed to by the creditor .3  This is consistent
with prior South Carolina cases and practice.39 The normal prac-
tice in South Carolina is to apply any partial prepayment to the
last maturing installments in inverse order.
(b) With one exception, described in (c) below, the SCCPC
provisions specifically deal with prepayment rebates only in pre-
computed transactions. The possible inference that no rebate of
any kind is due in a nonprecomputed transaction, however, is
rebutted by the provisions stating that the debtor may repay in
full a transaction governed by the SCCPC rate and charge provi-
sions "at any time without penalty."3 ' The most reasonable in-
ference from this language is that a rebate of unearned credit
service or loan finance charges as of the date of prepayment
386. The evil involved in flipping is the ability to charge interest on interest or
compounding of interest when full rebate of unearned credit charges is not required. See
also notes 418-19 and accompanying text infra.
387. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-209 (1976), -210 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (credit sales), 37-3-
209, -210 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (loans). The 1974 SCCPC utilized the 1968 UCCC provisions.
The 1976 SCCPC Amendments replaced these with the 1974 UCCC provisions.
388. See INTEGRATED CODE, supra note 3, §§ 37-2-209, 37-3-209, at Comments.
389. See authorities'cited note 274 supra. But see Note, The Effect of Partial Prepay-
ment on Precomputed Consumer Loans, 29 OKLA. L. Rsv. 731 (1976) (in which the author
argues that a credit or rebate of the credit charge in a partial prepayment situation should
be required because a creditor ends up receiving more total finance charge than originally
authorized).
390. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-209 (1976), 37-3-209 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part H,
section D(4) infra for the SCCPC provisions regulating refinancing transactions. These
provisions require the credit service or loan finance charge in non-precomputed transac-
tions be applied to the unpaid amount in the account plus "accrued charges on the date
of refinancing." S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-205(1) (1976) (credit sales), 37-3-205(1) (Cum.
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should be returned to the debtor. Any other interpretation ne-
gates the meaning of the term "without penalty." Since the credit
service or loan finance charge in most nonprecomputed transac-
tions is calculated on the unpaid balance at the end of the month
or other payment period in question, no unearned charges will
have been collected by the creditor.39' To the extent that a portion
of the full prepayment is attributable to unaccrued and, there-
fore, unearned credit service or loan finance charges, however, it
must be refunded or credited to the debtor.392
(c) In both precomputed and nonprecomputed transactions,
except those pursuant to revolving accounts or consumer leases,
a creditor can contract to retain a minimum charge not to exceed
$5 in a transaction in which the original indebtedness is $75 or
less, or up to $7.50 in a transaction in which the original indebted-
ness exceeds $75.13 If such a right is included in the contract, the
creditor can retain the minimum amount without any obligation
to rebate even though the actual amount of the credit service or
loan finance charge earned at time of the prepayment may be less
than these specified amounts. 94
(d) Two methods of calculating prepayment rebates for pre-
computed transactions are specified by the SCCPC: The
"actuarial method" and the "sum-of-the-digits" method, more
commonly known as the Rule of 78's.3 5 The actuarial method
391. This is in contrast to the situation in a precomputed transaction in which the
credit service or loan finance charge is added to the amount of credit. If the full amount
of the obligation is collected and kept by the creditor in advance of the due date of the
final installment, then necessarily the charge includes some unearned items. The earlier
the prepayment is made, the greater the percentage of unearned charges collected.
392. Regardless of the legal rights involved, in real estate transactions mortgage
lenders have generally rebated unearned interest on a pro rata or actuarial basis in a full
prepayment situation, except when the mortgage or an applicable statute specifically
provides for some kind of prepayment penalty. Hunt, The Rule of 78: Hidden Penalty For
Prepayment In Consumer Credit Transactions, 55 B.U.L. REv. 331 (1975).
393. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-210(2), 37-3-210(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See also id. §
37-2-201(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See notes 241-42 and accompanying text supra. A creditor
must forego the right to this minimum charge, however, in a refinancing transaction. S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-205 (1976), 37-3-205 (Cum. Supp. 1977). If the rule were otherwise, a
creditor might be tempted economically to encourage refinancings in the early stage of
an obligation, especially when the amount of credit is small.
394. Id. § 37-2-210(2), 37-3-210(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
395. Id. §§ 37-2-210(4), 37-3-210(4) ("sum-of-the-digits" method), 37-2-210(5), 37-3-
210(5) ("actuarial" method). The comments at §§ 37-2-210 and 37-3-310 of the INEGRATED
CODE contain extensive examples showing the calculations of both methods to the same
set of facts. Another excellent summary of the sum-of-the-digits method, as well as a fairly
complete refund table, is found in 1 CoNs. CRED. Gum (CCH) 530. The Department of
Consumer Affairs has proposed a rule authorizing the use of various tables based on a 365-
1979]
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results in a rebate of essentially all of the unearned credit service
or loan finance charge because the calculations require that all
payments received be allocated first to the unpaid credit charge,
computed on an actuarial basis, and then to the unpaid balance
of the principal. The sum-of-the-digits method allocates a greater
portion of the total credit service or loan finance charge to the
earlier portions of the transaction than does the actuarial
method. As a consequence, the sum-of-the-digits method always
results in a lower rebate being due the debtor than the actuarial
method. 9 The amount of the difference increases with the term
and rate of the obligation and is greater during the initial months
of a typical precomputed installment transaction. Whichever
method is used or required, no rebate need be made if the amount
of the rebate due is less than one dollar.
39 7
(e) The actuarial method for computing the rebate can be
used in all cases, but is mandatory when more than 61 install-
ments are due or a nonstandard deferral charge has been made
in the transaction.
398
(f) In situations in which the sum-of-the-digits method is
authorized, the difference between a rebate calculated pursuant
to the sum-of-the-digits method 399 and the one calculated on the
day year actuarial rebate method, utilizing the annual percentage rate disclosed to the
consumer in the transaction, rounded to the nearest one half of one per cent. The creditor
is protected from liability for any error in such charts, provided the charts are not used
after discovery of an error. This proposed rule is being issued pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 37-2-210(5)(b), 37-3-210(5)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Note, however, the rule had not been
formally adopted as of 8/8/78 and will not be final until sometime in 1979.
396. See Hunt, supra note 392, at 338-39. "First, the higher APR (Annual Percentage
Rate) for a given term of indebtedness, the greater is the error in the Rule of 78. Second,
the longer the term for a given APR, the greater is the error in the Rule of 78. Third, if
both the rate and term increase, the resulting error increases dramatically." Id. at 349. A
dramatic example of these principles is when a $5,000 obligation on a mobile home is to
be repaid in 12 years at a 9% add-on rate (14.12% APR) and refinancing or consolidation
takes place in the 52d month. The actuarial refund method will result in a rebate that is
$1,157 higher than would be due under the sum-of-the-digits method. Id. at 346. The
dollar amount of the "error" or difference between the two methods peaks at approxi-
mately one-third of the transaction. Id. at 339. See also Comment, Rule of 78's And The
Required Disclosures Under Regulation Z, 23 U. KAN. L. REv. 709, 710-13 (1975).
397. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-210(1), 37-3-210(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
398. Id. §§ 37-2-210(4) to (5), 37-3-210(4) to (5) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The 1974 UCCC
recommends 48 months as the cut-off point for the Rule of 78's. 1974 UCCC § 2.510. The
legislative history of the SCCPC does not reveal any reason for the change to 61 months.
See note 1 supra. The rationale for a cut-off point is to eliminate the incentive to creditors
to refinance long-term installment contracts to increase the actual yield. See notes 373-
74 and accompanying text supra for discussion of the relation between deferrals and
prepayment rebates.
399. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-210(4) to (5), 37-3-210 (4) to (5) (Cum. Supp. 1977)
for transactions in which the sum-of-the-digits method is authorized.
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actuarial method is not a penalty and does not constitute a part
of the credit service or loan finance charge."' Any sum deducted
from the authorized rebate, however, such as an acquisition or
refinancing fee, must be included in the calculation of the credit
service or loan finance charge.0 '
(g) When prepayment is made other than by voluntary, full
prepayment by the debtor, the following rules apply:
(1) If a judgment is entered against the debtor following
acceleration after default, the debtor is entitled to any required
prepayment rebate on the obligation calculated as of the date
the judgment is entered. 2
(2) If the prepayment is made by the proceeds of consumer
credit insurance, the required prepayment is calculated as of the
date the creditor receives the insurance proceeds or twenty days
after proof of loss has been furnished to the creditor, whichever
is the earlier.0 '
(3) If prepayment is made in a refinancing or consolidation
transaction, 04 the required prepayment rebate that is credited
to the total amount due is calculated as of the effective date of
the refinancing. If the transaction is not precomputed, then the
amount of credit against which the permissible credit service or
loan finance charge is applied is the unpaid balance plus any
accrued, but unpaid, credit charge on the obligation in question.
400. See note 315 and accompanying text supra. In one respect, Act 988, which
governs the rates, charges and most other aspects of loans made by consumer finance
companies holding licenses under that Act, see Part I, section C(9) supra, gives the
consumer more protection in rebate situations that the SCCPC. Act 988 generally autho-
rizes the sum-of-the-digits rebate method, but requires that the rebate be calculated on
a pro rate basis if the loan is refinanced during the first 90 days of the contract. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 34-29-140 (Cum. Supp. 1977). This restriction, which has the effect of eliminating
any incentive for the creditor to encourage a refinancing during the first 3 months of a
contract, has no comparable counterpart within the SCCPC. Because a creditor will
increase the effective yield on a particular contract anytime the sum-of-the-digits rebate
method is used (versus the use of the actuarial method) and because a very high percen-
tage of small loans involve one or more refinancings, an amendment to the SCCPC similar
to the provision in Act 988 is worthy of serious consideration. According to one authority,
up to 80% of all small loans are refinanced or consolidated before being fully paid out.
See Hunt, supra note 392, at 333.
401. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-17-50 (1976), which is part of the Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Act, authorized a $15.00 acquisition fee in prepayment situations. This charge is
not an authorized excludible cost under the SCCPC.
402. Id. §§ 37-2-210(7), 37-3-210(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
403. Id. 99 37-2-210(8), 37-3-210(8). In other prepayment situations, credit insurance
written for the transaction will be cancelled. In these cases the creditor must refund or
credit to the debtor any premium rebate received from the insurer under rebate methods
approved by the South Carolina Insurance Commissioner. Id. § 37-4-108(3) to (4) (1976).
404. See Part II, section D(4) infra.
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The minimum fees specified in (b) above, however, cannot be
retained by the creditor in any such transaction."5
4. Refinancing, Consolidation, and Conversion
Transactions.-The SCCPC has provisions governing several dif-
ferent types of refinancing, consolidation, and conversion trans-
actions.
(a) Refinancing Rates for Closed-End Consumer Credit
Transactions.-A closed-end consumer credit sale or loan whose
rates and charges are governed by the SCCPC can be refinanced
in the traditional rewriting transaction. The permissible credit
service or loan finance charge is governed by the SCCPC rates
applicable to closed-end credit transactions."' Appropriate addi-
tional charges," 7 payment of which is deferred, can also be added
to the amount of the debt and excluded from the credit service
and loan finance charge."'
(b) Consolidation of Multiple Consumer Credit
Transactions. -When a debtor has more than one consumer
credit transaction with the same seller or lender, the creditor can
agree to consolidate the transactions in the same manner as refi-
nancing a single debt. The appropriate credit service and loan
finance charge rate ceilings are the same as for single debt refi-
nancing transactions. 9
405. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-205 (1976), 37-3-205 (Gum. Supp. 1977).
406. Id. See the Chart in Part V infra for a summary of the appropriate rate ceilings
for the various transactions referred to in this subsection.
407. See Part II, section D(1) supra.
408. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-205(2) (1976), 37-3-205(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The
minimum fee that can be retained by a creditor in a prepayment transaction, however,
cannot be retained in a refinancing of this type. See note 393 supra.
409. Id. §§ 37-2-206 (1976), 37-3-206(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977). If the transaction is a
closed-end consumer credit sale and is secured by cross-collateral, § 37-2-408 (1976), or
two or more secured transactions are consolidated with the result that only a single
periodic payment is due, all payments are deemed to be applied to the various security
interests on a pro rate basis in proportion to the original amounts of the respective debts
for the goods or services in question. Id. § 37-2-409(1). For example, if the original amount
financed in the first transaction is $1,000 and $500 in the second and the two debts are
consolidated or secured by cross-collateral, two-thirds of each payment will be allocated
to the first transaction and one-third to the second until the first transaction is deemed
to be paid in full. At that point the seller's security interest in the collateral in the first
transaction terminates. All subsequent payments are then allocated to the second transac-
tion. The 1968 and 1974 UCCC texts require the entire payment be applied to the original
goods or services purchased in a closed-end collateral transaction. 1968 UCCC § 2.409;
1974 UCCC § 3.303. While the UCCC allocation results in the initial collateral being
released more quickly than it is under the SCCPC, the UCCC allocation method has been
criticized as being unfair to the creditor because the amount of the debt on the new
collateral, which is constantly depreciating, is not reduced until after all prior transactions
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(c) An Alternative to Refinancing Multiple Consumer Credit
Sale Transactions.-When the debtor has more than one con-
sumer credit sale with a seller, an alternative to treating the
transaction as a refinancing is for the parties to agree to add the
unpaid balances together and have a single payment made. 10
This consolidation method will not result in any substantive
change in the credit service charge of any of the credit sales in-
volved, although it may involve an extension of the maturity of
the original obligation.4"'
(d) Consolidation and Refinancing Transactions Between
Different Creditors.-When the debtor has one consumer credit
obligation with a credit seller and another with a lender, the
parties can agree to refinance and consolidate with one of the two
creditors." ' If this is done, however, the maximum permissible
rates are those applicable to closed-end consumer loans. There-
fore, if a seller ends up as the creditor, the maximum permissible
rate is 12% per annum13 unless the seller can qualify as a super-
vised lender. As a practical matter, this provision is only feasible
for use by lenders who qualify to make loans at supervised loan
have been paid in full. In addition, a creditor can easily avoid the allocation problem by
not consolidating and continuing to apply the full amount of each payment to each
transaction involved, or by not securing the transaction with cross-collateral. The SCCPC
allocation method, which was the one adopted in one of the early drafts of the 1968 UCCC,
is a compromise between the first in - first out approach finally adopted by the UCCC
and a straight pro rata system based on the amount of the respective debts at the time of
the consolidation. The latter method was held unconscionable in Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), because the original collateral could
never be released until the entire debt had been paid. See Kripke, supra note 5, at 474-75
(1968). No parallel provision regulates consumer credit loans secured by cross-collateral.
The rationale of the Williams case would seemingly apply to loans as well as to sales. The
proposed FTC Rule on Unfair Credit Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 444 (1975), first published in
April 1975, requires an allocation on a first in - first out basis in all cross-collateral
obligations involving goods purchased from retailers. Failure to use this method would be
an unfair trade practice. This provision covers consumer credit sales and loans secured
by cross-collateral. If this rule becomes effective, it would supercede the pro rata provi-
sions in the SCCPC. See note 18 supra. Both the SCCPC and the UCCC require that
payments in revolving charge accounts secured by cross-collateral payments be allocated
first to the credit service charges and then to the unpaid balances of the amounts financed
in the order of purchase. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-409(2) (1976); 1968 UCCC § 2.409; 1974
UCCC § 3.303 (2).
410. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-206(2)(1976).
411. No refinancing is really involved in this transaction and, therefore, no prepay-
ment rebate is due. If one or more of the consolidated transactions are secured credit sales,
then the payments are to be applied as required by § 37-2-409. See note 408 and accompa-
nying text supra.
412. Id. § 37-3-206(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
413. Id. § 37-3-201.
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rates, which have a base ceiling of 18% per annum. '4
(e) Conversion to Revolving Loan Account.-When the
debtor has an open-end revolving charge account and either a
closed-end credit transaction with the same lender or a consumer
credit sale with a seller, the parties may agree to add the unpaid
balance of the other transaction- to the -open-end revolving loan
account." 5 This transaction is treated as a refinancing and the
appropriate loan finance charge ceiling is that applicable to open-
end loans. This alternative is not available to authorize consoli-
dation into a revolving charge account.
(f) Conversion in Event of Default in a Precomputed Loan
Transaction.-When the debtor is in default for 10 or more days
on two or more installments on a precomputed loan transaction,
the lender can elect to convert the loan to one in which the loan
finance charge is based on the unpaid balance.41 The appropriate
rate ceiling is then that for closed-end loans. This type of conver-
sion is an alternative to imposing delinquency or deferral charges.




Refinancing and consolidation transactions require special
regulations to ensure that a creditor cannot abuse them to evade
the rate ceilings on regular transactions. One method utilized by
the SCCPC to accomplish this goal is to require that all refinanc-
ing and consolidation of transactions, with one exception dis-
cussed below, be treated in effect as full prepayments. This
means that the debtor will be credited with an unearned credit
service or loan finance charge calculated as required by the
SCCPC rebate provisions .4  This prevents "flipping," which
arises when a creditor is not required to make rebates of un-
earned finance charges in refinancing transactions and, there-
fore, can add the unearned finance charge to the unpaid balance
and collect a new finance charge on the full amount. This process
results in collecting interest on interest."' The net result of the
414. Id. § 37-3-508; Part II, section B(1)(c) supra. It is highly unlikely, because of the
required convenience and advantage test, that a credit seller could qualify for a supervised
lender license.
415. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-207 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
416. Id. § 37-3-203(4).
417. The UCCC also prevents this option from being exercised in consumer credit
sales. 1968 UCCC § 2.203; 1974 UCCC § 2.502.
418. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-210, 37-3-210 (Gum. Supp. 1977). See Part II,
section D(3) supra.
419. The rate ceiling structure imposed on refinancing transactions is another at-
tempt to regulate flipping. See notes 406-18 and accompanying text supra. A creditor
could also seek to evade the normal rate structure by use of a large balloon payment at
[Vol. 29
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SCCPC provisions is that the credit service or loan finance charge
on the refinanced or consolidated transaction is based on the total
amount of credit extended after giving effect to all rebates due.
The one exception is a true consolidation involving consumer
credit sales in which the balances on two separate accounts with
the same seller are simply added together and made payable in
one rather than two payments (transaction (c) above). Although
such transactions frequently extend the maturity of the obliga-
tions, technically no refinancing, and, therefore, no rebate is in-
volved.
E. SCCPC Remedies
The individual and administrative remedies set forth in Arti-
cles 5 and 6 of the SCCPC are an integral part of the regulation
of consumer credit transactions that are governed by the SCCPC.
No regulatory system will be effective without a comprehensive
system of remedies to enforce its provisions. On the whole the
SCCPC remedies meet this criteria. The individual remedies are
more comprehensive and consistent than those available in non-
SCCPC transactions.2 More importantly, the administrative
powers of the Administrator of the Department of Consumer Af-
fairs provide the real assurance that the SCCPC will be fully
enforced. Individual consumers will often not know that a viola-
tion has occurred or will choose not to pursue a claim even if they
should discover a violation. The Administrator is armed with
broad investigative powers and can bring a variety of administra-
the end of the obligation. The creditor might agree to refinance the amount of the balloon
payment at a much higher rate than the original transaction. Another possible method of
evasion is to split one obligation into two or more obligations to collect the higher credit
charges authorized for obligations under $1,000 under the SCCPC rate structure. Refi-
nancing at a higher rate in the balloon payment situation is effectively controlled by
requiring the creditor to refinance the balloon payment (defined as one more than two
times the average prior payments) at the same rate as the original transaction. S.C. CODE
ANN. § § 37-2-405 (credit sales), 37-3-402 (1976) (consumer loans). The multiple agreement
abuse is regulated by the SCCPC provisions that make the extra credit service or loan
finance charge collected by a creditor excess charges subject to the various individual and
administrative remedies established in the SCCPC. Id. §§ 37-2-402 (Cum. Supp. 1977)
(consumer credit sales), 37-3-409 (1976), 37-3-509 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (consumer loans).
The SCCPC remedial provisions are discussed in Part II, section E infra.
420. See Part I, section D infra. The SCCPC civil and administrative remedies are
derived from an amalgamation of the 1968 and 1974 Texts of the UCCC. See generally,
Curran, Administration And Enforcement Under The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 33
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 737 (1968); Miller, Enforcement Of The Uniform Consumer Credit
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tive and court actions,421 to enforce any violation of the SCCPC.
Prior to the adoption of the SCCPC, the administrative enforce-
ment in consumer credit transactions was parceled out to a num-
ber of federal and state agencies that licensed or in some cases
insured the particular creditor, and the primary regulation of
credit practices of retail merchants and service companies grant-
ing consumer credit was through TIL and the various unfair trade
practice regulations administered by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. Although the SCCPC Administrator still shares investiga-
tive and enforcement powers with other regulatory agencies, the
centralization of the enforcement powers in the Administrator
substantially increases the chances that effective, consistent en-
forcement will take place.4 2
The following is a summary of the main features of the reme-
dies for violation of the SCCPC rate and charge provisions.
1. Individual Remedies.-
(a) Debtor Remedies.-The SCCPC provides three different
individual consumer remedies. The first requires a refund of any
excess charge that is collected by the creditor.4 3 A creditor must
actually make the refund to the debtor and is not allowed to
credit the account by the amount of the refund, unless the debtor
waives this right. This prevents the creditor from applying the
refund to the last maturing installments.419
Second, if the court finds that a violation has occurred, it is
required to award attorneys' fees and costs to the consumer. In
determining the attorneys' fees due, "the amount of the recovery
on behalf of the consumer is not controlling. 42 5 This language is
421. See notes 433-43 and accompanying text infra.
422. Rather than seeking the appropriate state or federal agency to file a complaint
with, a consumer can file with the SCCPC Administrator, who has the responsibility to
see that the complaint is funneled to other agencies that legally must be involved and to
see that appropriate action is taken to resolve meritorious complaints. S.C. CoDE ANN.
§§ 37-6-104 to -105. (Cum. Supp. 1977). Complaint centralization should have a signifi-
cant positive impact on the number of complaints and the action taken on them.
423. Id. § 37-5-202(3). Other SCCPC violations can also trigger the SCCPC civil
penalty and attorneys' fees provisions as well as other remedies. In some cases, the provi-
sion or practice that constitutes the violation is declared void or unenforceable. See, e.g.,
id. §§ 37-2-413 (1976), 37-3-404, -514 (excess attorneys' fees provision is unenforceable),
37-2-414 (1976), 37-3-405 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (excess default charge provision is unenforce-
able). If the debtor paid a charge that violated these provisions, the amount can be
recovered as an excess charge. See note 355 and accompanying text supra.
424. Id. § 37.5-202(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The consumer can lose the right to a refund
by affirmatively waiving the right or by failing to request the refund after being given a
30-day notice of the right by the creditor.
425. Id. § 37-5-202(8).
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obviously intended to encourage individual actions to enforce
SCCPC violations when the amount of recovery is too small to
justify representation by a private attorney on a contingent fee
basis. In this connection, the SCCPC, like the UCCC, does not
affect any existing state restrictions on private class actions.
Under South Carolina case law, however, it is extremely doubtful
that a private class action could be brought against a creditor
because of excess charges."'
Third, the court may award the debtor in a private nonclass
action suit a civil penalty of not less than $100 nor more than
$1,000. 427
(b) Creditor Defenses.-A creditor has a defense to liability
for one or more of these remedies under three different statutory
provisions. First, no liability other than for a refund of any excess
charge paid by the debtor is due if the "creditor shows by a
preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional
and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the mainte-
nance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error.
' '4 8
Similar language in TIL has been strictly construed, and credi-
tors in most cases have been relieved of liability only when the
error is purely clerical, such as the misreading of a rate table.
49
426. South Carolina has a state class action statute, § 15-5-50 (1976), but it is ex-
tremely doubtful that a class action based on a claim of excess charges is authorized by
this statute. This statute has been narrowly construed in the past and held inapplicable
to cases in which the issue in question can be fully determined without joining other
parties. See, e.g., Benjamin v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 269 S.C. 250, 237 S.E.2d 72
(1977); Wilder v. South Carolina St. Highway Dep't, 228 S.C. 448, 90 S.E.2d 635 (1955).
See also Note, State Class Actions, 27 S.C.L. REv. 87, 91-116 (1975). The rationale in these
decisions should apply to a case involving usury when the only issue necessary for decision
is whether the particular contract before the court violated the SCCPC or other applicable
usury statutes. Other parties having contracts with the same creditor might have differ-
ent or independent claims. The preclusion of a class action in a state court has no effect
on the right to maintain a class action in federal court, assuming the jurisdiction and
other requisites can be met. See TIL § 130, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1976) (class actions autho-
rized in TIL disclosure violation cases).
427. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-202(1), (3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
428. Id. § 37-5-202(7).
429. See, e.g., Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975); Haynes v. Logan
Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1974); Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Tr.
Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Foundation Plan, Inc. v. Breaux, 345 So.2d
955 (La. App. 1977). Many cases construing usury statutes have been more liberal in
excusing creditors for errors of fact in the absence of evidence of an intent to collect
usurious charges. Most courts, however, distinguish between errors of fact and errors of
law, allowing the creditor to escape with a mere refund when relatively minor errors of
fact are involved, but imposing a penalty when misinterpretations of law are involved,
even if the amount involved is minor. See, e.g., Georgia Inv. Co. v. Norman, 231 Ga. 821,
204 S.E.2d 740 (1974) (payment of $1 notary fee to employee of a lender held to be
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Second, the creditor can argue that the excess charge was
made in conformity with a rule, regulation, administrative inter-
pretation, or opinion issued by the SCCPC Administrator or the
Commission on Consumer Affairs. 3 The only remedy authorized
for the debtor in this situation is a refund of any excess charge
paid, but neither the civil penalty, nor presumably attorneys' fees
or costs, is awarded to the debtor.43 '
additional interest that caused loan to be usurious); Fisher v. Bethesda Discount Corp.,
221 Md. 271, 157 A.2d 265 (1960) (loan held void for usury when a $2.68 late charge was
collected for a payment that was four rather than the required five days overdue; the
lender forgot to exclude Sunday from the time period as required by statute); Annot. , 11
A.L.R.3d 1498 (1967) (contains a collection of cases in this area). The South Carolina
usury cases are consistent with those from other jurisdictions. See Graydon v. Standard
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 145 S.C. 551, 143 S.E. 259 (1928); Westrope v. Abbott, 134 S.C. 502,
133 S.E. 465 (1926); Tate v. Lenhardt, 110 S.C. 569, 96 S.E. 720 (1918); Rushton v.
Woodham, 68 S.C. 110, 46 S.E. 943 (1903); Mortimer v. Pritchard, 8 S.C. Eq. (Bail. Eq.)
505 (1831). But see Plyler v. McGee, 76 S.C. 450, 57 S.E. 180 (1906) (lender liable for
"unintentioned" mistake in charging compound interest). The South Carolina Supreme
Court has been more liberal than some other courts in excusing creditors when the error
has been made by an attorney advising one of the parties. Compare Haynes v. Logan
Furniture Mart, Inc. with Westrope v. Abbott; Mortimer v. Pritchard.
430. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-6-104(4), -506(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977). This defense is
available even though the rule, regulation, administrative interpretation, or opinion is
subsequently declared invalid. In addition, any creditor and not merely the creditor who
made the request or is the subject of the interpretation can utilize the defense. See also
note 254 and accompanying text supra.
431. The two applicable SCCPC sections are ambiguous concerning attorneys' fees
and costs, however. One statute states that "[e]xcept for refund of an excess charge, no
liability is imposed under this title for an act done or omitted in conformity with a rule
of the Administrator. . . "Id. § 37-6-104(4) (1976) (emphasis added). The other section
involved, § 37-6-506(3), states that
[n]o provision of this title or of any statute to which this title refers which
imposes any penalty on any creditor shall apply to any act done, or omitted to
be done, in conformity with any rule or regulation so adopted, amended or
repealed or in conformity with any written order, opinion, interpretation or
statement of the Commission or of the Administrator. . .(emphasis added).
The term "rule," used in both provisions, is defined in § 37-6-402(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977)
and appears to be broad enough to cover most of the actions mentioned in § 37-6-506(3),
except possibly "statements." This definition, however, specifically excludes declaratory
rulings, which under § 37-6-409 (1976) are treated as having "the same status as decisions
or orders in contested cases," another defined term. See id. § 37-6-402(1) (Cum. Supp.
1977). Declaratory rulings will at best be covered only by § 37-6-506(3), which excuses the
creditor from any "penalty," a term that is distinguished from attorneys' fees and costs
in the liability sections. See id. §§ 37-5-202 (civil liability in individual actions), 37-6-113
(civil actions by the Administrator). The entire issue is further complicated by the legisla-
tive adoption of a revised administrative procedure act in 1977, codified at §§ 1-23-10 to
-400. To the extent of any conflict, the APA will prevail. See, e.g., Garey v. City of Myrtle
Beach, 263 S.C. 247, 209 S.E.2d 893 (1974). The 1977 Act restricts the term "rule" to
decisions in "contested cases" and uses a new term, "regulations," to cover what is defined
as "rules" in § 37-6-402(5) of the SCCPC. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-10(4), -310(2), (6)
(Cum. Supp. 1977). As a result, more matters may fall under § 37-6-506(3) and be exempt
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Third, the creditor is not liable if he has notified the debtor
of the violation before the creditor receives written notice of the
violation from the debtor. The creditor must also correct the vio-
lation by refunding any excess charge paid by the debtor within
45 days after giving the debtor the required notification.43
2. Administrative Remedies.-The SCCPC Administrator
has several different enforcement powers.
First, the Administrator has broad investigatory powers, in-
cluding the power to examine all books and records and to sub-
poena records of any creditor entering into or collecting any in-
debtedness due on consumer credit transactions in South Caro-
lina . 31 Second, the Administrator can seek cease and desist or-
ders for violations . 3 4 All complaints concerning alleged violations
by supervised financial organizations (for example, banks, sav-
ings and loan institutions) must be referred to the administrative
agency having supervisory authority over these institutions. The
agency is then required to consult with the SCCPC Administrator
and to keep the Administrator informed of all developments. Any
cease and desist action can only be filed by the licensing
agency.43 Nevertheless, the SCCPC Administrator can bring
from civil liability but still may be subject to an award of attorneys' fees and costs.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-6-104(3) (1976) is identical to § 6.104(3) of the 1968 UCCC which
contains the identical definition of "rule" in § 6.402(5) as is contained in S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 37-6-402(5) (1976). Section 6.104(4) of the 1974 UCCC contains the same exculpatory
language as S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-6-104(4), but adds the terms "interpretation" and
"declaratory ruling" after "rule." The comments do not indicate that a major substantive
change was intended by the 1974 text change. Neither the 1968 nor 1974 UCCC contains
a section similar to § 37-6-506(3).
In summary, while the Legislature clearly intended to allow a creditor to escape all
liability that arises as a result of reliance on a public ruling of the Administrator, except
for refund of excess charges, the chosen language unfortunately falls short of accomplish-
ing this purpose. The entire issue is further complicated by the 1977 South Carolina
Administrative Procedure Act. Amendments to §§ 37-6-104(5), -506(3), clarifying the
actual legislative intent, are highly desirable. Cf. TIL § 130(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f) (1976)
(TIL provisions exempting a creditor from liability when an act is done or omitted to be
done in good faith "in conformity with any rule, regulation, or interpretation thereof by
the Board or in conformity with any interpretation or approval by an official or employee
of the Federal System duly authorized by the Board to issue such interpretations or
approvals. .. ").
432. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-202(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977). In this situation the creditor
has the choice of adjusting the account or refunding the excess to the debtor. Compare
note 424 and accompanying text supra. For disclosure violations, TIL and the SCCPC
require that a creditor make the correction within 15 days of notifying the consumer in
order to escape liability. TIL § 130(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(b) (1976); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-
5-203(2) (1976).
433. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-6-106 (1976).
434. Id.
435. Id. § 37-6-105 (Cum. Supp. 1977). A variety of different agencies have this
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other types of authorized actions, described below.
A third type of enforcement power is the right of the SCCPC
Administrator to bring a civil action seeking injunctions against
alleged violators of the SCCPC.436 The SCCPC Administrator also
can bring a civil action, including a class action, to recover actual
damages and excess charges imposed upon consumers. 37 The in-
dividual consumer's right to recover a civil penalty of up to $1,000
is not available in such an action; the Administrator, however,
can sue to recover a single civil penalty of up to $5,000, "for
repeatedly and intentionally violating" the SCCPC.13s
Approval must be obtained from the Commission on Con-
sumer Affairs for the commencement of litigation, except in a
nonclass action civil suit for damages and a cease and desist
action against a creditor who is not a supervised financial institu-
tion."9 This is an unusual and probably unique provision and is
not contained in the UCCC texts. The apparent purpose of this
section is to prevent the SCCPC Administrator from recklessly
bringing groundless lawsuits against creditors.440 No evidence ex-
ists so far that this approval requirement has caused any diffi-
culty for the Administrator.
3. Criminal Penalties. -Criminal sanctions, consisting of a
fine of up to $5,000, and imprisonment not exceeding one year,
power. For example, the South Carolina Board of Financial Institutions has licensing
authority over state banks, state savings and loan institutions, state credit unions, and
all consumer finance companies whether licensed under the SCCPC or Act 988 of 1966.
The Comptroller of the Currency has general supervisory control over national banks; the
Federal Home Loan Bank has general supervisory authority over federal savings and loan
associations. The Federal Credit Union Administration has licensing and supervisory
authority over federal credit unions. Many institutions are subject to both state and
federal supervision. For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the
South Carolina Board of Financial Institutions approve licenses and supervise the opera-
tions of state banks that are not members of the federal reserve system.
436. Id. §§ 37-6-110 to -12 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977). Included is the power to obtain
temporary restraining orders as well as permanent injunctions for substantive violations
of the SCCPC and unconscionable credit praitices. Injunctive relief can also be combined
with a claim for civil damages brought by the Administrator.
437. Id. § 37-6-113 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
438. Id. § 37.6-113(2). No civil penalty, however, can be recovered for "making un-
conscionable agreements or engaging in course of fraudulent or unconscionable conduct."
Id. An injunction under § 37-6-111 is the only remedy for unconscionable conduct.
439. Id. § 37-6-104(6).
440. The official legislative history contains no information on the rationale of this
section. See notes 1, 102 supra. The statement in the text is based on the author's personal
recollection of the debate on this issue in various meetings of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code Study Committee, which submitted this provision to the Legislature as part
of the 1976 SCCPC Amendments. See 1976 UCCC STUDY CoMmrrEE REPORT, supra note
1, at § 43.
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or both, can be imposed on "a lender who willfully makes charges
in excess of those permitted by applicable law.""' A violation is
a misdemeanor. A similar criminal statute for violation of the
South Carolina usury statutes' has apparently not been widely
utilized. The SCCPC Administrator can be expected, however, to
push for prosecution under the SCCPC criminal provision in ap-
propriate cases.
4. Miscellaneous. -The statute of limitations for suits
brought to enforce damage rights for excess charges under the
SCCPC is "one year after the scheduled or accelerated authority
of the debt" for closed-end transactions,443 and two years "after
the violation or passage of a reasonable time for refund occurs"
for open-end transactions.444 These statutes of limitations, how-
ever, only affect the right of affirmative recovery by the debtor,
who also has the right to assert the claim of excess charges and
penalties by way of defense or set off in any suit brought by the
creditor to collect on the obligation. 445 A creditor has six years
from the date of default to file a suit based on a note or security
agreement,446 and twenty years for a real estate mortgage. "
The SCCPC also directs that "[a]ny judgment obtained for
violations of any provision of this act shall draw interest on the
judgment at the same rate as initially charged by the lender to
the borrower. '4 8 This provision is quite unusual because the rate
ceilings under the SCCPC reach a maximum of 36% per year for
obligations of $300 or less. The statutory rate on all other judg-
ments is 6% per year.44 Some aspects of this provision are trou-
blesome. By its wording, this section only applies to loans and
may be interpreted as not applying to credit sales, an interpreta-
tion that would produce an anomalous and awkward situation. In
441. S.C. ConE ANN. § 37-5-301(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Criminal sanctions for excess
charges under the UCCC are limited to supervised lenders, not all lenders as under the
SCCPC. 1968 UCCC § 5.301; 1974 UCCC § 5.301. Credit sellers are not subject to criminal
liability under either the UCCC or the SCCPC.
442. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-100 (1976).
443. Id. § 37-5-202(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The statute of limitations for administra-
tive action seeking a special civil penalty under § 37-6-113(2) is two years from the act or
violation in question.
444. Id. § 37-5-202(3).
445. Id. § 37-5-205 (1976). This is a codification of the common-law right of set-off
utilized in prior South Carolina usury cases. See, e.g., Allen v. Petty, 58 S.C. 240, 36 S.E.
586 (1900); Land Mtg. Inv. & Agency Co. of Am. v. Gillam, 49 S.C. 345,26 S.E. 990 (1896).
446. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-520 (1976).
447. Id.
448. Id. § 37-6-416.
449. Id. § 34-31-20.
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addition, the section is placed in Article 6 of the SCCPC, which
contains the administrative remedies and other SCCPC adminis-
trative provisions, and a question exists on whether the section
applies only to judgments obtained by the SCCPC Administra-
tor. Furthermore, if the transaction out of which the judgment
arose has been refinanced at a higher or lower rate than at the
original obligation, it is unclear whether the rate on the judgment
should be the rate charged on the initial transaction or the rate
charged on the refinancing. 5 ' Because of these problems, the Leg-
islature should seriously consider revising this section.
One final problem that deserves brief discussion concerns the
applications of the SCCPC penalty provisions to national banks.
Because of the federal preemption doctrine,45 ' national banks vio-
lating the SCCPC rate and charge provisions are liable for the
penalties specified in the National Banking Act452 and not those
450. This section is not in either the 1968 or 1974 UCCC texts. The section was
originally an amendment to S.340 of 1973, adopted by the Senate in 1974. 1974 S.C. SEN.
J. 625.
451. See note 18 supra.
452. See 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1976) (calls for forfeiture of the entire interest due on the
obligation plus an affirmative recovery by the debtor of twice the interest paid by means
of a separate action or counter-claim). See, e.g., Farmers' & Mechanics' Natl Bank v.
Dearing, 91 U.S. 29 (1875); American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F.2d
980 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975) (federal remedy exclusive even though
state law determines whether the transaction is usurious); First Nat'l Bank v. Howard,
59 Okla. 134, 158 P. 438 (1916) (debtor's attorneys' fee authorized by state law not recover-
able against national bank). This is the same statutory usury penalty provided by S.C.
CODE ANN. § 34-31-50 (1976), which, as is pointed out in Part II, section D, continues to
govern many transactions whose rates and charges are not governed by the SCCPC. The
National Banking Act provision contains a two-year statute of limitations on the right to
recover the penalty that begins to run from the date of payment of the illegal interest.
See, e.g., Panos v. Smith, 116 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1940). Presumably S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-
6-416 (1976), which states that any judgment for violation of the SCCPC will bear interest
at the same rate as the initial loan obligations, rather than the normal judgment rate of
6%, § 34-31-20, will apply to a judgment against a national bank arising out of an SCCPC
violation. See notes 448-50 and accompanying text supra. The National Banking Act does
not prescribe any judgment interest rate.
The criminal penalties specified in the SCCPC can be enforced against a national
bank. State v. First Nat'l Bank, 2 S.D. 568, 51 N.W. 587 (1892), cert. denied, 163 U.S.
686 (1896). An individual or official administrator having jurisdiction over national banks
can bring an action to enforce the rights granted under 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1976) in either
state or federal court. See Daniel v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955);
Planters' Nat'l Bank v. Wysong & Miles Co., 177 N.C. 380, 99 S.E. 199, cert. denied, 250
U.S. 665 (1919). A national bank can escape liability under 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1976) under
the SCCPC bona fide error theory codified in S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-202(7) (Cum. Supp.
1977). This statute states that a creditor can escape liability if the violation was uninten-
tional and "resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of proce-
dures reasonably adapted to avoid the error." A national bank can also utilize whatever
other defenses are available against a claim of usury under state law.
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in the SCCPC. In many situations, however, the National Bank-
ing Act penalties are more stringent than those under the
SCCPC.453
PART III. CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
WHOSE RATES AND CHARGES ARE NOT
GOVERNED BY THE SCCPC RATES
CEILINGS
A. Introduction
Not only is all business and commercial credit exempt from
direct regulation by the SCCPC rate structure, but a significant
amount of what is normally thought of as consumer credit is also
excluded from the SCCPC rate and charge provisions. 54 The per-
missible rates and charges that can be made in these excluded
and exempted transactions are based on a complex combination
of statutory and case law typical of the usury system that exists
in most states. The rate structure for a particular transaction
depends on four interrelated factors: (1) The status of the creditor
as a seller or lender (there are several different types of lenders,
each with special rate structures), (2) the status of the debtor
(whether, for example, the debtor is an individual or a corpora-
tion with at least $40,000 of issued stock), (3) the type of credit
(the primary but not exclusive distinction being whether the
credit is a sale or a loan and whether it is secured by a real estate
One final issue involving national bank consumer credit loans made in South Caro-
lina deserves a brief comment. A national bank is allowed to charge "interest at the rate
allowed by the laws of the State. . . where the bank is located. . ." 12 U.S.C. 485 (1976).
This language has been interpreted to mean that a national bank can charge the highest
rate authorized by state law for any lender even though a state bank was not eligible to
make loans at these rates. Seee.g., Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 548 F.2d 255
(8th Cir. 1977); Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Northern Lanes v. Hackley Union Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co.,
464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1972); United Mo. Bank v. Danforth, 394 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. Mo.
1975). For criticism of this line of cases, see Comment, National and State Interest Rates
Under the National Bank Act: Preference or Parity?, 58 IOWA L. REv. 1250 (1973). See also
note 721 and accompanying text infra. This "most favored lender" doctrine provides
additional protection, which is unavailable to state banks, to a national bank sued on an
excess charge claim.
453. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-202 (Cum. Supp. 1977) with 12 U.S.C. § 86
(1976). See Part II, section E(1)-(2) supra.
454. See Part I, sections B and C supra.
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mortgage of some kind), and (4) the amount of credit.
Although the SCCPC deals with consumer credit, it contains
two significant provisions that affect all credit that is not gov-
erned by its rate ceiling structure. The first, which is identical to
the equivalent UCCC section 5 provides: "With respect to a sale
other than a consumer credit sale, the parties may contract for
the payment by the buyer of any credit service charge." '56 As a
result, there are no limitations of any kind on the rates and
charges that can be made on any credit sale that is not a con-
sumer credit sale under the definitions and exclusions of the
SCCPC15 1 This statute codifies the time-price doctrine 11 under
which the credit charges imposed in a credit sale are held not to
be interest and, therefore, to be exempt from the usury statutes.
This doctrine has been recognized in South Carolina for well over
a century."'
455. See 1968 UCCC § 2.605.
456. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-605 (1976).
457. There is no rate limit for real estate mortgages or other credit sales not covered
by the SCCPC rate structure. This includes any sale of real estate that is for personal,
family, or household purposes in which the seller takes a mortgage and the mortgage is
one that is "primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money security interest
in land." The transaction is by definition not a consumer credit sale. Id. § 37-2-104(2)(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part I, section B(4)(d) supra. A purchase money real estate
mortgage taken by a seller in connection with a credit sale that is not for personal, family,
or household purposes (e.g., a purchase money mortgage taken by a seller of real estate
used for business or farming purposes) is also exempt from any rate limitation under this
provision. A mortgage that is taken by a seller and that does not meet the test of being
"primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money security interest in land,"
but that is taken on land used for personal, family, or household purposes, is, however,
subject to the SCCPC rate structure. This is true regardless of the amount of the mortgage
since, if the other requisites of a consumer credit sale exist the mortgage is a consumer
credit sale. See id. § 37-2-104(1). See Part I, section B(1) supra. The SCCPC rate structure
also governs a mortgage taken by a seller that meets the statutory first lien purchase
money test when the parties agree that the SCCPC will apply to the transaction. Id. §
37-2-601 (1976). Section 37-3-601 (Cum. Supp. 1977), however, specifically prohibits the
parties from agreeing to make the transaction subject to the SCCPC in a loan transaction
"primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money security interest in land."
Since there is no rate maximum applicable to non-SCCPC real estate mortgages arising
from credit sales, a seller would probably not agree in many circumstances to have the
transaction governed by the SCCPC. A proposed bill (S. 899) designed to make all credit
sales involving real estate mortgages subject to the same rates as real estate mortgage
loans passed the South Carolina Senate in the 1978 legislative session, but was not voted
on by the House of Representatives.
458. For discussions of the doctrine, see, e.g., Brown v. Crandall, 218 S.C. 124, 61
S.E.2d 761 (1950); Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Installment Sales, 68
YALE L.J. 839 (1959); Note, Applicability of Usury Laws to Credit Installment Sales, 4
S.C.L.Q. 290 (1951); Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967).
459. See Coleman v. Garington, 28 S.C.L. (2 Speers) 238 (1843). The time-price
doctrine was most recently applied in Davenport v. Unicapital Corp., 267 S.C. 691, 230
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The second SCCPC provision46 that affects the rate struc-
ture of non-SCCPC transactions concerns maximum rates for
loans and, in contrast to the section on nonconsumer credit sales,
makes major changes in South Carolina law. This section, which
varies considerably from the equivalent section of the UCCC,45'
states:
With respect to a loan other than a consumer loan, the parties
may contract for the payment by the debtor of any finance
charge or other charge except such loans that are less than
$50,000 or are primarily secured by a first lien which is a pur-
chase money security interest in land.
462
For purposes of analysis this section can be viewed as creating two
categories of nonconsumer credit loans: (1) loans not secured by
real estate and (2) loans secured by real estate.
Non-SCCPC loans that are for $50,000 or above and are not
secured in whole or in part by a real estate mortgage are not
subject to any rate or charge limitations. This has significantly
changed the law governing these loans because the South Caro-
lina general usury statute,463 which before the enactment of the
SCCPC regulated these transactions, contains a maximum rate
structure of 10% for nonmortgage loans in excess of $50,000, but
not more than $100,000, 12% for loans in excess of $100,000, but
not in excess of $500,000 and no limitation on loans above
$500,000.
On the other hand, loans of less than $50,000 that are not
secured in whole or in part by a real estate mortgage are subject
to the pre-SCCPC usury statutes.6 4 The result is that, except for
those loans governed by the general SCCPC rate ceiling structure,
S.E.2d 905 (1976), in which the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the creditor's
failure to use the magic words "credit price" or "time price differential" indicated that
the transaction in question was a loan and not a credit sale and, as a loan, was usurious.
This case, based on a factual situation that arose before the effective date of the SCCPC,
concerned aluminum siding installed on a residence and typifies the strict construction
placed on the time-price doctrine in consumer credit transactions. Several courts have
held recently that various types of consumer credit sales were really loans and, therefore,
subject to the usury interest limitations. See note 273 supra. In effect, the SCCPC, like
the UCCC, adopts the rationale of these cases and subjects consumer credit sales to rate
maximums that are basically the same as the consumer loan rate ceilings.
460. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-605 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
461. See 1968 UCCC § 3.605, which provides that there is no rate limitation for any
loans not governed by the UCCC rate structure.
462. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-605 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
463. Id. § 34-31-30.
464. See Part II, section B infra.
1979]
111
Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
there has been no change in the rate structure for these loans.
If a non-SCCPC loan is secured in whole or in part by a real
estate mortgage, an entirely different rate structure applies and
depends on whether the loan is one "primarily secured by a first
lien which is a purchase money security interest in land." '465 If the
mortgage meets this test, the applicable rate structure is that
established in the general usury statute for loans secured by first
mortgages on real estate. 6' The rate structure for these loans is
thus the same as before the enactment of the 1976 SCCPC
Amendments. If the loan, however, is not "primarily secured by
a first lien which is a purchase money security interest in land,"
the applicable rate structure depends on whether the loan is less
than $50,000 and whether it qualifies as a first lien. If it is $50,000
or more, then there is no rate maximum regardless of whether it
is a first or second lien."'7 This represents a significant change
from prior South Carolina law, which regulated the rates of these
mortgages in amounts of $500,000 or less.468 If it is less than
465. See Part I, section B(4)(d) supra. If the mortgage does not meet this test but
involves a loan transaction that is primarily for personal, family, or household purposes
and otherwise meets the tests of a consumer loan, the mortgage is subject to the SCCPC
loan rate structure as well as to all other provisions of the SCCPC regardless of the amount
of the mortgage. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-104 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Unlike the practice
with credit sales involving mortgages, the parties cannot agree that a mortgage loan that
is "primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money security interest in land"
will be subject to the SCCPC. Id. §§ 37-3-601, -605. See also note 457 supra.
466. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
467. This is because § 37-3-605 (Cum. Supp. 1977) specifically states that the parties
may contract for a finance or other charge for any loan that is not a consumer loan subject
to the SCCPC or other special rate statute, except in two situations: (a) loans that are
less than $50,000 and (b) loans of whatever amount that are "primarily secured by a first
lien which is a purchase money security interest in land." Most wrap-around real estate
mortgages, which have been widely used in recent years, would probably be exempt from
any interest maximum if the amount of the mortgage is $50,000 or more since such
mortgages are generally considered second mortgages. See Note, Wrap-Around Financing:
A Technique for Skirting the Usury Laws?, 1972 DUKE L.J. 785. As this note indicates,
however, qualification of wrap-around mortgages as second mortgages, which are generally
eligible for higher interest rates than first mortgages, is far from certain. In addition, these
mortgages present other legal problems. See Ferguson v. Tanner Development Corp., 541
S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (collection of prepaid interest made note usurious even
though the total interest over the life of mortgage was less than statutory maximum). But
see Monning, Usury Implications of Front-End Interest and Interest in Advance, 29 Sw.
U.L. Rav. 748 (1975). In addition, these mortgages usually involve significant amounts
of prepaid interest, which under I.R.C. § 461(g), enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, must be amortized over the period to which the interest applies. Prior law autho-
rized the deduction of this interest in the year it was paid. This change will undoubtedly
reduce the incentive to use wrap-around mortgages in the future. See also I.R.C. § 189
(amortization of construction period interest).
468. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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$50,000, then, the applicable rate maximum ranges between 8%
and 12.68%, depending on the status of the lender and the lien of
the mortgage." 9 The rate ceiling structure for these loans is essen-
tially the same as existed prior to the adoption of the 1976 SCCPC
Amendments. ' 0
An additional complicating factor involved in all transac-
tions subject to the non-SCCPC rate statutes is the determina-
tion of the charges that must be included in the calculation of the
interest on loan finance charge in order to determine whether the
maximum rate has been exceeded. Except in a few cases, notably
Act 988 of 1966,111 the applicable statutes do not specify what
charges can be excluded from the interest calculations, as does
the SCCPC.472 Therefore, case law is the primary source of au-
thority for this determination. Unfortunately, the case law is not
consistent or comprehensive, particularly in cases involving real
estate mortgages. The interrelationship between the non-SCCPC
usury statutes and cases determining which charges must be in-
cluded and which can properly be excluded from the interest or
loan finance calculation are explored in sections B and C of this
Part.
B. Statutory Provisions
1. Basic Usury Statute.-The basic South Carolina usury
statute, which applies in the absence of any statutory exception,
provides:
No greater interest than six percent per annum shall be
charged, taken, agreed upon or allowed upon any contract aris-
ing in this State for the hiring, lending or use of money or other
commodity, either by way of straight interest, discount or other-
wise, except upon written contracts wherein, by express agree-
469. See Part II, section B(2)(a) infra. All rates cited in this Part are based on 12-
month contracts. Rates for longer term contracts will be higher in many cases. See also
B(a) of the Chart in Part V infra for a summary of the possible rates that would apply to
such a transaction.
470. The rates discussed in this paragraph are based on the assumption that the
mortgage loan in question is not covered by the SCCPC. If it is, then the SCCPC rate
structure would apply. See Part V, Chart B(9)(e) infra.
471. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Act 988 of 1966 (codified
at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-29-10 to -260 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977)) governs consumer
finance companies that want to qualify to make high rate restricted loans, in contrast to
supervised loans that require a supervised lender license. See Part I, section C(9) supra
and Part III, section B(2)(b)(ii) infra, for further discussion of Act 988.
472. See Part II, section D supra.
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ment, a rate of interest not exceeding eight percent may be
charged . . .
The maximum allowable rate under this statute is 6% unless the
debtor agrees in writing to a rate not exceeding 8% per annum.
As a practical matter, however, the 6% limitation comes into play
only in a loan or contract in which no interest rate is specified or
in a verbally made loan. But these situations are quite rare. The
maximum contract rate, then, is effectively 8%, and this figure
is referred to as the maximum contract rate throughout the re-
mainder of this article.
2. Exceptions to the 8% Contract Interest Rate.-A number
of South Carolina statutes create exceptions to this basic 8%
contract rate. Some of these exceptions have broad application,
and others apply to one specific type of institution. A great vari-
ety in the rate of interest is allowed by the statutes. Some of these
statutory exceptions express the rate as so many dollars per
$100 per annum, and others speak in terms of a certain percen-
tage per month or per year. Some specifically allow or prescribe
certain additional charges; others do not. The result is that it is
extremely difficult for a lawyer, much less a layman, to under-
stand, compare, and analyze all these exceptions intelligently.
(a) General Exceptions.-The following exceptions to the
8% contract rate are available to all creditors who meet the cri-
teria listed, unless their rates are governed by special statutory
rate ceilings.
(i) No Rate Ceiling.-The following transactions are not
subject to any rate ceilings established by South Carolina stat-
utes:
(a) A credit sale that is not covered by the general SCCPC rate
ceiling structure. "' This includes a credit sale secured by a real
estate mortgage.
473. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977). In contrast to SCCPC rates,
which must be calculated on the basis of a 365-day year, see note 322 and accompanying
text supra, non-SCCPC rates can be calculated on the basis of a 360-day year. See Mer-
chants' & Planters' Bank v. Sarratt, 77 S.C. 141, 57 S.E. 621 (1907).
474. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 37-2-605 (1976). See notes 457-61 and accompanying text
supra. One additional type of transaction involving credit sales of real estate that merits
some discussion is a "sale" of property by a lender who as the mortgagee purchases the
real estate at a foreclosure sale or takes title to the property in lieu of a foreclosure. If the
lender subsequently conveys the property to a third party and in return takes a mortgage
for all or a portion of the sales price, is this subsequent transaction a "credit sale" or a
"loan"? If it is a loan, the transaction is subject to much more stringent rate regulation
than if it is a sale. See notes 484-500 and accompanying text and Part V infra. The answer
to this question is critical in a situation in which the rate in the new mortgage exceeds
[Vol. 29
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the maximum rate authorized for a mortgage loan for the principal involved. The argu-
ment in favor of the transaction's being a sale and, therefore, subject to the credit sale
rate maximums is as follows: The lender properly obtained legal title to the property and
the original mortgage has been extinguished. Its prior existence, therefore, should be
legally irrelevant to subsequent sales. In addition, there is no reason why the lender should
not be treated like any other party who sells property. If a nonlender had purchased the
property at the foreclosure sale and subsequently conveyed it and took back a purchase
money mortgage, no one would seriously question that the transaction was a sale. See,
e.g., Stark v. Bauer Cooperage Co., 3 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1925); Wheeler v. Marchbanks,
32 S.C. 594, 10 S.E.2d 1011 (1890); Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1121-24 (1967).
The argument that the transaction should be treated as a loan for usury purposes
rather than as a sale is as follows: Courts have always taken the position that the sub-
stance and not the form of the transaction controls its characterization and have in past
cases involving real estate mortgages held that transactions that are cast in the form of
sales and, therefore, exempt from usury claims under the time-price doctrine, are actually
loans. See, e.g., Raben v. Overseas Barters, Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 613, 286 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup.
Ct. 1967); cf. Chewning v. Huebner, 142 Ga. App. 112, 235 S.E.2d 573 (1977) (subsequent
refinancing of original purchase money mortgage assumed by a subsequent purchase held
to be a usurious loan); London v. Toney, 263 N.Y. 439, 189 N.E. 485 (1934) (same basic
fact situation as Chewning); 1970 Op. S.C. ATr'y GEN. No. 2652; 1967 Op. S.C. ATr'y GEN.
No. 2363. The argument that these transactions are in substance loans is strengthened
by the fact that lenders are in the business to make loans and not to sell property, in credit
sales transactions. Some lenders are actually prohibited from holding on an indefinite
basis property taken in satisfaction of mortgages. See 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1976) (national
banks may hold this type property for no more than five years); cf. Rules and Regs. of
the S.C. Bd. of Fin. Insts. 15-26 S.C. CODE OF STATE REGS. (1976) (state savings and loan
associations must write down the value of such property on a yearly basis). In addition,
the imposition of rates higher than can legally be made for loans under the guise of a sale
is an indication of an intent to evade the usury laws. See, e.g., Raben v. Overseas Barters,
Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 613, 286 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Mayfield v. British & Am. Mtg.
Co., 104 S.C. 152, 157-58, 88 S.E. 370, 372 (1916) (looks to substance of transaction and
intent of lender). While the mortgagee technically has title to the property, this should
not, under the circumstances, authorize the mortgagee to charge a rate higher than it
could have charged had it made a mortgage loan when it did not own the property being
mortgaged.
The pertinent South Carolina cases are inconsistent. Cohen v. Williams, 164 S.C. 499,
162 S.E. 758 (1932), held that a subsequent sale involving a purchase money mortgage by
the original mortgagee who purchased the property at a foreclosure sale was a credit sale
that qualified for application of the time-price doctrine even though the mortgagee had
charged the new purchaser the maximum interest plus $300 profit over and above the
foreclosure sales price. In an earlier case, Milford v. Milford, 67 S.C. 553, 46 S.E. 479
(1903), however, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a sale of real state in which
the seller took a purchase money mortgage was a loan transaction. Cohen, which did not
discuss Milford, nevertheless appears to have overruled it. In Brown v. Crandall, 218 S.C.
124, 161 S.E.2d 761 (1950), however, the supreme court stated that Milford failed to meet
the time-price test of a credit sale because the deed had stated the total consideration for
the sale to be $1632.00, whereas the notes executed in connection with the mortgage added
up to $2251.20. Apparently the interest was included in the notes. According to the court,
a valid credit price for the purposes of the time-price doctrine could have existed only if
the deed had stated that the consideration was $2251.20. Id. at 129, 61 S.E.2d at 763. If
this rationale is followed, and the supreme court has in the past strictly construed the
time-price doctrine, no credit sale of real property involving a mortgage would qualify as
a "sale" under the time-price doctrine unless the consideration in the deed and the
amount of the mortgage included the full amount of the "interest" to be collected in the
transaction. Cf. Davenport v. Unicapital Corp., 267 S.C. 691, 230 S.E.2d 905 (1976) (credi-
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(b) A loan in excess of $50,000 not secured by a real estate
mortgage.'71
(c) A real estate mortgage loan in excess of $50,000 in which
the mortgage is not "primarily secured by a first lien which is a
purchase money security interest in land" and the loan is not
for personal, family, or household purposes. 8
(d) A real estate mortgage loan in excess of $500,000 that is
"primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money
security interest in land."4 '
(e) A real estate mortgage loan purchased or insured by a gbv-
ernment agency.' 8
tor's failure to use the magic words "credit price" or "time-price differential" result in a
loan and not a sale). The cost of documentary stamps alone makes this approach impracti-
cal in a transaction of any sizeable amount or term. Cohen is distinguishable from Milford
since Cohen is not a time-price case because the court determined that the $300 profit
made by the original mortgagee when he sold the property was not interest. Hence, the
interest rate in the mortgage was legal even if the transaction had been considered a loan.
Sufficient doubt about the ultimate outcome in this type of situation exists to indi-
cate that lenders are well advised not to make real estate mortgages on reacquired mort-
gaged property that is subsequently sold at rates higher than the authorized loan rates
until the legal issues involved can be clarified by legislative or judicial action.
475. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-605 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
476. Id.
477. Demas v. Convention Motor Inns, 268 S.C. 186, 232 S.E.2d 724 (1977); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
478. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-19-10 to -30, 34-25-150 (1976), 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp.
1977). All mortgages purchased in'whole or in part or insured by the Federal Housing
Administration, Veterans Administration, Farmers Home Administration, Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association, Government National Mortgage Association, Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation, "or by any State or Federal governmental or quasi-
governmental organizations" are exempt from any South Carolina rate limitation. The
rates on some of these types of mortgages are established essentially by free market bids,
for example, those purchased by the Federal National Mortgage Association; however, the
maximum rates on other, such as many types of FHA and VA loans, are established by
federal statute or regulation. The various federal programs accounted for 13.29% of all
outstanding real estate mortgages in the United States at the end of 1976. SAVINGS AND
LOAN FACT BOOK 30 (24th ed. 1977). At the end of 1976 only two percent of the total real
estate mortgages held by savings and loan associations operating in South Carolina were
VA or FHA-HUD loans. Fed. Home Loan Bd. of Atlanta, Statistics (1977) (unpublished).
The remainder of the federally sponsored programs were handled by other lenders, princi-
pally private mortgage companies and insurance companies. For a detailed description of
the various federal programs, see SAVINGS AND LOAN FACEOOK supra, at 110-17. See
generally H. BIVENS, BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION (1969). Although the legislation creating this exemption covers mortgages
purchased by state agencies, no valid program of this kind presently exists in South
Carolina. See also note 488 infra. As of June 29, 1978, the maximum rate set by HUD for
FHA single-family residential loan programs and by the Veterans Administration for VA
loans was 9.50% per annum. 43 Fed. Reg. 29000, 29113 (1978). In addition to these interest
rates, the mortgagor may pay directly or indirectly "points," which raise the mortgagee's
effective yield, and, in the case of FHA insured loans, an annual insurance premium of
1/2 of 1% of the average principal outstanding.
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(f) A loan to a corporation with $40,000 of issued capital stock.
A corporation organized to do business for profit with issued
capital stock of a par value of $40,000 or more, or stated capital
of $40,000 when the stock is no par, is prohibited from pleading
or claiming usury in either a civil or criminal action." 9 Thus,
there is no rate ceiling for loans to these corporate borrowers.
The amount of issued capital stock reported to the South Caro-
lina Tax Commission in the annual report of corporations, or in
a similar report by a foreign corporation, is conclusive evidence
of the $40,000 minimum required by this statute."' Guarantors,
accommodation parties, and other persons secondarily liable on
the obligation are prohibited from making a usury claim.48' This
prohibition also applies to assignees, transferees, and other suc-
cessors in interest of corporate obligors meeting the $40,000 is-
sued capital requirement. This provision overrides any statutory
interest rate limitation. Its main effect, then, is to include
within the category of transactions having no rate maximum
loans made to corporations with issued capital of $40,000 or
more in which the amount loaned is either less than $50,000 and
not secured by real estate, or $500,000 or less and "primarily
secured by a first lien which is a purchase money security inter-
est in land."4 ' Partnerships, joint ventures, proprietorships, and
other types of noncorporate entities do not fall within the ambit
of this statute.4
479. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-80 (1976).
480. Id.
481. Robert L. Huffines, Jr., Foundation, Inc. v. Rockie Realty, Inc., 347 F. Supp.
1256 (D.S.C. 1972). This accords with the rule generally followed in the United States.
See, e.g., Universal Metals & Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976); Sundseth
v. Roadmaster Body Corp., 74 Wis. 2d 61, 245 N.W.2d 919 (1976). An individual comaker,
however, can plead usury because he is primarily and not secondarily liable. See, e.g.,
Universal Metals & Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976). The claim of usury
is considered personal to the borrower. This is the rationale for the rule that an assignee
or vendee cannot recover for usury if the assignor or vendor had no valid usury claim. See,
e.g., Zeigler v. Maner, 53 S.C. 115, 30 S.E. 829 (1897); S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-70 (1976)
(only the "borrower and his heirs, devisees, legatees or personal representative or any
creditor or any person having a legal or equitable interest in the estate or assets of such
borrower may plead" usury).
482. See Part I, section B(4)(d) and notes 462-70 and accompanying text supra. A
mortgage loan of less than $50,000 that does not meet the purchase money security interest
test is also exempt from any rate limitation if it is made to a qualifying corporation; but
these loans are less likely to occur than loans falling within the two categories described
in the test.
483. An issue that has not been decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court is the
status of a loan to a corporation that is in effect a "dummy" corporation meeting the
requirements of S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-80 (1976) but having no purpose other than to
serve as a vehicle for a loan at a higher rate. The courts are split on this issue. Most follow
the New York rule that upholds the transaction against the claim of usury if the corporate
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(ii) Real Estate Mortgages Other Than Those Not Subject
to Any Rate Limitation. -The rate structure for real estate mort-
gages that are regulated by South Carolina statutes is compli-
cated immensely by the amorphous concept of a mortgage loan
"primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money
security interest in land," a concept that is used in the SCCPC
to exclude certain real estate mortgages from the definition of a
consumer credit sale and a consumer loan.4"4 This same concept,
however, 'is also used as a linchpin to distinguish between mort-
gage loans that are subject to non-SCCPC South Carolina rate
statutes and those that are not.48 5 None of the rate statutes for
real estate mortgages were designed to harmonize with the magic
words "primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase
money security interest in land." The result is a very complex
mortgage rate structure, which for the purpose of analysis can be
broken down into three broad categories.
The first category consists of a considerable number of real
formalities are complied with. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521
(1930). The other courts follow the stricter New Jersey rule that looks at the substance of
the transaction to determine if the loan is actually made to an individual or noncorporate
entity at a usurious rate. See, e.g., Lesser v. Strubbe, 56 N.J. Super. 274, 152 A.2d 409
(1959). See generally Gortnan, Using a "Dummy" Corporate Borrower Creates Usury and
Tax Difficulties, 28 Sw. L.J. 437 (1974); Note, Incorporation to Avoid the Usury Laws, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 1390 (1968). Under the existing interest rate structure in South Carolina,
this question will actually present problems only in situations involving real estate mort-
gages for apartments and for other commercial and business purposes when the amount
of the mortgage is $500,000 or less. Even in these situations, there is less likelihood now
than in the past that a developer or owner would be willing to form a corporation in order
to obtain a mortgage. Many real estate ventures are based on the ability of the investors
to offset against their other income various tax losses generated by the business. This can
be accomplished if an individual or a partnership (although in the case of partnerships to
a lesser degree than before the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976) owns the
property but not if a corporation is the owner of the property, unless the corporation
qualifies for subchapter S status. This is difficult to achieve in most types of real estate
ventures. Attempts by taxpayers to utilize a corporate form for loan purposes and subse-
quently to claim that it should be disregarded for tax purposes have been largely unsuc-
cessful. See Stogel & Jones, Straw and Nominee Corporations in Real Estate Tax Shelter
Transactions, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 403. If the loan is made to a corporation that subse-
quently conveys the property to individuals or to a partnership, the vendee cannot claim
the mortgage was usurious. See note 481 supra. See also Rosen v. Columbia Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 29 Misc.2d 329, 213 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Annot., 82 A.L.R. 1153 (1933).
484. See Part I, section B(4)(d) supra.
485. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-605 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Non-SCCPC credit sales are
not subject to any rate limitation. See id. § 37-2-605 (1976). See also notes 455-59 and
accompanying text supra. This was the state of the law in South Carolina before the
SCCPC. Rates on mortgage loans have traditionally been highly regulated, and the inter-
action of the purchase money security interest test with these traditional mortgage loan
rate statutes is the major source of the complexity discussed in the text.
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estate mortgages that are not subject to any South Carolina sta-
tutory rate limitations. These mortgages are listed in the preced-
ing subsection. 86
A second category includes the mortgages subject to the rate
structures of the SCCPC45 7 or, if the lender is a qualified restricted
lender,488 to Act 988 of 1966.88 These rate structures apply to any
real estate mortgage transaction, regardless of the amount, in
which the credit is used primarily for personal, family, or house-
hold purposes and in which the transaction is not one that is
"primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money
security interest in land." All these mortgages are by definition
consumer credit transactions.8 0 A second mortgage on a home
owned by the mortgagor who uses the loan proceeds primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes, is one example of a mort-
gage qualifying under this category. Another example is a first
mortgage on the borrower's residence when the residence was not
at the time subject to any other mortgage and the loan proceeds
are used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
All other real estate mortgages comprise the third category
and are subject to non-SCCPC South Carolina rate statutes. The
applicable rate statute for a particular transaction in this cate-
gory depends on a number of factors, the most important of which
are the amount of the loan and the qualification of the mortgage
as one "primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase
money security interest in land.""49 The following is a summary
486. See notes 474-78 and accompanying text supra. Mortgage loans to corporations
with $40,000 or more of issued capital stock are also not subject to a usury defense. See
notes 479-83 and accompanying text supra.
487. See Part II, section B(1) supra. The basic rate maximum for these mortgages is
18% per annum.
488. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-3-501(3) to (4) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part I, section
C(9) supra.
489. See Part III, section B(2)(b)(ii) infra.
490. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-104(2)(b), 37-3-104(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part
I, section B(4)(d) supra. Real estate mortgages taken in connection with consumer credit
sales, as well as real estate mortgage loans, qualify for this category. Non-SCCPC credit
sale mortgages, however, are exempt from any rate limitations. See id. § 37-2-605 (1976).
See notes 455-59 and accompanying text supra.
491. All the problems with this purchase money security interest concept discussed
in Part I, section B(4)(d) supra apply to the following remarks. The interpretations of this
concept by the South Carolina Commission on Consumer Affairs are also relevant. See
note 125 supra. Mortgage lenders will naturally seek ways to keep a mortgage for personal,
family, or household purposes from qualifying as one "primarily secured by a first lien
which is a purchase money security interest in land" because most nonqualifying mort-
gages are eligible for higher rates than mortgages meeting this test. Litigation over the
proper scope of a purchase money security interest mortgage is likely because of the many
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of the maximum rate structure applicable to mortgages falling
within this residual category:
(1) A real estate mortgage that is "primarily secured by a
first lien which is a purchase money security interest in land."
The rate structure for these loans is: 9% for loans not in excess of
$60,000, 10% for loans in excess of $60,000 but not more than
$100,000, 12% for loans in excess of $100,000 but not more than
$500,000, and no limitation for such mortgages exceeding
$500,000.412 This rate structure governs basically all first mortgage
loans in which the loan is used by an individual to purchase land
for future development as a homesite or to build or to purchase a
personal residence. It also governs any qualifying first mortgage
when the loan proceeds are used for business or for any other
nonconsumer purpose as, for example, to finance a factory, shop-
ping center, or a real estate development project. It is not, how-
ever, applicable to any first mortgage that does not qualify as one
"primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money
security interest in land" or to any second mortgage. All these
mortgages are governed by the SCCPC or Act 988 of 1966 if the
loan is used primarily for personal, family, or household pur-
poses."0 3 If the loan is not for these purposes, the rate structure
problems with this concept. Any scheme or artiface that gives the appearance of trying to
avoid the interest limitations that govern purchase money mortgages will substantially
increase the chances that a court will find a particular transaction usurious. See notes 617-
21, 706 and accompanying text infra.
492. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977). In the 1978 legislative session,
the South Carolina Legislature attempted to amend this section to provide that all first
lien real estate mortgages of $100,000 or less could have a maximum interest rate of 10%.
The constitutionality of this amendment is discussed in the Addendum at the end of this
article. In 1977 the General Assembly enacted legislation establishing the rate structure
set forth in the text. No. 222, 1977 S.C. Acts 223-24. This legislation, whose constitution-
ality is not in doubt, will expire on July 1, 1979. The 1978 legislation will also expire on
the same date. Unless the legislature enacts special legislation after June 30, 1979, the
rate structure on mortgage loans of amounts up to $100,000 will be 8% for mortgages not
in excess of $50,000 and 10% on mortgages in excess of $50,000, but not more than
$100,000. Id. Legislation authorizing a basic rate of 9% for standard first mortgages on a
two-year basis was first passed in 1973. No. 839, 1973 S.C. Acts 1879. The 9% rate applied
to mortgages of $50,000 or less until June 30, 1977, the effective date of the legislation
extending the rate an additional two years. No. 122, 1977 S.C. Acts 223-24.
Some real estate mortgages might be made pursuant to § 34-13-120 (1976), which
authorizes a 7% add-on rate (12.68% per annum for a 12-month note) for installment
loans. See notes 506-12 and accompanying text infra. Mortgages made under the authority
of this statute are, like other closed-end installment loans, precomputed transactions in
contrast to standard mortgages, which are usually fully amortized. Section 34-13-120 is
most often used for mortgage loans on unimproved real estate and for some second mort-
gages.
493. See notes 487-90 and accompanying text supra.
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outlined in the next paragraph is applicable.
(2) A real estate mortgage that is not "primarily secured
by a first lien which is a purchase money security interest in
land" and the loan proceeds are not used primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes. There is no rate limitation on
these mortgages unless the amount of the mortgage is less than
$50,000. 411 Mortgages of less than $50,000 can utilize the highest
of the following four rate maximums for which the loan in ques-
tion can qualify: 12.68% per annum, if the mortgage can qualify
as an installment loan;495 12% per annum if the parties agree that
the transaction will be governed by the SCCPC;59 9% if the mort-
gage qualifies as a first mortgage;49 ' or 8% if the mortgage does
not qualify for the higher rates authorized in any of the above.""
This rate structure applies to all second mortgages in which
the loan proceeds are not used primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes; for example, a second mortgage on a home
taken as security for a business loan to the borrower. It also ap-
plies to any first mortgage that does not qualify under the pur-
chase money security interest rubric when the loan proceeds are
not used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes;
for example, a business loan involving a first mortgage placed on
business property that was previously not subject to any mort-
gage.
South Carolina statutes also contain stringent restrictions on
the use of variable interest rates. Although 1977 legislation au-
thorizes a variable interest rate for mortgage loans in excess of
494. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-605 (Cum. Supp. 1977). An argument can be made
that any mortgage falling within this category, regardless of the amount, is free from any
interest limitations under the wording of § 37-3-605 (Cum. Supp. 1977). This interpreta-
tion requires that the $50,000 threshold in the section be construed as applying only to
non-real estate transactions. For at least two reasons, it is unlikely that the South Carolina
Legislature intended this construction. First, contrary to prior South Carolina law, it frees
many second mortgages and some first mortgage loans made to businesses from any rate
limitations. The available legislative history indicates that in enacting the 1976 SCCPC
Amendments the Legislature intended to leave mortgage interest rates unchanged. See
notes 1 and 102 and Part I, section B(4)(d) supra. Second, since there is no comma
between the $50,000 languag6 and the phrase "or are primarily secured by a first lien
which is a purchase money security interest in land," this interpretation of § 37-3-605
(Cum. Supp. 1977) violates the normal rules of statutory construction.
495. Id. § 34-13-120 (1976). See Part Ill, sections B(2)(b)(i) and B(2)(b)(ii) infra.
496. Id. § 37-3-601 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Loans that are "primarily secured by a first
lien which is a purchase money security interest in land," are, however, not eligible for
this agreement. See Part H, section B(3); note 457 and accompanying text supra.
497. Id. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
498. Id. The 8% maximum automatically applies if no exception is available. See note
473 and accompanying text supra.
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$100,000,111 its use in mortgages of $100,000 or less is severely
limited by two factors: the variation cannot exceed 1% over and
above the interest rate initially agreed upon, and if the rate is
raised, the mortgagor has the option of paying off the mortgage
without penalty; and if the mortgage is $50,000 or less, the maxi-
mum rate, including the maximum variable rate, cannot exceed
8%, which is less than the rate authorized for such mortgages in
the absence of a variable rate."'° The result is that on mortgage
499. No. 122, 1977 S.C. Acts 223-24 (amending S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-31-30, -90(2)
(1976)). Prior to this legislation, the wording of these two statutes on variable interest rates
was confusing at best. They were also subject to being interpreted as prohibiting the use
of variable interest rates on any mortgage, except those of $50,000 or less in which the
highest interest rate was less than 8%.
500. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-90(2) (1976), as amended by No. 122, 1977 S.C. Acts
223-24. The use of variable interest rates in residential mortgages has not met with a great
deal of success in the United States, although this device has been used in Europe and
England for several decades. See Landers, The Truth in Lending Act and Variable-Rate
Mortgages and Balloon Notes, 1976 Am. B. FouNDATION RESEARCH J. 35; Werner, Usury
and the Variable-Rate Mortgage, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 155 (1976); Note, Adjustable Interest
Rates in Home Mortgages: A Reconsideration, 1975 Wis. L. Rav. 742.
A clause authorizing a rise in the stipulated rate in the event of a statutory increase
in the state's authorized rate has been held illegal on the ground that changes in the usury
statutes operate only prospectively. Campbell v. Gawart, 46 Mich. App. 529, 208 N.W.2d
607 (1973). Compare Campbell with Union Mtg. Banking & Tr. Co. v. Hagood, 97 F. 360
(C.C.D.S.C. 1899); Lewis v. Dunlap, 112 S.C. 544, 100 S.E. 170 (1919); Exchange Bank
v. McMillan, 76 S.C. 561, 57 S.E. 630 (1907) (statutes in effect at time loan entered into
control determination of usury). An attempt to avoid the legal problems of variable inter-
est rates by means of a clause adjusting the principal for inflation was struck down in
Aztec Properties, Inc. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 530 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976). See also Olwine v. Torrens, 344 A.2d 665 (Pa. 1975); Note,
Indexing the Principal: The Usury Laws Hang Tough, 37 U. Prrr. L. REv. 755 (1976). A
more promising solution is a new HUD program that has a fixed interest rate, but autho-
rizes lower payments in the early years of the mortgage than in later years. The amounts
that would have been payable on a constant payment basis in excess of the amounts
actually paid in the reduced payment years are added back to the principal. This variable
payment program, also known as an "FHA 245 loan," avoids the legal problems inherent
in a variable interest rate mortgage. It does, however, raise other usury questions because,
in effect, these plans involve interest on interest, or compounding of interest. In October
1977 Congress passed legislation authorizing the use of graduated mortgage payment plans
on a permanent basis and exempting all these mortgages that are insured under a National
Housing Act program from any state interest restrictions. Housing and Community Devel-
opment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, § 310, 91 Stat. 1136 (1977) (amending 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715z-10 (1976)). Existing South Carolina statutes exempt mortgages insured or pur-
chased by any federal program from any state usury limitations; so the use of graduated
mortgage payments for any of these mortgages produces no usury problems. See S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-19-10 to -30, 34-25-150 (1976), 34-31-10 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The use of gradu-
ated payments in other types of mortgages, however, is possibly subject to attack because
of usurious compounding of interest. See note 631 and accompanying text infra. The
Federal Home Loan Bank Board has recently published proposed regulations that autho-
rize savings and loan institutions wide latitude to make all kinds of flexible mortgages.
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loans of $100,000 or less, a variable rate of 1% is only available
for mortgage loans in excess of $50,000, but not more than
$100,000, and the maximum rate with the variation cannot ex-
ceed 10% per annum. Because of the prevailing real estate mort-
gage rates, variable interest rates are of doubtful practical use in
any South Carolina real estate mortgages of $100,000 or less.
(b) Special and Limited Exceptions.-The South Carolina
Code also exempts certain types of creditors from the 8% loan
contract rate. One broad category of these exemptions applies to
loans by banks, banking institutions, and other lending agen-
cies."' The term "other lending agencies" has been broadly con-
strued to include all corporations, firms, and individuals involved
in the business of lending money in South Carolina.12 An individ-
ual or business entity making an occasional loan, however, is
apparently not able to take advantage of these provisions and is
limited to the 8% contract rate maximum unless the loan can by
agreement be made subject to the SCCPC.50 3 If SCCPC coverage
is agreed upon, the maximum rate is 12% per annum.0 4 In addi-
tion, not all lending agencies can utilize these sections because
some statutes regulating the particular creditor specifically make
the regulating statute exclusive. Credit unions, insurance pre-
mium service companies, and pawnbrokers (for loans not in ex-
cess of $50) fall into this category.55 The lending institutions that
can utilize these provisions are banks, savings and loan institu-
tions,56 insurance companies, mortgage brokers, and consumer
finance companies operating as Act 988 licensees.0 ' A second
category of these special exemptions consists of the statutes that
apply to a specific lender, such as consumer finance companies
Presumably, however, these mortgages are subject to state usury limitations. See 43 Fed.
Reg. 33,254-57 (1978).
Due-on-sale and similar clauses are also used by mortgagees as methods of attempting
to raise mortgage rates. These clauses have enjoyed more judicial success than variable
interest rates. See Part Im, section C(2)(m) infra.
501. See Part I, section B(2)(b)(i) infra.
502. Smith v. Bulman, 197 S.C. 357, 15 S.E.2d 635 (1941).
503. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-601 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part II, section B(3) supra.
504. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-601 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
505. See Part I, section B(2)(b)(ii) infra.
506. There is some question, however, concerning the authority of savings and loan
institutions to utilize the installment loan section, S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-13-120 (1976), for
real estate mortgages other than home improvement loans that are not covered by the
SCCPC rate structure. See notes 511 and 596-607 and accompanying text infra.
507. The rate structure available to Act 988 companies is high enough that it is
doubtful that they would want to utilize the rate authorized in these sections. See Part
m, section B(2)(b)(ii) infra.
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operating as Act 988 licensees."'
(i) Loans by Banks, Banking Institutions, and Other Lend-
ing Agencies. -Three statutes are involved in this category.
(1) Banks, banking institutions, and other lending agencies
are authorized to collect fees in lieu of interest or add-on
charges."' The fees are statutorily set according to the following
scale:
Type Period Amount Rate Renewal
Single Payment 30 days or Under $50 Flat $3 Flat $2
more
Single Payment 30 days or $50 or more Flat $5 Flat $2
more
Installment Loan Not less $50 or more Flat $7.50 $1.50 install-





Prior to adoption of the 1976 SCCPC Amendments, this statute
was used primarily in connection with small, short-term personal
loans. This statute, however, was not repealed by the SCCPC
and, therefore, could theoretically be used for very small loans
whose rates are not governed by the SCCPC. The yield under this
statute could be higher in certain loans than the yield permitted
by any other applicable statute.
The actuarial rates authorized by this provision are ex-
tremely high. For example, if a single payment loan for $50 is
made for thirty days and is renewed for eleven subsequent thirty-
day periods before final payment is collected, the total paid will
be $77 ($5 plus $22 renewal, plus $50 principal) for an annual
actuarial interest rate of 54%. Since the statute contains nothing
more than a rate statement, it would also be possible to refi-
nance-rather than renew the loan-and enter into a new loan
contract each month. Each monthly period would then yield a $5
charge. Installment loans could be handled in the same manner
since this statute does not contain a definition of "monthly in-
stallment" or "renewal." It also does not require the lender to
508. See Part III, section B(2)(b)(ii) infra.
509. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-40 (1976).
[Vol. 29
124
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss5/3
1979] CONSUMER PROTECTION CODE
rebate any of the fee upon prepayment of the loan or in connec-
tion with a refinancing transaction .5 1 Apparently it is also possi-
ble under this section to make separate "loans of interest" on the
unpaid fees due and "loans of principal" on the unpaid amount
of cash advanced at the end of a loan period. If this is done,the
actual yields calculated on an annual percentage rate basis as
required by the SCCPC and TIL could be increased astronomi-
cally. Because of the statute's limited applicability and the possi-
bility of inordinately high effective yields when it is used, serious
thought should be given to repealing this statute.
(2) Another statute allows banks, banking institutions, and
other lending agencies to make installment loans of not less than
$10.00, repayable in installments over a period of not less than
three months at an add-on rate of 7% per annum "for the financ-
ing of purchases and for other desirable purposes." 5"1 This statute
510. Prepayment rebates for SCCPC loan transactions are regulated under S.C.
CODE ANN. § 37-3-210 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part II, section D(4) supra.
511. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-13-120 (1976). In 1962 this statute, originally passed in
1935, was amended to make it inapplicable to real estate loans. No. 762, 1962 S.C. Acts
1882. This section, however, was reenacted in 1966, and the language relating to real estate
loans was omitted. No. 1042, 1966 S.C. Acts 2662. A further revision and reenactment in
1968 eliminated any dollar maximum and again did not refer to real estate loans. No. 1265,
1968 S.C. Acts 3018. Most lenders have assumed that it is permissible to make some kinds
of real estate mortgage loans under this statute. Two questions have arisen, however. The
first relates to the authority of savings and loan institutions to utilize this section at all
for real estate mortgage loans other than for home improvement loans not covered by the
SCCPC. See notes 596-607 and accompanying text infra. The second concerns the use of
this section for first mortgages of any kind by lenders in view of No. 839, 1973 S.C. Acts
1880 (amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977)) which provides special
rate maximums for "loans secured by first mortgages on real estate. . . ." The inference
is that § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977) is the exclusive section governing first mortgage rates
and that it limits the applicability of § 34-13-120 (1976) to second mortgages. This does
not seem, however, to be a justifiable position since further language in § 34-31-30 states:
"[Plrovided further, that nothing contained herein shall limit or prohibit the . . . rate
of interest, charges, [or] fees . . .made pursuant to any other statutes of this State."
The installment loan statute, § 34-13-120 (1976), does not distinguish between first and
second mortgages since it does not refer at all to real estate mortgages. Perhaps a more
important impediment on the use of § 34-13-120 (1976) for first lien real estate mortgages
of any kind is as follows: The statute authorizes the use of "interest or add-on charges at
the rate of not exceeding seven percent per annum just as if the entire amount of the debt
matured on the date the last installment becomes due. . . .. This language implies that
the transactions authorized are precomputed transactions in which all the interest is
added to the principal at the inception of the transaction rather than being computed
monthly on the declining principal balance, which is the standard method of computing
interest in real estate mortgage loans. Not only is the method of computation authorized
in this statutory section awkward for real estate mortgages, but it also results, particularly
in long-term transactions, in increasing substantially the cost of documentary stamps,
which are based on the amount of the debt. In a precomputed transaction, the amount of
the debt shown on the note includes the interest; however, in an amortized loan, only the
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allows an effective yield of 12.68% per year on a twelve-month
loan and a slightly higher rate on a longer loan calculated on the
actuarial basis as required by the SCCPC. It is the main statute
used by banks and other qualified lenders to obtain rates for
closed-end credit transactions512 that are higher than the basic 8%
contract rate. There is no requirement in this statute that the
loan be secured. Prior to the adoption of the 1976 SCCPC
Amendments, it was utilized in connection with all types of in-
stallment loans from small personal unsecured loans to fairly
large secured loans involving purchases of consumer goods such
as automobiles and color televisions. Although the SCCPC
closed-end rate ceiling structure,5 13 which authorizes a base rate
of 18% per annum, will apply in most consumer installment
credit transactions, this statute is still in effect and can be uti-
lized for any closed-end credit transactions that are not governed
by the SCCPC rate structure, including some loans secured by
real estate.514 Of course, the transactions must be made by banks
and other institutions qualifying under the statute. This statute
contains no limitations on what charges other than interest can
be made. Under the rules discussed in the next section, it would
be permissible for qualified lenders to charge late payment fees
and prepayment penalties, or to refuse to rebate all or a portion
of the unearned interest in connection with a refinancing type
transaction.5 '
(3) Banks, banking institutions, and other lending agencies
doing business in South Carolina are authorized to charge
"interest, service charges or add-on charges," at a maximum rate
of 11/2% per month on unpaid balances due under a revolving
loan principal is shown on the note. Further, existing banking regulations seem to prohibit
the use of a precomputed method for most types of real estate mortgages. Most second
mortgage loans covering private residences are governed by the SCCPC rate structure.
Therefore, § 34-13-120 (1976) would not be applicable to these loans either. See note 465
and Part I, section B(4)(d) supra. The existing confusion over the use of § 34-13-120 (1976)
needs to be remedied by legislation. Part IV infra contains further recommendations for
legislative reform of the existing regulation of real estate rates in South Carolina.
512. Closed-end credit transactions are generally single transactions, as opposed to
open-end or revolving credit transactions in which the debtor can incur more than one loan
up to the maximum authorized. Closed-end installment loans are typically precomputed,
i.e., the interest is added to the amount loaned and the total is repaid in equal monthly
installments.
513. See Part II, section B(1)(c) supra.
514. See note 511 supra.
515. See Part I, section C(2) infra. This contrasts to prepayment rebates for SCCPC
transactions, which are strictly regulated by statute. See Part I, section D(4) supra.
[Vol. 29
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credit plan for the financing of purchases.-" ' This provision, en-
acted in 1968,' legitimized the use of lender credit cards and
authorizes an effective interest rate of 18% per annum calculated
according to the actuarial method. Although most bank card con-
sumer credit transactions are now governed by the SCCPC's 18%
per year limit,5'1 8 this statute applies to any open-end revolving
credit transaction not covered by the SCCPC.11 This provision
does not, however, apply to revolving charge plans by sellers of
goods and services. These transactions are governed by the
SCCPC rate structure for revolving credit if they are consumer
credit transactions subject to the SCCPC rates.510 If the SCCPC
does not cover the transactions, however, no statutory rate maxi-
mum would apply.
2'
(ii) Other Special Exceptions. -Seven types of institutions
are subject to special legislation that either creates special ex-
emptions to the 8% rate or prohibits the use of one or more of the
exemptions. They include (a) consumer finance companies oper-
ating as Act 988 licensees, (b) credit unions, (c) insurance pre-
mium service companies, (d) pawn brokers, (e) banks, (f) sav-
ings and loan associations, and (g) insurance companies. The
first four types of institutions are subject to much more extensive
special rate regulation than the remaining three.52 2
(1) Consumer finance companies have a choice of being li-
censed under the SCCPC, in which case the loans are governed
by the SCCPC, or of being licensed by the South Carolina Board
of Financial Institutions5 1 under the South Carolina Consumer
516. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-13-120 (1976).
517. No. 1265, 1968 S.C. Acts 3018.
518. S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-13-515 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part II, section B(2)(b)
supra.
519. Cf. FRB Official Staff Interpretation No. FC-0139 (1977) which holds that the
5% cash discount authorized by TIL for not using a credit card cannot be included as
interest under state law. This ruling applies to business as well as consumer credit. [1977]
5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,749. See note 292 supra.
520. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-207 (1976). See Part II, section B(2)(a) supra.
521. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-605 (1976). See notes 455-57 and accompanying text
supra.
522. See Part I, section C(9) supra.
523. The licensing and examination provisions of Act 988 licensees are contained in
S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 34-29-30 to -100 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977). The requirements are
essentially that the licensee have minimum liquid assets of $25,000 per office and meet
the "convenience and advantage" to the community test. Although the wording is slightly
different, these are essentially the same tests as for a supervised lender under the SCCPC.
Id. § 37-3-503 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The Board of Financial Institutions (earlier called the
Board of Bank Control) has the sole licensing and examination powers over both Act 988
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Finance Act, more commonly known as Act 988 of 1966. If a
consumer finance company elects to be an Act 988 licensee the
rates and most other aspects of their loans are governed by that
Act and not by the SCCPC. s2 1 Consumer finance companies li-
censed under Act 988 have authority to make loans in the amount
of $7,500 or less to individuals and organizations other than cor-
porations.s?5 With the exception of the SCCPC, Act 988 is by far
the most comprehensive South Carolina statute dealing with con-
sumer credit transactions. The rates allowable under Act 988 are
authorized as exceptions to the general contract rate maximums.
Loans by banks, savings and loan associations, insurance compa-
nies, credit unions, and pawnbrokers, as well as loans to corpora-
tions, however, are specifically excluded from the purview of this
rate structure.
5 26
The basic fees that Act 988 licensees can legally charge are
divided into two categories: "finance" charges and "initial"
charges. The "finance charges" permitted by this Act vary with
the size of the loan, which is the actual cash received by the
borrower, as illustrated by the following table:
5 2
Size of Loan Maximum Finance Charge
1. $0 ----- $ 150 1. $2.50 per month
2. $150.01 - - - $1,000 2. (a) $20 per $100 per year on the
1st $100 of the loan
(b) $18 per $100 per year on the
next $200 of the loan
(c) $9 per $100 per year on the
next $700 of the loan.
3. $1,000.01 - - - $7,500 3. $7 per 100 per year
licensees and consumer finance companies that become SCCPC supervised lenders. Id.
§§ 37-3.502 to -506 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Under both acts a separate license must be
obtained for each business location. A parent company with several offices cannot, how-
ever, operate some of them under Act 988 licenses and others under SCCPC supervised
lender licenses. Section 37-9-102 (Cum. Supp. 1977) requires that "all persons related to"
an SCCPC supervised lender licensee must also become SCCPC licensees. The sharing of
responsibility between the SCCPC administrator and the Board of Financial Institutions
for administration, investigation, and prosecution of complaints of SCCPC violations by
all consumer finance companies is discussed in Part II, section E(2) supra.
524. See Part I, section C(9) supra. When there is a conflict between Act 988 and the
SCCPC, Act 988 controls. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-106 (Cur. Supp. 1977). The implications
of this bifurcation for Act 988 licensees are discussed in Part I, section C(9) supra.
525. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-20(a) (1976). Loans to corporations by Act 988 licensees
are governed by the general usury statutes.
526. Id. § 34-29.30(b).
527. See id. § 34-29-140 (Cur. Supp. 1977).
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Each category is exclusive so that, for example, if making a $1,200
cash advance, an Act 988 lender cannot charge category 2(a), (b),
and (c) rates on the first $1,000 and category 3 rates on the next
$200.
To the unsophisticated person these rates may not appear
terribly high because of the way they are expressed. When trans-
posed, as required by TIL and SCCPC into the effective annual
actuarial percentage rate,"8 however, they are quite high, particu-
larly for very small loans. For example, on a $100 cash advance
for 10 months, repayable in 10 equal monthly installments, an
Act 988 licensee could collect a finance charge of $25.00, and the
effective rate is 51.33% per annum. If the same loan was for $150,
the effective rate, calculated as required under TIL and SCCPC,
would be 35% per annum. For loans in amounts of less than $100
and for periods of less than one year the annualized rates are
astronomical. For loans over $100 and up to $1,000, the effective
rates (rounded off to the nearest I/ %) are 35% for the first $100,
31.75% for the next $200, and 16.25% for the remainder. On a $300
cash advance repayable in twelve monthly installments, the an-
nual percentage rate is 42.80%. Finally, for loans over $1,000 and
up to $7,500 the effective rate is 12.75% per annum.
In addition to these "finance charges," Act 988 also autho-
rizes the collection of an initial nonrefundable charge.sn This
charge varies with the size of the loan as follows:
Size of Loan Maximum Initial Charge
1. $0 ----- $ 300 1. 6% of cash advanced
2. $300.01 - - - $1,000 2. $18
3. $1,000.01 --- $4,000 3. 5% of cash advanced
4. $4,000.01 - $7,500 4. $200
On loans under $1,000 this initial charge may never be collected
on a renewal or a refinancing of the same amount within three
months of the original loan. This initial charge, however, may be
collected on the amount of the new money advanced if "within
528. See Part II, section C supra.
529. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140(a)(2) to (3) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Most or all of these
initial charges would have to be included in the loan finance charge if the loan in question
was governed by the SCCPC. See notes 184-85 supra, 533-34, 539 and accompanying text
infra. See also Part I, section D(1) supra. It would also have to be included in the calcula-
tion of the Annual Percentage Rate for TIL purposes. See notes 9, 76 supra.
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three months" a loan for more than the original amount is made
in connection with a refinancing that takes place within three
months of the initial loan. In addition, a new initial fee can be
collected if the loan is renewed or refinanced more than ninety
days after the transaction is initially consummated or ninety days
after it has been renewed or refinanced. The same restrictions
apply for loans over $1,000, except that the limitation period is
twelve months rather than three months.
This fee is described by Act 988 as one that includes, but is
not limited to, attorneys' and brokers' fees, costs of investigating
the moral and financial standing of the borrower, closing costs,
and any other services rendered in connection with the making
of the loan. 5 This initial fee does not include the expenses for
items such as documentary stamps and recording fees. They also
constitute additional charges that can be excluded from the
permissible finance charge. 31 The consumer finance company re-
tains most, if not all, of this initial fee. The result is that. the
initial fee increases the effective yield received by an Act 988
licensee. In 1976 these initial fees accounted for 20.34% of all
income received by South Carolina consumer finance com-
panies."y
The ability to charge these initial fees in addition to the
"finance charge" accounts in large measure for the real yield
under Act 988 being higher on very small loans than the autho-
rized by the SCCPC. Under the SCCPC a substantial portion
of the initial charge has to be included in the credit service and
loan finance charge, and results in a lower yield.53 Consequently,
approximately forty-five percent of all consumer finance com-
panies operating in South Carolina have Act 988 licenses.
34 Most
consumer finance companies whose average loan portfolio is
above $500, however, have chosen to be licensed as supervised
530. Id.
531. Section 34-29-140(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977) excludes official fees from the finance
charge.
532. 1976 Consumer Finance Division Annual Report, supra note 186, at 2. The other
sources of income for all consumer finance company licensees in 1976 were as follows:
Delinquency and deferral fees-6.26%, insurance commissions and rebates-8.40%, net
loan finance charges-60.13%, collections on loans previously charged off-.87%, and
other income-4.00%. Id.
533. See Part I, section D supra. Such charges would also have to be included in the
calculation of the Annual Percentage Rate for TIL disclosure purposes. See note 529 supra.
534. See cover letter of Everett H. Whitler, Director Consumer Finance Division, to
the State Board of Financial Institutions, 1976 Consumer Finance Division Annual Re-
port, supra note 186.
[Vol. 29
130
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss5/3
CONSUMER PROTECTION CODE
lenders under the SCCPC since the SCCPC rate structure is
higher for larger loans than the Act 988 rates. 5'
Besides the initial fee and filing and recording fees, Act 988
licensees can also make the following other charges in addition to
the authorized finance charge:
(1) A one-time late charge fee of five percent of any install-
ment or portion of an installment which is delinquent for five
or more days;536
(2) a deferment charge of 1% per month on the amount de-
ferred when the original amount of the loan exceeds $500 and
of 2% per month if the original loan is less than $500. No initial
charge can be collected on the deferral amount, however, and a
deferral charge cannot be made on an installment for which a
delinquency charge has been made. Further, if the deferral is for
less than one month, it cannot exceed $10 regardless of the
amount deferred;537
(3) default charges, such as expenses of repossession, storing,
and selling of the collateral, reasonable attorneys' fees deter-
mined by a court, and suit costs;m and
(4) insurance, including authorization to require the borrower
to purchase credit life and disability insurance for the term of
the loan as well as reasonable property damage insurance cover-
ing any collateral.09
If a loan is repaid prior to maturity or in connection with a
renewal, refinancing, or consolidation transaction, a refund of
unearned finance charges (but not the initial fee) is required on
the basis of the sum of the digits method also known as the Rule
of 78's . 40 A pro rata refund is required, however, if the renewal
or refinancing takes place within the first ninety days of the
contract. " ' Moreover, if any insurance involved in the loan is
535. See notes 183-85 and accompanying text supra.
536. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
537. Id. § 34-29-140(f).
538. Id. § 34-29-140(e).
539. Id. § 34-29-160 (1976). The terms, amounts, and rates for this insurance are
subject to extensive regulation. For example, the loss to premium ratio on property and
disability insurance must be "not less than fifty percent, and rates producing a lesser loss
ratio shall be deemed excessive." Id. Under the SCCPC, which would govern consumer
finance companies holding licenses as supervised lenders, the premiums that are required
by a creditor for life and disability insurance have to be included in the calculation of the
"credit service" or "loan finance" charge. Compare S.C. CODE ANN, §§ 37-2-202(2)(b) and
37-3-202(2)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977) with id. § 34-29-160 (1976). See notes 339-43, 529, 533
and accompanying text supra.
540. See notes 395-96 and accompanying text supra.
541. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140(a)(3)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See also 1970 Op. S.C.
1979]
131
Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REvIEw [Vol. 29
cancelled and the Act 988 licensee receives any premium rebate,
it must credit or refund the rebate to the borrower under the
Rule of 78's.
Act 988 also regulates maximum loan terms as follows:43
Cash Advance Maximum Maturity
$1,000 or less 24 1/ months
$1,001 to $1,500 36/a months
$1,501 to $2,000 48 / months
$2,001 to $7,500 601/ months
In addition, Act 988 prohibits a consumer finance company
from making a purchase money loan involving a security interest
in real estate under the Act. 988 rate structure."' Second mort-
gages, as well as first mortgages on real estate in connection with
loans for purposes other than purchasing real estate, however, are
permitted."' Act 988 does not regulate or prohibit any other type
of loan. It does, however, require that both a husband and wife
sign any security agreement involving household furniture"' and
prohibits splitting of loans between two or more borrowers, for
example, a husband and wife, or between affiliated finance com-
panies with the intended purpose of obtaining a higher rate than
would be the case if the loans were not split. 4'
Arr'y GEN. No. 2667 (pro rata basis means daily basis).
542. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-160 (1976).
543. Id. § 34-29-140(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977). This statute also provides that "[tihe
payments on any loan. . . shall be in substantially equal, consecutive monthly install-
ments and shall be in an amount not less than ten dollars per month, exclusive of finance
charges." Id. The SCCPC regulates only repayment maturities for supervised loans (those
exceeding 12% per annum) of $1,000 or less in which the rate of loan finance charge
exceeds 18% per annum. Id. § 37-3-511.
544. rd. § 34-29-140(h) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Technically Act 988 licensees could utilize
the general usury statutes, including § 34.13-120 (1976), which authorizes a 7% add-on
(12.68% on a 12-month loan on an actuarial basis) for permissible real estate mortgage
loans. See notes 511-14 and accompanying text supra. Because many of the fees and
charges excluded from the finance charge in Act 988 have to be included in the interest
calculation under § 34-13-120, however, it is doubtful they would do so except in cases of
loans of more than $7,500. See 1972 Op. S.C. Arr'y GEN. No. 3131 (mortgage service fee
authorized by S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-90 (Cum. Supp. 1977) not available for loans made
under Act 988).
545. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140(h) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
546. Id. § 34-29-150(e) (1976).
547. Id. § 34-29-140(d) (Cum.. Supp. 1977). The SCCPC contains similar prohibitions
against the use of multiple agreements. Id. §§ 37-2-402, 37-3-409, -509 (1976).
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The penalty for contracting or receiving any charges in excess
of those specifically permitted by Act 988 is that the entire loan
is void and the debtor can recover from the lender any amounts
paid for interest or principal."' In addition, any officer, director,
or agent participating in the void transaction will be subject to
criminal penalties for a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not
less than $200 nor more than $500 or thirty days to six months in
jail.' These civil and criminal penalties do not apply, however,
if the excess charge was made as "the result of an accidental or
bona fide error."5 0 There have been no South Carolina cases
construing this language, but it is similar to SCCPC language"'
exculpating creditors from liability. The cases interpreting these
other statutes should apply by analogy."5
(2) South Carolina law authorizes the establishment of
"cooperative credit unions" to promote thrift and to make moder-
ate loans of money to its members. It regulates these entities
under the authority of the act and the supervision of the State
Board of Financial Institutions.553 Federal credit unions are estab-
lished under the Federal Credit Union Act and are supervised and
insured by the National Credit Union Administration."' All as-
pects of loans by credit unions are excluded from the SCCPC even
though virtually all of their transactions otherwise fall within the
definition of consumer loans.55
The South Carolina act regulating state credit unions pro-
vides that a credit union may charge "reasonable rates of interest,
not to exceed one percent per month on unpaid loan balances."5 "
This is one of several statutes that allow what is classified as an
add-on rate, and the effective rate calculated on the actuarial
method is 12% per annum on a twelve-month loan. The Federal
Credit Union Act, however, specifies that federal credit unions
may lend "at rates of interest not exceeding one per centum per
month on unpaid balances, inclusive of all charges incident to
548. Id. §§ 34-29-20(d) (1976), -140(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
549. Id. § 34-29-20(e) (1976).
550. Id. §§ 34-29-20(d) (1976), -140(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
551. Id. §§ 37-5-202(7), -203(3). See notes 430-32 and accompanying text supra. The
SCCPC language was taken from TIL and the UCCC. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1976);
UCCC § 5.202(7), .203(3).
552. See cases cited in note 429 supra.
553. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-27-10 to -270 (1976 & Cum. Supp., 1977).
554. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1790 (1976), as amended by Act of Apr. 19, 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-22, §§ 101-310, 91 Stat. 49-53.
555. See Part I, section C(8) supra.
556. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-27-70 (1976).
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making the loan.' '5 7 This comparison is revealing. Because the
South Carolina act does not specifically include other charges in
the interest rate computation and has no other provision regulat-
ing these charges, it is possible, subject to common-law limita-
tions, for state credit unions to impose additional charges.55 To
the extent these additional charges are retained by the credit
union, the actual effective yield on a particular loan may legally
be in excess of the 12% per annum statutory limit. Federal credit
unions, however, must include all costs in the interest computa-
tion. If these costs are significant, their inclusion in the calcula-
tion of the interest could reduce the actual effective yield below
12% per annum. Theoretically, state credit unions may also exact
prepayment penalties in refinancing as well as voluntary prepay-
ment situations because there is no specific regulation of prepay-
ment under the state statute.559 The Federal Credit Union Act,
however, specifically provides that no prepayment penalty can be
charged on either a partial or whole prepayment.5 0
Legislation passed by Congress in 1977 greatly expands the
loan authority and flexibility of federal credit unions by authoriz-
ing: (1) home mortgage loans of up to thirty years for a principal
residence (the previous statutory maximum was ten years), (2)
mobile home and home improvement loans of up to fifteen years
(the prior maximum was ten years), (3) unsecured loans in any
amount for up to twelve years (the prior maximum amount was
$2,500 for a maximum period of five years), (4) revolving lines of
credit, which could lead to issuance of credit cards and participa-
tion in an Electronic Funds Transfer System (prior to these
amendments each advance had to be separately approved), and
(5) the ability to enter into loan participation agreements with
other credit unions.5 6
1
State credit unions have had the power to make long-term
real estate loans for many years without official regulation.6 '
There are no specific statutes or regulations governing in detail
557. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1757(5)(A)(vi) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
558. See Part EI, section C(2) infra. Permissible additional charges for loans whose
rates are governed by the SCCPC are strictly regulated. See Part II, section D(1) supra.
559. See Part I, section C(2)(j) infra. Prepayment rebates in loans governed by the
SCCPC rate structure are subject to extensive regulation. See Part II, section D(3) supra.
560. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1757(5)(A)(viii) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
561. See id. § 1757.
562. At the end of 1976, the 43 state credit unions in South Carolina had $16.7 million
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the amount and lengths of state credit union loans, but upon
approval of the State Board of Financial Institutions they have
the right to participate in any activity authorized for federal
credit unions. 63 Because of the substantial cost advantages they
have over other private creditors 6 ' and the aggressive attitude of
their management personnel, credit unions can be expected to
increase substantially their share of the consumer credit market
in the future in spite of the twelve percent per annum interest
limitation.
(3) Insurance premium service companies are specially li-
censed and regulated lenders. 55 The credit and other charges they
make in connection with consumer credit unions are governed by
the Insurance Premium Service Company Act rather than by the
SCCPC; however, all provisions of the SCCPC except for the rate
and charge provisions apply to their premium loans on insurance
that is for personal, family, or household purposes.66 On the other
hand, premium loans by these companies for business and other
nonconsumer purposes are not subject to any SCCPC provi-
sions. 67
Insurance premium service companies are authorized to ad-
vance to a broker, insurer, or agent premiums on an insurance
contract and to contract with the insured for the repayment of
amounts advanced plus a service charge. These companies are
prohibited from writing any insurance or selling any service other
than premium financing. The act does not apply to insurance
companies, authorized lenders (banks, credit unions, consumer
finance companies), or insurance sales in connection with install-
ment sales or loans.
A premium service insurance contract requires a minimum
down payment of 10%.111 The service charge, the charge for the
use of the cash advanced, must be computed on the balance of
premiums due after subtracting the down payment. The maxi-
mum rate is / of 1% per month on the unpaid balance, resulting
in an effective rate of 9% per annum on a twelve-month con-
tract.569 These companies are also authorized to make an initial
563. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-1-110 (1976).
564. See note 178 supra.
565. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-27-10 to -100 (1976).
566. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part I, section C(3)
supra.
567. See Part I, section B(5) supra.
568. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-26-90(c) (1976).
569. Id. § 38-27-90(e).
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nonrefundable $10 charge that is in addition to and not part of
the service charge. "7' This $10 charge is excluded from the unpaid
balance for the purpose of computing the service charge. This
results in a much higher effective annual percentage rate than the
allowable service charge indicates, because the amount of this
initial charge is high in relation to the total loan and the average
term of these loans is relatively short. If the insurance contract
is cancelled by the borrower, the unearned service charge "shall
be refunded on a short rate basis as determined by the Insurance
Commission." ' Premium service contracts may contain a power
of attorney authorizing the lender, upon the borrower's default,
to cancel, subject to certain notice limitations, the insurance con-
tract listed in the agreement.112 When such a contract is can-
celled, the unearned premiums must be returned by the insurer
to the insurance premium service company which, under penalty
of license revocation or suspension, must return to the insured
within thirty days of receipt any return premium over and above
the "amount due from the insured.
'573
Although the Insurance Premium Service Company Act pro-
hibits a service company from writing any insurance in connec-
tion with its loans, " ' it does not specifically prohibit charges such
as delinquency or deferral charges or refinancing fees. A premium
service company is prohibited, however, from splitting a loan on
two or more policies financed with the same borrower or from
intentionally cancelling an insurance policy with the intention in
either case of obtaining an additional $10 initial fee.
75
(4) Insurance agents and insurance agencies (other than
those that are owned or controlled by insurance companies)5 8 can
advance premiums to an insured and charge the greater of 18%
per annum or $1.50 per month from the effective date of the
policy or binder." If the insured defaults on the payments due
570. Id. § 38-27-90(d).
571. Id. § 38-27-90(e). For the short-rate tables, see Rules and Regs. of the S.C. Dep't
of Ins. 69.10, S.C. CODE OF STATE REs. (1976).
572. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-27-100 (1976).
573. Id. § 38-27-100(b),(e).
574. Id. § 38-27-90(a).
575. Id. § 38.27-90(b).
576. See id. §§ 38-51-410, as amended by No. 596, 1978 S.C. Acts 1746, 38-51-470
(1976). Prior to the 1978 amendments to § 38-51-410, a possible argument was that this
section applied only to assigned-risk automobile policies, which are no longer issued in
South Carolina. See notes 151-54 supra.
577. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-51-430 (1976). Prior to the 1978 legislation, see note 576
supra, the maximum authorized rate for advanced premiums was 12% per annum or $1.50
per month, whichever was greater. See id. § 38-51-470 (1976).
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the agent, the agent has the right to cancel the policy,578 in which
event the insurer must rebate the unearned premium on a pro-
rated basis. Any excess of unearned premium over the amount
that the insured owes the agent on the loan must be refunded to
the insured within thirty days of receipt by the agent.57 The
statutory provisions authorizing these premium loans prohibit
the imposition of any charges other than the fee described
above. 80 It is unclear, however, whether this prohibition covers
delinquency or deferral fees. Nevertheless, it does seem clear that
an agent making a premium loan cannot impose a prepayment
penalty.581
There are no statutory restrictions on the types of policies
that can qualify for this special rate treatment. If the insurance
is for personal, family, or household purposes, a premium loan
would then be subject to all provisions of the SCCPC except those
covering rates and charges.58 2 On the other hand, if the insurance
is for business or other nonconsumer purposes, the loan is not
subject to any part of the SCCPC. 5 3
(5) Another South Carolina lender who has a special ex-
emption from the 8% maximum contract rate is a licensed pawn-
broker. For loans not in excess of $50 licensed pawnbrokers are
authorized by statute to charge a maximum of $1 per 30-day
period for each $10 loaned.5 4 This rate amounts to 120% for a
twelve-month contract. A minimum charge of fifty cents may be
collected for loans of less than $10. 5 5 The SCCPC defers to this
statute for the rates on loans not over $50; however, loans in
excess of $50 are subject to the SCCPC rate and additional charge
provisions if the loan is for personal, family, or household pur-
poses.88 The duration of pawnbroker loans is unregulated by the
578. Id. §§ 38-51-440 to -450.
579. Id. § 38-51-460.
580. Id. § 38-51-420.
581. This results from the requirement that the agent return to the insured "[a]ny
excess of return premium paid by the insurer to an agent, agency or producer in discharge
of the lien provided by this article over the amount of unpaid balance and accrued service
charges" in the event the policy is cancelled. Id. § 38-51-460. If the agent cannot charge a
prepayment penalty when the policy is cancelled for nonpayment of the premium, surely
a prepayment penalty cannot be imposed if the insured voluntarily prepays the loan.
582. See Part I, section C(3) supra.
583. See Part I, section B(5) supra.
584. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-29-100 (1976).
585. Id.
586. See Part I, section C(5) supra. If a loan by a pawnbroker qualified as a business
loan, the maximum rate would be the charge authorized by S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-39-100
(1976), if the loan was $50 or less. Either § 34-31-40 (1976) or § 34-13-120 (1976) would
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pawnbroker statute, and no provision requires any refund of the
unearned portion of the service charge upon prepayment, re-
newal, or refinancing of an existing debt. If the loan is for per-
sonal, family, or household purposes, which is invariably the case,
these matters, as well as all other aspects of pawnbroker loans,
however, are subject to the SCCPC even with loans of $50 and
less. This is because the pawnbroker exclusion in the SCCPC
applies only to any rates and charges that are specifically regu-
lated by another statute.5
(6) State and federal banks operating in South Carolina's8
can take advantage of all the exemptions to the 8 % basic contract
rate discussed above.59 For example, they can have revolving
control if the loan was in excess of $50. The rates under these statutes are discussed in
Part Ill, section B(2)(b)(i) supra.
587. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(4) (1976). See Part I, section C(5) supra.
588. As of June 30, 1976, 71 state banks with a total of 380 banking locations and 19
national banks with 317 branches operated in South Carolina. Of the state banks, which
are licensed by the State Board of Financial Institutions, only six had elected to become
members of the Federal Reserve System. The primary reason most state banks have
chosen to continue as nonmembers is the effect on earnings of the high reserves required
by Federal Reserve Bank regulations. All national banks are automatically members of
the Federal Reserve System. All South Carolina banks are insured by FDIC at the current
$40,000 per account level. At the end of 1976 national banks held 52.4% of all deposits
and 54.5% of all loans; state nonmember banks held 45.3% of all deposits and 43.9% of
all loans; state member banks held 2.3% of all deposits and 1.6% of all loans. The loan
mix at the end of 1976 was as follows: Real estate-30.04% (residential 38%, commercial
56%, farm 6%); non-real estate farm loans-6.37%; commercial and industrial
loans-18.79%; individual loans-42.01%; other-2.79%. For some reason the proportion
of individual loans by South Carolina banks is considerably higher (42.01% versus 28.39%)
and the proportion of nonmortgage farm loans is much lower (6.37% versus 16.24%) than
for the nation as a whole. See Assets and Liabilities-Commercial and Mutual Savings
Banks-December 31, 1976, Tables 5, 12 and Attachment.
South Carolina has enabling legislation for what are called cash depositories, a type
of institution that came into being during the Depression. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-17-
10 to -170 (1976). These institutions accept and hold deposits, but do not make direct
loans. While there were at one time in excess of twenty cash depositories operating in
S6uth Carolina, there are currently none, the last one having converted to a state bank
approximately five years ago. Because of the capitalization requirements imposed by
FDIC for charter approval, it is extremely doubtful that any new cash depository will ever
be approved. Telephone interview with Mr. Carl Cleveland, Commissioner of the State
Board of Financial Institutions (August 29, 1977).
589. See Part I, sections B(2)(a)(i)-(ii) and (b)(i) supra. The National Bank Act
allows national banks to charge "interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State...
where the bank is located. . . " 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976). Several recent cases have inter-
preted this language to mean that national banks are not limited to the rates authorized
for state banks, but can charge the highest rate that a lender in the state is authorized to
make for the equivalent loan. See cases cited note 452 supra. On this basis, national banks
operating in South Carolina could make loans of up to $7500 under the rate and charge
system authorized under Act 988 of 1966. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140 (Cum. Supp.
1977). See notes 527-42 and accompanying text supra.
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credit or overdraft plans for which they can charge 112A% per
month or 18% per annum on the unpaid balances,'"s and they can
make installment loans of all kinds at 7% add-on rates (12.68%
per annum for a twelve-month loan).'" Of course, these South
Carolina contract rate exemptions do not apply when banks make
loans that are subject to the SCCPC rate structure.
All banks are subject to a great deal of state and federal
regulation that in many cases restrict the use of these exceptions
for certain types of loans. This is particularly true for real estate
loans.5 Although there are some differences, state member and
nonmember banks, as well as federal banks, are generally eligible
to make the same kinds of loans for the same rates and under
almost the same restrictions even though they are subject to dif-
ferent regulatory bodies. " 3
The banking statutes do not limit the charges that, in addi-
tion to pure interest or add-on charges, can be made without
danger of a usury claim. The appropriateness of such charges is
governed by the rules discussed in the next section." 4
(7) Approximately ninety-seven percent of all loans made
by savings and loan associations operating in South Carolina are
secured by real estate mortgages." The remaining three percent
In 1974 an amendment to the National Banking Act authorized national banks to
charge at "a rate of 5 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial
paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where the bank
is located .... Act of Oct. 29, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-501, § 201, 88 Stat. 1558 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976)). This legislation, which applied only to business and agricultural
loans in excess of $25,000, expired on July 1, 1977. Id. § 206, 88 Stat. 1560 (1974). Even if
this provision had continued, it would have had very limited utility in South Carolina
because of the existing interest rate structure (the discount rate at the end of October 1977
was 6%).
590. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-13-120 (1976).
591. Id.
592. See, e.g., id. § 34-13-20. See id. §§ 34-13-30 to -90 for other types of limitations
on amounts and types of loans made by state banks.
593. See, e.g., id. §§ 34-1-110 (allowing state banks, pursuant to regulations issued
by the State Board of Financial Institutions, to engage in any "activities that are autho-
rized for national banks"); 34-13-30 (permitting state banks to make secured and unse-
cured installment loans on "terms and conditions as may be prescribed for similar loans
for national banks"). See notes 452 and 589 supra. Section 34-1-110 prohibits state banks
from charging interest rates other than those specifically authorized by South Carolina
statutes even if a federal statute authorizes a higher rate. See also id. § 34-3-20 (exempting
national banks from most of the loan and other restrictions applicable to state banks).
594. See Part III, section C(2) infra.
595. Data from the Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta shows that the 48 federal
and 25 state savings and loan institutions in South Carolina had $3.5 billion in mortgage
loans and $96.7 million in nonmortgage loans outstanding at the end of 1976. Of the
mortgage loans, 78% were single-family residential mortgages. The major types of non-
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consist of passbook or share loans, unsecured home improvement
loans, and loans to purchase mobile homes. The primary statute
regulating real estate mortgages taken by savings and loan asso-
ciations requires that they be amortized "by the periodic reduc-
tion of principal method" and that "interest shall be computed
only on unpaid balances."" 6 Each payment is required to be ap-
plied first to any advances made on behalf of the mortgagor for
items such as taxes and insurance and "second to the payment
of interest accrued prior to the date of such payment and the
remainder to the reduction of principal.""' This statutory lan-
guage precludes the use of the typical precomputed installment
loan method of calculation, in which the interest for the entire
term of the loan is either added to or discounted from the amount
of the credit extended and the yield is almost double the yield
computed on an actuarial basis. 98
Although the vast majority of real estate mortgages held by
savings and loan associations are fully amortized mortgages, a
question exists whether it is permissible for these associations to
make mortgage loans under the South Carolina installment loan
statute.99 That section authorizes a 7% add-on rate that yields
12.68% per annum on the simple interest actuarial method for a
twelve-month loan, a yield that is considerably higher than the
real estate loans were passbook or share loans (35.57%), home improvement loans (22.63%)
and mobile home loans (41.43%). Federal Home Loan Bank Data (1977) (unpublished).
All savings and loan association accounts are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation.
Rates charged by federal savings and loan associations cannot exceed those estab-
lished by state law. 12 U.S.C. § 1425 (1976). Unlike the National Bank Act, however, there
is no separate federal penalty provision for making excess charges. See note 452 supra.
Hence, the normal state usury statutes and other penalty provisions apply to federal
associations. For a summary of the applicable penalty provisions, see the Chart in Part V
infra.
Savings and loan institutions nationally hold 36.5% of all real estate mortgages and
41.5% of mortgages covering family dwellings occupied by four persons or fewer. Other
major types of mortgagees are mutual banks (9.2%), commercial banks (16.7%), life fnsur-
ance companies (10.3%), federally supported agencies (13.2%), and others-principally
private mortgage companies and brokers (14.1%). SAVINGS AND LOAN FACT BOOK, supra
note 478, at 29-30. For the total amount of mortgages on South Carolina property held by
banks and life insurance companies, see notes 588 supra, and 616 infra. The only other
readily available figure is that for mortgages held by the Federal Land Bank on South
Carolina farms, which at the end of June 1977 totaled $423,553,880. 1977 Combined
Financial Report-The Farm Credit Banks of Columbia, South Carolina.
596. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-25-110 (1976).
597. Id.
598. See Part I, section C(1) infra.
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rates authorized for standard first mortgages.1ro The argument in
favor of the availability of the higher rate for installment loans is
twofold: (1) the statute itself states that it applies to "banks,
banking institutions and other lending agencies;" ' and (2) the
statute requiring "direct reduction" or fully amortized loans"°' is
not intended to be exclusive. The argument against this interpre-
tation is: (1) the statutory scheme regulating savings and loans
is intended to make the "direct reduction" method the exclusive
method for real estate mortgages; and (2) the South Carolina
Legislature has specifically exempted home improvement loans
and loans to purchase mobile homes from the direct reduction
strictures,"3 a fact that further indicates that the direct reduction
method is exclusive except when a specific statutory exemption
exists. Many savings and loan associations are making loans on
unimproved real estate under this 7% add-on installment loan
provision. Although the amount of these loans is not significant
in comparison to other loans held by savings and loans, the possi-
bility of a usury claim exists, and it appears to be in the best
interest of all parties that this issue be clarified by legislation or,
perhaps, by appropriate regulations.0"'
600. See Part Ill, section B(2)(a)(ii) supra.
601. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-13-120 (1976).
602. Id. § 34-25-110.
603. Id. §§ 34-25-130 to -140. See § 34-25-120 (1976), which is subject to interpretation
as prohibiting all loans under special rates allowed to banks and other lending agencies
(see Part Im, sections (1)(a)-(c) supra) without specific statutory authorization. This
interpretation would also prohibit any loans other than real estate mortgage loans by state
savings and loan associations without specific statutory approval. In addition, No. 659,
1976 S.C. Acts 1739 amended § 34-31-30 (1976) to provide that interest on passbook or
savings account loans made by savings and loan institutions and banks is limited to the
rates specified in § 34-31-30 (1976) (8% up to $50,000) unless federal statutes authorize
higher rates. Section 34-25-140 (1976), which deals with mobile home loans by savings and
loan institutions, specifically authorizes the use of the 7% add-on rate, allowed by § 34-
13-120 (1976), in these loans. Home improvement loans insured by the FHA are exempt
from state interest limitations by § 34-25-150(2)(b)(1976). Although § 34-25-130(1976),
which deals with home improvement loans, does not specifically authorize the use of the
7% add-on rate authorized by § 34-13-120, non-FHA home improvement loans can, by
inference, be made at the rate under this provision. If § 34-25-120 is subject to the restric-
tive interpretation suggested earlier in this paragraph, a question may be raised about the
authority of savings and loan institutions to utilize SCCPC rates for any nonmortgage
transaction since none of the statutes authorizing non-real estate mortgage loans specifi-
cally mention the SCCPC. Legislation clarifying all these points is desirable. See also note
511 supra.
604. Pending proposals that significantly expand the authority of savings and loan
institutions to make additional types of non-real estate mortgage loans provide additional
justification for resolving this issue. See, e.g., The Hunt Commission Report: A Panel, 29
Bus. LAW. 497, 516-22 (1974).
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The above discussion is premised upon the assumption that
the mortgage in question is not one whose rates and charges are
governed by the SCCPC. If it is governed by the SCCPC, and this
depends on the difficult determination of whether it is a mortgage
"primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money
security interest in land," ' 5 the SCCPC loan rate ceilings, which
authorize a base rate of 18% per annum on an actuarial basis,
apply."' In addition, home improvement and mobile home loans
that are for personal, family, or household purposes are governed
by the SCCPC rate statutes."' The 7% add-on installment loan
statute comes into play only for transactions in which the savings
and loan association wants to make a loan at a rate above 8% and
no other applicable statute authorizes a rate as high or higher
than the 12.68% maximum authorized by this statute.
As far as charges that can be made in addition to the maxi-
mum authorized interest rate are concerned, the rules discussed
in the next section08 apply to any transaction not governed by the
SCCPC rate structure and the rules discussed in Part III9 apply
to transactions governed by the SCCPC rate and charge provi-
sion.
In summary, the vast majority of loans by savings and loan
associations are direct reduction, fully amortized real estate
mortgages. The authority of savings and loan associations to
make any kind of real estate mortgage loans on a precomputed
installment basis is questionable, and this issue should be re-
solved by clarifying legislation. The rate structure for mortgage
loans, as well as for all other types of credit made by savings and
loan associations, is summarized in the appended chart. 10 Very
few differences exist between the respective loan authorities and
restrictions of state and federal savings and loan associations.,
605. See Part I, section 4(d) and Part M, section B(2)(a)(ii) supra.
606. A savings and loan institution is a supervised lender entitled to make loans at
the supervised loan rates authorized by S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-515 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
See id. § 37-1-301(17) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
607. But see note 603 supra.
608. See Part III, section C(2) infra.
609. See Part II, section D(1) supra.
610. See Part V infra.
611. State savings and loan associations are licensed and supervised by the State
Board of Financial Institutions, and federal associations are governed by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-1-110 (1976) authorizes state-chartered
savings and loan associations, pursuant to regulations adopted by the State Board of
Financial Institutions, "to engage in any activities that are authorized for. .. Federally-
chartered savings and loan associations by Federal law or regulation. .. "
[Vol. 29
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(8) Since insurance companies are lending agencies, they
can also make loans at interest rates in excess of the 8% contract
rate under all of the exemptions set forth in subsections (a) and
(b)(1) of this section.' 2 In addition, an insurance company mak-
ing a secured loan can require the borrower to purchase life, prop-
erty, and title insurance with the lender insurance company as a
prerequisite for the loan. The premiums charged for this insur-
ance will not, by statute, be counted as additional interest and
will not make the loan usurious as long as the charges for the
premiums are the same as for other persons."3 Since the insur-
ance company presumably makes a profit on the premiums and
can also charge the maximum interest rate for the type of loan
in question, the result is a windfall."4 This provision, however,
covers only secured loans, and an insurance company cannot re-
quire this insurance for unsecured loans without the premiums
being considered additional interest.
This statute does not regulate the other charges that can be
imposed in a loan made by an insurance company. These charges
are governed by the rules set forth in the next section."'5 Since real
estate mortgages constitute the bulk of insurance company lend-
ing activities subject to any usury limitations, the charges that
can be made in addition to interest in real estate transactions are
of particular importance." 8
",-C. Calculating the "Interest" on Loans
The most critical factor in determining whether a claim for
usury exists in a particular loan is the calculation of the amount
of interest that is being charged. If the actual per annum yield
produced by applying the total interest to the amount of credit
is less than the rate ceiling applicable to the particular loan, the
usury statutes have not been violated. Most courts presented with
this issue have held for usury purposes that the amount of credit
612. See notes 474-521 and accompanying text supra.
613. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-9-240 (1976).
614. See Part I, section C(2)(b) infra for further discussion of the treatment of
insurance premiums in non-SCCPC loans. Insurance companies do not ordinarily make
loans that are governed by the SCCPC rate and charge structure; however, if these loans
are made, the rate maximum for closed-end transactions is 12% unless the insurance
company obtains a license as a supervised lender. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-301(17),
37-3-501 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
615. See Part III, section C(2) infra.
616. At the end of 1974, insurance companies held $815.6 million in real estate mort-
gages in South Carolina. LiFE INSURANCE FACr BOOK 78 (1976).
19791
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is limited to the amount of the loan actually controlled by the
borrower. For this reason, the amount of any required compensat-
ing balance or similar device must be deducted from the loan
principal and the amount of interest is applied to this net amount
to determine if the applicable rate ceiling has been exceeded .
7
If the yield exceeds the authorized statutory rate, a claim for
usury will lie.
This section discusses the charges that must be included in
the determination of interest and those that may properly be
excluded. They are examined in the same fashion as the SCCPC
concepts of "credit service charge" and "loan finance charge" in
Part 1U." 'l Particular emphasis will be given in this section to the
interest and noninterest charges involved in real estate transac-
tions since this is the area in which much of the recent litigation
has taken place. The penalties and remedies are discussed in
section D of this part."'
1. What is "Interest? "-The term "interest" is not defined
by any South Carolina statute. The South Carolina Supreme
Court, however, has stated that "interest is the compensation
617. See, e.g., Cappaert v. Bierman, 339 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1976). Charging interest
on the full amount of the principal on a mortgage when less than the full amount has been
disbursed produces the same result. See Tri-County Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lyle, 280
Md. 69, 371 A.2d 424 (1977). But see note 673 infra. See also Grundel v. Bank of Craig,
515 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (interest paid on a loan to purchase an interest-free
certificate of deposit the borrower was required to purchase as a prerequisite for further
loans under a line of credit held to be "interest" for the line of credit loans); Carson
Meadows, Inc. v. Pease, 91 Nev. 187, 533 P.2d 458 (1975) (only 75% of face amount of note
from a corporation to investors actually loaned to the corporation); Miller v. First State
Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) ($14,000 of $70,000 of a three-year loan was
frozen in special account to be used for payment of interest on the note). The normal rule
is that the face amount of a note is controlling in determining the maximum permissible
interest rate. Pursuant to this principle, the maximum interest rate that can be collected
in a construction mortgage, or for a line of credit, or other open-end or revolving credit
arrangement is the maximum rate based on the face amount of the note rather than the
maximum rate that could be collected on the funds that have been disbursed and are
outstanding. A lender cannot, however, as was pointed out above, charge interest on the
face amount of the note if less than the face amount is outstanding. See Tri-County Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lyle, 280 Md. 69, 371 A.2d 424 (1977). Similarly, a creditor cannot
utilize a note containing a face amount higher than the one he intends to make available
to the borrower when the purpose of the face amount figure is to obtain a higher interest
rate than would otherwise be permissible. For example, a court would probably find a note
for more than $50,000 usurious if the lender intended to loan only $40,000 and the interest
rate charged for the loan was greater than that allowed for a $40,000 loan for the same
purpose. This transaction presents strong evidence of an intent to evade the interest
statutes, one of the principle elements of usury. See cases cited notes 620 and 673 infra.
See also notes 705-6 and accompanying text infra.
618. See Part Ill, section D infra.
619. See Part II, section D supra.
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allowed by law, or fixed by the parties, for the use of money
... ,,"20 All attempts to charge fees in excess of the basic 8%
contract rate authorized by statute must be evaluated against
this definition.12' If a fee is found to be simply a method of charg-
ing for the use of money, rather than a charge for other services
rendered, the fee will be added to the stated interest charge when
computing the actual per annum percentage. If the total amounts
charged by a creditor for the use of money loaned to a debtor are
found to exceed 8% per annum, the contract must fall within the
ambit of a permitted exception to the basic 8% contract rate 22 or
it will be subject to the penalties for usury623
There are several methods of calculating interest. The nor-
mal rule, and the one that applies in the absence of a contrary
statutory authorization, is the simple interest, or actuarial,
method by which the interest is calculated periodically on the
outstanding principal. This is the method utilized by the
SCCPC. 24 There are two other common methods of calculation.
The first is the discount method, under which the lender collects
all the interest for the full term of the loan at the inception of the
transaction. The second is the add-on or precomputed method,
by which the interest for the entire term is added to the actual
credit advanced and the total amount is repaid in installments.
A typical add-on rate statute has provisions permitting $x per
$100 per annum.6 25 Both of these methods result in actual yields
620. Coward v. Jones, 167 S.C. 118, 126, 166 S.E. 96, 99 (1932). In contrast to SCCPC
rates, which are required to be calculated on a 365-day year, see note 322 and accompany-
ing text supra, non-SCCPC rates can be computed on the basis of a 360-day year, the basis
used in most standard rate tables. Merchants' & Planters' Bank v. Sarratt, 77 S.C. 141,
57 S.E. 621 (1907). Whether the charge is called interest is irrelevant if a court determines
that the charge is actually "for the use of money." One case was recently remanded by
an appellate court to determine if the amount of the reduction in a discount on gasoline
sold by a distributor to an operator of a gas station was in fact interest, in which case the
loan would be usurious. Handi Inv. Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1977).
The discount was negotiated at the same time as the signing of a renewal note between
the distributor and the operator. The South Carolina Supreme Court has consistently held
that the substance and not the form of the transaction controls. See, e.g., Brown v.
Crandall, 218 S.C. 124, 61 S.E.2d 761 (1950); Mayfield v. British & Am. Mtg. Co., 104
S.C. 152, 88 S.E. 370 (1916); Osborne v. Fuller, 92 S.C. 338, 75 S.E. 557 (1912) (disguised
sale held to be a loan). The more devious the scheme to hide interest, the more likely a
court is to find that usurious intent exists.
621. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See also note 473 and accom-
panying text supra.
622. See Part III, section B supra.
623. See Part II, section D infra.
624. See Part I, section C supra.
625. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-13-120 (1976) (nonconsumer installment loans),
37-2-211 (1976) (consumer credit sales of motor vehicles).
1979]
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that are higher than the equivalent rate calculated on a simple
interest basis.
The basic South Carolina usury statute2' specifically allows
interest to be computed on a discount basis, and since the lender
under this statute collects his interest in advance and can earn
interest on that amount by lending it out, the effective yield is
higher than if the same loan were made on a simple interest basis.
For example, a $1,000 twelve-month single payment loan, in
which the interest is discounted and deducted from the proceeds
at 8% per annum, actually yields 8.70% if it is calculated actuari-
ally as required under the SCCPC and TIL. This type of loan,
however, is legal under the general usury statute and case law,
despite the fact that the yield exceeds the 8% per annum limita-
tion imposed by that section.0 2
The general rule, however, is that the discount method can-
not be used to collect interest in advance for periods in excess of
one year. 2 1 One reason for this limitation is simply that the effec-
tive yield on a long-term discount basis would be enormous. For
instance, a three-year discounted note at 8%, under which the
borrower receives as proceeds the gross amount of the loan less
all the interest for thirty-six months, would result in an effective
yield in excess of 18% per annum, calculated on the actuarial
basis as required under the SCCPC.29 A second reason for this
626. Id. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
627. While it seems clear that the use of a discount method for a maximum period
of one year is proper for a rate of up to 8% per annum, it is not at all clear that this method
is permissible for the higher rates authorized by this same statute for loans in excess of
$50,000. The first paragraph of § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977) states that "no greater
interest. . . shall be charged, taken, agreed upon or allowed. . . either by way of straight
interest, discount or otherwise, except upon written contracts wherein, by express agree-
ment, a rate of interest not exceeding eight percent may be charged." (emphasis added).
None of the following paragraphs of this section, which authorize rates greater than 8%,
however, make any specific mention of discount. They utilize instead only the term "rate
of interest." The effective yield, if discounting were allowed for these larger loans, would
be significantly higher than the stipulated interest rate. For example, on a one-year loan
of $75,000 discounted at 10%, the effective yield is 11.11%. Except for loans made before
September 29, 1976, the effective date of the SCCPC, this question is relevant only for
real estate mortgages of one year or less in excess of $50,000 and not governed by the
SCCPC. Caution dictates that the lender not use the discount method on any of these
mortgages.
628. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1975); Annot., 57
A.L.R.2d 630, 636-43 (1958). There are no South Carolina cases precisely on point. But
see cases cited note 629 infra.
629. Apparently, it is not usurious if the three-year note is structured so that the
lender collects a maximum of one-year's interest in advance each year. See Johnson v.
Groce, 175 S.C. 312, 317, 179 S.E. 39, 40-41 (1935); Schlosburg v. Bluestein, 150 S.C. 311,
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rule is that the general contract interest statute under considera-
tion allows only for the collection of interest at the rate of 8% "per
annum," and several cases from states with similar interest stat-
utes have held that this "per annum" language prohibits a lender
from computing discount interest on other than a per annum or
yearly basis.m Therefore, on long-term loans a lender is limited
to computing and collecting interest as earned or in advance by
way of discount for a period not in excess of one year, unless a
contrary statute, such as one specifically authorizing an add-on
or similar rate, exists.
It is also usurious to discount and deduct interest from a note
and then to charge interest on the principal amount of the note
from the date of the loan. This amounts to collecting interest
twice on the same loan, and a claim for usury would lie if the total
interest exceeded the maximum allowed by the applicable stat-
ute. 3' On the other hand, the collection of interest on unpaid
interest past due, which amounts to compounding of interest, is
lawful if the loan contract allows such compounding. 3 ' Similarly,
148 S.E. 60 (1929); Newton v. Woodley, 55 S.C. 132, 33 S.E. 1 (1899) (no usury when five-
year note provided that interest was to be discounted and collected annually in advance).
630. See, e.g., Agostini v. Colonial Tr. Co., 28 Del. Ch. 30, 38-43, 36 A.2d 33, 37-39
(1944); Silver Sands of Pensacola Beach, Inc. v. Pensacola Loan & Say. Bank, 174 So. 2d
61, 66-67 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965).
631. See Carolina Say. Bank v. Parrott, 30 S.C. 61, 8 S.E. 199 (1888). The evil here
is interest on interest or compound interest, which is universally condemned. See, e.g.,
Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 467 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1972); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 421 (1966).
The collection of interest on overdue amounts after default is, however, generally not held
to be illegal compounding of interest. See note 632 infra.
632. The collection of interest after maturity or default presents some difficult legal
issues. A majority of cases concerning a claim of usury have upheld clauses that call for
interest in excess of the statutory maximum after maturity. The decisions have held that
the excess is in the nature of a delinquency charge that can be avoided by prompt payment
and, therefore, is not a charge for the "use of money." The only South Carolina cases on
this point, however, have held that these clauses constitute usurious interest. Union Mtg.
Banking & Tr. Co. v. Hagood, 97 F. 360 (C.C.D.S.C. 1899); Carroll County Say. Bank v.
Strother, 28 S.C. 504, 6 S.E. 313 (1888). See Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 449 (1969). Nevertheless,
a clause calling for interest after maturity at a rate equal to or less than the maximum
rate authorized by statute does not create a usury claim even though the result is that
interest may be collected on interest. See Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 421 (1966). If the loan
contract, however, does not stipulate the rate of interest after maturity, the general rule
is that the rate is automatically the legal rate, which is 6%, and not the rate specified in
the note itself. See cases cited in Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 902 (1951).
Acceleration of the note prior to maturity presents additional problems. The main
issue is whether the creditor is entitled to collect the unearned interest on future install-
ments. The majority rule is that the creditor must credit the borrower with any unearned
interest that is included in the face amount of the notes. See Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 650
(1975). But see Long Realty Co. v. Breedin, 175 S.C. 233, 242-49, 179 S.E. 47, 51-54 (1935)
(unapproved dictum). In precomputed transactions, the normal rule is to rebate on the
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it is also proper to provide in the loan contract that if the princi-
pal is not paid when due, additional interest at a permissible rate
may be exacted on the unpaid principal until the balance due is
paid in full. No illegal double collection of interest is involved in
this instance."'
The type of discount discussed in the preceeding paragraphs,
which deal with a particular method of interest calculation, needs
to be distinguished from the discount involved in the purchase or
assignment of an existing obligation at less than the face amount
of the note. Unless the assignor in the latter type of transaction
is a mere dummy conduit used as a scheme to evade the interest
rate statutes, the discount charged the assignor by the assignee
is not "interest" as far as the borrower is concerned because it is
not imposed on the borrower by the assignee.634 This rule applies
even if there is a prior understanding or agreement between the
original lender and the assignee to purchase or assign. Any other
result would jeopardize the legality of the billions of dollars of
chattel paper and real estate mortgage financing handled on a
discount basis.
35
Although discount and collection of interest in advance at
the maximum authorized per annum rate for a period not in
excess of one year are allowable under the basic South Carolina
interest statute, computing or collecting this interest on an add-
on basis, would almost certainly be held to be usurious.66 Under
sum of the digits or Rule of 78's method. See Part II, section D(3) supra. The lender,
however, in the absence of a contrary statute, is not legally obligated to give the debtor
any credit for unearned interest if the debtor voluntarily prepays. See Part I, section
B(2)(j) infra. The inconsistency between requiring a rebate if the debtor defaults, but not
requiring one if a voluntary prepayment is made, is hard to justify.
One additional question involves the collection of interest on the principal from the
date of acceleration to the date of judgment or payment. Presumably this is treated like
the issue of interest after maturity and should be covered by specific language in the note.
After judgment is rendered, the amount of the judgment, which includes unpaid principal
plus any accrued but unpaid interest, attorneys' fees, and costs bears interest at 6% per
annum. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-20 (1976). Several states have raised the interest rate on
judgments in recent years to bring it more in line with prevailing rates. See, e.g., ALAssA
STAT. § 09.30.070 (1973) (8-10%); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-204 (1974), -205 (Cum. Supp.
1977) (up to rate specified in the obligation, otherwise 8%); OR. Rav. STAT. § 82.010(1)(b)
(1977) (same as rate specified in the obligation). See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-6-416
(1976). See notes 448-50 and accompanying text supra.
633. See note 632 supra.
634. See, e.g., Hershman, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market, 22 Bus. LAW. 333,
347-51 (1967); Annot., 165 A.L.R. 679 (1946). See also note 292 supra. But see Cumberland
Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1977) (distinguishable on grounds of consti-
tutional prohibition against discounting).
635. See authorities cited note 634 supra.
636. The few decisions on this issue agree that an add-on rate cannot be used in the
[Vol. 29866
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the add-on method, the total interest due for the entire period is
added to the principal and the total sum is repaid in installments.
The principle reason for this rule is that the yield calculated on
an add-on basis is almost twice as much as the same rate calcu-
lated on a simple interest basis. For example, on a $1,000 twelve-
month loan at 8%, the effective yield on a discounted basis is, as
was pointed out above,1 7 15.68%; however, if the same loan were
computed on an add-on basis and repayable in twelve monthly
installments, the effective yield would be 14.45%, or almost dou-
ble the basic 8% contract rate maximum authorized by the basic
South Carolina usury statute . 38 Nevertheless, as was pointed out
in the preceeding section,639 there are several South Carolina stat-
utes 4' that specifically allow interest to be computed on an add-
on basis for certain types of installment loans. These statutes
constitute exceptions to the general contract rate statute and its
prohibition against the use of such rates.
In summary, interest includes any charge made for the use
of money imposed by the lender on the debtor. Unless the statute
indicates otherwise, interest must be calculated on a simple inter-
est or actuarial basis. Several South Carolina statutes authorize
the use of add-on rates and the general contract interest statute
authorizes the use of the discount method of calculation for peri-
ods not in excess of one year.
2. Additional Charges.-The add-on and discount devices
for increasing the loan yield involve methods of calculating the
percentage ceiling based on the interest element stated in the
loan contract. All lenders from time to time, however, make the
borrower pay charges in addition to the stated interest. The
charges range from the cost of documentary stamps for the note
to a requirement that the borrower give the lender a certain per-
centage of the earnings or income from a business financed by the
loan. It is important for all parties to determine whether certain
charges are permissible additional charges or whether they are
absence of specific statutory authority. See Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 630, 666-68 (1958). Al-
though S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977) authorizes interest "either by way
of straight interest, discount or otherwise," the "otherwise" does not constitute statutory
authorization for the use of an add-on rate. Compare this with the cases cited in note 629
supra.
637. See note 627 and accompanying text supra.
638. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
639. See Part I, section B(2)(a), (b)(i) supra.
640. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-13-120 (1976) (general installment loan statute),
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merely disguised fees for use of the money. If a charge falls in the
latter category it may be combined with the pure interest stated
in the loan contract to result in a usurious yield. The problem has
always been a perplexing one in South Carolina and elsewhere.
This is primarily because the term "interest" is not defined in the
usury statutes, and the determination of what is and what is not
interest is left to the courts. This case-by-case approach has re-
sulted in a large number of cases that are confusing and conflict-
ing. " ' The SCCPC minimizes the definitional problem by exten-
sive regulation of what charges and fees can be excluded from the
credit service and loan finance charge 4 ' South Carolina also has
some additional statutes that stipulate what charges in addition
to pure interest may be made.43 Most notable is Act 988 of 1966
for consumer finance companies."' These statutes, however,
cover only specific types of loans, and many do not have provi-
sions regulating all types of additional charges. The common-law
rules developed by the courts apply in these cases.
Any analysis of this area is difficult because of the confusing
opinions. In the absence of contrary statutes, however, the exist-
ing rules in South Carolina may be summarized as follows:
(1) The basic rule is that any charge which is imposed on
the debtor by the lender for the use of money is interest, regard-
less of what the charge is called in the agreement between the
parties." ' If the particular charge, however, is exacted by a third
party unrelated to the lender and the lender receives no collateral
benefit from the third party, it is a permissible charge that can
be excluded from the determination of the interest for the trans-
action in question. "4'
641. Compare Citizens' Bank v. Heyward, 135 S.C. 190, 133 S.E. 709 (1925) (2%
commission paid to the bank president for a loan held to make the loan usurious even
though the bank itself did not receive any portion of this commission) with Long Realty
Co. v. Breedin, 175 S.C. 233, 179 S.E. 47 (1935) (loan involving a 5% commission, approxi-
mately one-half of which was received by the lender, held nonusurious).
642. See Part II, sections C and D supra.
643. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
644. Id. §§ 34-29-10 to -260 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part III, section
B(2)(b)(ii) supra.
645. See cases cited note 620 supra.
646. If the charge, however, is exacted by the lender for use of the money in question,
the charge is interest, even if it is paid by a third party. This is the situation, for example,
with points charged a seller of real estate as part of a mortgage loan being made to the
purchaser. See Part III, section C(2)(f) infra. This rule also applies to schemes in which a
debtor pays less than the maximum permissible amount of interest, but a third person
not directly receiving the loan proceeds agrees to pay an additional amount of interest and
[Vol. 29
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(2) Charges retained by the lender are more likely to be
construed as interest than are charges paid to third parties for
actual services rendered. Nevertheless, as a general rule, reasona-
ble charges retained by the lender, that can be traced directly to
services rendered for a particular loan, and that are not general
overhead expenses, such as rents or salaries, will not be included
in the interest calculation. A charge is generally considered rea-
sonable if it does not exceed what a third party unrelated to the
lender would charge for the same service. The amount of this type
of charge that is found to be unreasonable, or that is found to be
part of general overhead will, however, be classified as interest. 4 '
(3) Charges made after a default by the borrower and pre-
payment penalties are less suspect than charges made at the
inception of the loan. Default charges and prepayment penalties
have traditionally been viewed as charges that are voluntarily
assumed by the debtor for failure to fulfill the terms of the loan
agreement, rather than as charges for the loan of money.648
(4) Even if a particular charge is found to be interest it,
along with all other charges found to be interest, can be amortized
over the full term of the loan, even though it is collected at the
inception of the loan. 49 This cuts down substantially on the legal
impact of finding a particular charge to be interest, especially in
cases involving long-term loans, such as real estate mortgages. If
the loan is made on the mistaken basis that the charge in question
is properly excluded but the interest rate charged is below the
maximum rate authorized for that type of loan, the inclusion of
the charge on an amortized basis might still result in the total
interest being less than the maximum allowed. For example, if at
the closing a charge of $500 is made and collected on a thirty-year
the combination of the two payments exceeds the authorized maximum. See Andelson &
Weiser, Usury and Third Party Payments: Another View, 51 Los ANGELES B.J. 589 (1976).
647. See Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1977).
648. See, e.g., Abbot v. Stevens, 133 Cal. App. 2d 242, 284 P.2d 159 (1955). See Part
I, section C(2)(j)-(k) infra.
649. See, e.g., Long Realty Co. v. Breedin, 175 S.C. 233, 179 S.E. 47 (1935); Daniel-
son v. Mixon, 109 S.C. 264, 95 S.E. 515 (1918); Danforth, Usury: Applicability to Collat-
eral Fees and Charges, 16 S.D.L. Rav. 52, 68 (1971). The rule allowing amortization over
the full scheduled term of the loan is followed even in cases concerning real estate mort-
gages in which the actual average pay-out period is much less than the scheduled
maturity date in the mortgage. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board estimates that the
average life of the conventional home mortgage is only ten years. 9 FED. HOME LOAN
BANK BOARD J. 39 n.4 (1976). If a mortgage loan is repaid before the maturity date, the
mortgagee's actual yield is higher than the disclosed rate. See Landers, Determining the
Finance Charge Under the Truth in Lending Act, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J.
45, 66. This principle is illustrated in note 664 infra.
1979]
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real estate first mortgage loan of $50,000 made to a consumer to
purchase a new home at 83/4 % interest, the loan is not in violation
of the 9% maximum rate authorized for such mortgages, '-5 even
if the $500 is included in the interest calculation. This is because
of the amortization rule. If this $500 had to be added to the other
interest collected in the first year of the loan, which would be the
case if amortization were not allowed, usurious interest in excess
of the maximum 9% authorized would have been collected in the
first year of the mortgage and would have triggered the usury
penalty provisions. "5'
Applying these general rules to specific types of charges
made by lenders produces results that are quite different in many
cases from treatment of the same charge by the SCCPC.
(a) Charges Paid to Third Parties.-Any charge that is
both reasonable in amount and paid to a third party for services
either actually rendered, or required by law, is permissible and
will not be held to be additional interest. Thus, it is proper for a
lender to collect fees for items such as documentary stamps, re-
cording costs, surveys, attorneys' fees for perfecting the title or for
closing the transaction, title insurance, credit investigations and
appraisals of collateral, and, in construction mortgages, pay-
ments for periodic inspections preceding disbursement . 5 2 On the
650. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part III, section B(2)(a)(ii)
supra. See also the Addendum infra.
651. See Part III, section D infra.
652. See Long Realty Co. v. Breedin, 175 S.C. 233, 179 S.E. 47 (1935); Yorkville Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Foster, 132 S.C. 276, 129 S.E. 44 (1925) (deduction of all reasonable
expenses is authorized without making the loan usurious); American Mtg. Co. v. Wood-
ward, 83 S.C. 521, 65 S.E. 739 (1909) (fee for recording costs and abstract of title); Brown
v. Brown, 38 S.C. 173, 17 S.E. 452 (1893) ($3.50 recording fee and $25.00 fee paid to third
party for an unspecified purpose). See generally Prather, Mortgage Loans and the Usury
Laws, 16 Bus. LAW. 181, 188-91 (1960); Annot., 21 A.L.R. 797, 823 (1922), supplemented
by Annot., 53 A.L.R. 743 (1928) & Annot., 63 A.L.R. 823 (1929).
Even if these charges are unreasonable, however, they will not be considered addi-
tional interest unless the third party is considered the agent of the lender. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 34-31-60 (1976) specifically states that a lender shall not "be charged with usury...
by reason of money paid or agreed to be paid to others by the borrower in order to obtain
a loan when the lender neither took nor contracted to take more than lawful interest." It
also gives the debtor a six-month period in which to bring suit against the third party for
recovery of any unreasonable fees paid to the party. If the third party is the agent of the
lender, however, the excessive part of the charge will be imputed to the lender as addi-
tional interest even though the entire fee is paid to the agent and the lender receives only
a portion or none of the fee. See Citizens' Bank v. Heyward, 135 S.C. 190, 133 S.E. 709
(1925); Mayfield v. British & Am. Mtg. Co., 104 S.C. 152, 88 S.E. 370 (1916) (lawyer who
closed other loans of lender held to be agent of lender, even though his fee was paid by
the borrower).
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other hand, these charges are suspect if they are not paid to third
parties, and there is some danger they would be considered addi-
tional interest. Most normal real estate closing costs, however,
even those retained by the lender, are acceptable because they are
payments for required services and not for the use of money! 3
(b) Insurance. -Charges for insurance require special coin-
ment, since most lenders require property damage insurance on
all secured loans involving personal property and real estate.
Many lenders also routinely require life insurance or disability
insurance. 54 If the borrower purchases this insurance from a third
party who is unrelated to the lender, there is little danger that
the charge will be held to be additional interest, even if the lender
finances the premium as part of the loan.655 In many cases, how-
ever, the lender voluntarily acts as the agent and procures the
policy for the borrower. In this case the lender will generally
receive a commission and a dividend or rebate from the insurer.
Most cases considering this question have held that the commis-
sion or similar fee is not additional interest, even when the lender
requires the insurance, as long as the amount of the insurance and
the commission or rebate are reasonable and the premium col-
lected by the lender is the same as the premium for like insurance
purchased through independent agents.656 No South Carolina
cases have been decided recently in this area, however, and the
question of commissions and rebates as interest is somewhat of
an open one in this state.
657
(c) Brokerage Fees. -Most cases have excluded any broker-
age fee from the interest calculation if the broker was acting solely
as the independent agent of the borrower. 56 The brokerage fee is
653. But see Danielson v. Mixon, 109 S.C. 264, 95 S.E. 515 (1918). See Part II, section
D supra for a discussion of the different treatment of many of these expenses under the
SCCPC.
654. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-55-110 (1976) prohibits a lender from requiring the borrower
to procure any of this insurance from a particular insurance company or to use the lender
as the agent. These restrictions do not apply when the lender is an insurance company.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-9-240 (1976). The premiums for life and disability insurance are not
included as interest even if the insurance is required, a result contrary to that for transac-
tions covered by the SCCPC rate structure. See Part II, section D(1)(b) supra.
655. See Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1344 (1963).
656. Id. at 1348.
657. The only South Carolina case dealing with this whole subject is the early case
of Land Mtg. Co. v. Gillam, 49 S.C. 345, 26 S.E. 990 (1897), which held that a $25 fire
insurance premium charged to a borrower was not additional interest and allowed the
borrower to recover the charge for breach of contract because the lender failed to purchase
the policy.
658. See, e.g., Whaley v. American Freehold Land-Mtg. Co., 74 F. 73 (C.C.D.S.C.
1979]
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interest, however, if it is paid to the lender or an agent of the
lender."9 There is a split in the decisions involving brokers who,
in effect, are acting as the agent for both the borrower and the
lender or have a close working relationship with the lender, even
though technically they are employed and paid by the borrower
in the particular transaction.6"
(d) Commitment and Standby Fees. -These fees are gener-
ally not considered interest payments for the use of money but
are viewed as payments for an option to borrow money in the
future."' There are no South Carolina cases on this point, how-
ever.
(e) Service Charge or Origination Fees.-In the absence of
a statute to the contrary, these fees are considered interest except
to the extent the lender can show that the money is used to pay
for actual services rendered in connection with the loan and is not
for general overhead; in other words, that they qualify for exemp-
tion under the general rules stated above."' The South Carolina
statute authorizing these fees in real estate mortgage loans is
discussed later in this subsection."0
3
(f) Points. -The imposition of points in real estate transac-
tions has become common during the past decade. Whether they
1896); New England Mtg. Say. Co. v. Baxley, 44 S.C. 81, 21 S.E. 444 (1895); Annot., 52
A.L.R.2d 703, 708-12 (1957).
659. See, e.g., American Mtg. Co. v. Woodward, 83 S.C. 521, 65 S.E. 739 (1909). A
majority of courts would not apply this rule if the lender did not know of the agent's
involvement and did not participate in the payment of the commission or receive any
portion of the commission. See Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 703, 737-42 (1957). But see Citizens'
Bank v. Heyward, 135 S.C. 190, 133 S.E. 709 (1925) (2% commission paid to bank presi-
dent in connection with a loan held to make the loan usurious even though the bank did
not receive any portion of the commission).
660. See Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 703, 713-19, 725-32 (1957). In Long Realty Co. v. Bree-
din, 175 S.C. 233, 179 S.E. 47 (1935), the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
result of a master's report that held the receipt of one-half of a commission by the mortga-
gee was not interest. The master's report, however, stated that at least part of the money
paid to the mortgagee was used to pay expenses incurred by the mortgagee and that even
if the portion of the commission paid to the mortgagee was considered interest, the total
of the commission plus the stated interest would not exceed the statutory maximum. Id.
at 240-42, 179 S.E. at 50-51.
661. See, e.g., Athern v. Wilshire Mtg. Corp., 104 Ariz. 59, 448 P.2d 859 (1968); Pivot
City Realty Co. v. State Say. & Tr. Co., 88 Ind. App. 222, 112 N.E. 27 (1928); Danforth,
supra note 649, at 61.
662. See Bankers Guar. Title & Tr. Co. v. Fisher, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 115, 117, 204 N.E.2d
103, 106 (1964); Bank of Aynor v. Adams, 132 S.C. 107, 128 S.E. 168 (1925); Danforth,
supra note 649, at 61-63; Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1389 (1963). See also notes 645-48 and
accompanying text supra. Essentially, origination fees paid to a lender are no different
from a brokerage commission paid to a lender. See Hershman, supra note 634, at 344-46.
663. See Part Im, section C(2)(n) infra.
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are charged to the borrower directly by the lender or against the
seller (who in turn raises the price of the property) points are
clearly charged for the use of money, and, therefore, the dollar
amount of the points is included in the calculation of interest!"'
There are no South Carolina cases on this issue.
(g) Participating Interests.-As an alternative to or in ad-
dition to lending money to a venture, an investor might demand
a percentage of the income from the operations, a participating
interest in the proceeds of any sale or refinancing, or a direct
ownership interest in the business. Regardless of the form of the
participating interest, the dollar amount of the equity interest
will possibly be considered interest, and usury would exist if the
total of all interest pushes the yield over the statutory maximum.
That the transaction is cast in some form other than a loan is not
determinative since the courts will readily look at the substance
rather than the form of the transaction.6 5 Although the cases in
this area are not totally consistent,"66 the general rule is that the
more speculative the possibility of a return on the participating
interest, the better the chances that a court will determine that
the participating interest is not interest for usury purposes. The
likelihood of finding interest increases, however, as the certainty
of a return on the participating interest increases.6"' When no
664. See Landers, Determining the Finance Charge Under the Truth in Lending Act,
1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 45, 64-65. The effect of points (or any other non-
service front-end charge) on the actual yield to the mortgagee varies inversely with the
life of the mortgage. The following example illustrates this point: An $18,000 mortgage at
6% interest with the mortgagee getting 10 points or $1,800 from the seller yields 7.3% if
the mortgage runs for twenty years, approximately 9% if it is paid off at the end of eight
years and approximately 13.2% if it is paid off at the end of three years. Benfield, Money,
Mortgages and Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 819, 859-61
(1968). Points charged in connection with VA and FHA mortgages are governed by federal
statutes and not state law since the rate and charges on these loans are specifically
exempted from South Carolina interest statutes. See Part I, section B(2)(a)(i) supra.
Although mortgage points are interest, for tax purposes the amount involved cannot be
deducted in the year paid, but must be amortized over the life of the mortgage. I.R.C. §
675. If the inclusion of the ownership interest, the value of which can be amortized over
the life of the obligation, see notes 659 and accompanying text supra, does not result in
the maximum allowable rate being exceeded, there is no usury claim. See Brown v.
Cardoza, 67 Cal. App. 127, 153 P.2d 767 (1974); Commerce Sav. Ass'n v. G.G.E. Managing
Co., 539 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
665. See cases cited note 620 supra; Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 475 (1967).
666. Compare Kessling v. National Mtg. Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971)
(total value of 25% interest as limited partner plus 8% on loan held usurious) with Tho-
massen v. Carr, 250 Cal. App. 2d 341, 58 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1967) (no usury when contract
provided for interest plus 30% of gross rentals until sale).
667. See Hershman, Usury and the "New Look" in Real Estate Financing, 4 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 315 (1969); Loisseaux, Some Usury Problems in Commercial
1979]
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debt is involved, a straight investment made for an ownership
equity interest in a business will clearly not result in a finding of
interest since any return is based on the profits of the business,
and profits are highly speculative, particularly in a new ven-
ture. 6 On the other hand, the amount of an ownership interest
taken in connection with a loan transaction in which the interest
rate specified in the note is near the prevailing market rate pre-
sents a very substantial risk that a court will find the dollar
value of the ownership to be additional interest for usury pur-
poses." 9 The result in cases falling between these two extremes
depends on a court's finding on the degree of contingency in the
repayment. An ownership interest taken in lieu of interest on a
loan is one example of this uncertain type of transaction.67 The
only South Carolina case dealing with this issue concerned con-
struction of a contract that required the owner of a hotel to pay
one-half the profits from the hotel in return for "loan" of
$2,000. 711 The defendant claimed this contract created a joint
venture in which he had invested $2,000 in return for one-half the
profits. The South Carolina Supreme Court had little difficulty
in finding the transaction to be a loan in which the profits were
assigned as security for payment. Although the owner of the hotel
had paid well over $2,000 under the contract, no claim of usury
was made in the case; nevertheless the court stated:
A court of equity will look through the form of a transaction to
its substance. Notwithstanding the words used, if it appears
that the form of the transaction is a disguise under which usu-
rious interest may be exacted, the transaction will be held to be
usurious and to the extent of the usury agreed to be paid will
not be enforced. 12
A prudent lender would be well advised to adopt a conserva-
tive stance in this area and not to take ownership interests except
in loans that contain no applicable usury limitation or in which
Financing, 49 TEx. L. REv. 419, 432-35 (1971).
668. See Atkinson v. Wilcken, 142 Cal. App. 2d 246, 298 P.2d 147 (1956).
669. See American Insurers Life Ins. Co. v. Regenold, 243 Ark. 906, 423 S.W.2d 551
(1968) (6% interest plus 1/2 net profit from ultimate sale of land); Whittemore Homes, Inc.
v. Fleishman, 190 Cal. App. 2d 154, 12 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1961); Kessling v. National Mtg.
Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971) (8% interest and 25% profits as limited part-
ner).
670. Compare Thomassen v. Carr, 250 Cal. App. 2d 341, 58 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1967) (no
usury) with Thompson v. Hague, 430 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (usury).
671. Virginia Hotel Co. v. Dusenberry, 218 S.C. 524, 63 S.E.2d 483 (1951).
672. Id. at 536, 63 S.E.2d at 489.
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the value of the ownership, when combined with any other inter-
est charged, does not exceed the maximum amount authorized for
the transaction.
73
(h) Late Charges. -Delinquency charges are not held to be
interest in the absence of proof that the amount assessed is unrea-
sonable relative to the administrative and other costs inherent in
processing late payments. The exclusion is based primarily on the
premise that this charge is one voluntarily incurred by the debtor
for nonperformance of the loan. " It is improper, however, to
673. See Hershman, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market-Revisited, 24 Bus. LAW.
1121, 1140 (1969). An alternative course of action is for the lender to require the borrower
to qualify for the corporate exemption in order to avoid any interest ceiling. There are
serious complications with this approach, however, especially with real estate ventures.
See note 483 and accompanying text supra. Loans of over $50,000 not secured by real
estate and loans in excess of $500,000 secured by a real estate mortgage are exempt from
any interest limitations; so the ownership interest problem does not exist for loans meeting
these dollar limitations. See notes 475-77 and accompanying text supra. A court would
probably not allow a lender to combine two independent loans to exceed the $50,000 or
$500,000 thresholds and thereby obtain higher interest rates than could be obtained on
either of the loans individually. See C&S S. DeKalb Bank v. Watkins, 236 Ga. 759, 225
S.E.2d 266 (1976). The result might be different, however, if the two loans were actually
consolidated or were closely connected by means of cross-collateral. See Sparkman &
McLean Income Fund v. Wald, 10 Wash. App. 765, 520 P.2d 173 (1974). See also note 617
supra for treatment of open-end or revolving credit transactions.
674. See, e.g., Hayes v. First Nat'l Bank of Memphis, 256 Ark. 328, 507 S.W.2d 701
(1974); Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 50 (1975). But see Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d 1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973) (delinquency fee of 2% of
the unpaid balance of the entire principal held unlawful as improper liquidated damages).
Federal regulations apply to some types of real estate mortgages that are exempt from
South Carolina usury limitations. See 24 C.F.R. § 241.105 (1977) (FHA mortgage late
charges limited to maximum 2% of payments more than 15 days late); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4212
(1976) (VA mortgage late charges limited to maximum of 4% of payments more than 15
days late).
In 1970, the South Carolina Attorney General issued an opinion holding that banks
could not impose delinquency or late charges on bank card revolving loans made pursuant
to S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-13-120 (1976). 1970 Op. S.C. ATr'y GEN. No. 2888. The opinion
was based in part on the failure of the Legislature to provide for these fees at the time
the statute was enacted. The authority for delinquency and other default charges, how-
ever, comes from case law and, if reasonable, these charges are not considered interest.
Very few South Carolina statutes contain any provisions for late charges. The rationale
of this opinion, however, would prohibit any late charges in the absence of specific statu-
tory authorization. For example, neither the general usury statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-
31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977), under which most business loans and real estate mortgages are
made, nor the basic closed-end installment loan statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-13-120
(1976), mentions late payments. No one has ever seriously questioned the right of a
creditor to make delinquency charges in loans covered by these statutes. That bank credit
card loans are open-end credit transactions should not change the common-law right of
lenders in the absence of a contrary statute to make delinquency and other reasonable
charges based on services rendered regardless of whether the transaction is open-end,
closed-end, precomputed, or not precomputed. See, e.g., Key v. Wortham Bank & Tr. Co.,
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charge both a deferral fee and a delinquency fee on the same late
payment, since this involves collecting interest on interest plus a
penalty.675 After imposing a late payment fee, a prudent creditor
is also well advised to apply all subsequent payments to the cur-
rent month's payment with any excess being applied to any prior
late installment rather than applying the payment first to the late
installment. The latter method of allocation results in current
installments not being fully paid and in further late charges being
triggered. The late charges would continue until the debtor pays
the full amount of the late payment and the late charge assessed
against it, plus the current month's payment.
(i) Deferral Charges.-An agreement to defer a past due
payment is an alternative to imposing a late charge. Essentially,
a new loan contract is made for the amount deferred. The cases
have generally upheld deferral charges against claims of usury
when the charge does not exceed the amount that can be collected
under the applicable usury statute if the amount deferred were a
new loan. Deferral charges have been upheld even if the interest
rate for the deferral exceeds the stated interest rate in the origi-
nal loan contract. 76 For example, it is proper to impose an 8%
deferral charge even though the original note called for interest
at 6%. The collection of both a deferral and a delinquency fee on
the same payment, however, is not proper, for the same reasons
stated in the preceding paragraph dealing with late charges.677
(j) Prepayments and Prepayment Penalties.-South Caro-
lina cases have consistently held that a lender is not obligated to
accept payment in advance of the due date. Therefore, no charge
of usury can be based on a claim of a prepayment penalty even
though a prepayment penalty technically involves the collection
of unaccrued interest. 78 One South Carolina case implies that a
543 S.W.2d 496 (Ark. 1976) (holding $12.00 bank card membership fee not to be interest).
A creditor cannot, however, charge both a delinquency fee and interest on a late payment
in either open-end or closed-end transaction. See authorities cited note 675 infra.
675. See, e.g., Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 467 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1972); Gordon Fin.
Co. v. Chambliss, 236 So. 2d 533 (La. Ct. App. 1970). The double charge would result in
illegal compounding of interest. See Carolina Sav. Bank v. Parrott, 30 S.C. 61, 8 S.E. 199
(1888); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 421 (1966).
676. See Utley v. Cavender, 31 S.C. 282, 9 S.E. 957 (1889). The basis for this holding
is that a deferral is essentially a new loan contract for the amount being deferred.
677. See note 675 and accompanying text supra.
678. Barringer v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 493 (E.D.S.C. 1935);
Cooke v. Young, 89 S.C. 173, 71 S.E. 837 (1911); Alexander v. Herndon, 84 S.C. 181, 65
S.E. 1048 (1909); Pyross v. Fraser, 82 S.C. 498, 64 S.E. 407 (1909). The South Carolina
cases are consistent with cases from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Eliasz v. Broadway Bank
& Tr. Co., 62 N.J. Super. 1, 161 A.2d 737 (1960); Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1265 (1961).
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100% prepayment penalty is proper."9 Of course, in practice, no
responsible institutional lender would exact such an exorbitant
penalty, although many impose a small percentage penalty for
partial or full prepayment or in refinancing transactions. This is
particularly true when interest rates are high and money is
tight.10 In addition, the SCCPC5' and other applicable statutes" '
regulate rebates in most consumer credit transactions. When no
statute applies, however, the possibility exists for lenders to im-
pose large prepayment penalties and to refuse to rebate some or
all of the unearned interest in connection with refinancing, con-
solidation, or renewal transactions.
(k) Default Charges.-The Uniform Commercial Code,
which has been adopted in South Carolina, requires that all
charges incurred in repossessing, storing, and disposing of collat-
eral be reasonable in amount and that any sale of the collateral
be conducted in a commercially reasonable mannerrs Default
charges are not interest for the use of money but, like delinquency
charges are imposed on the debtor for failure to fulfill the terms
of the loan agreement."4
(1) Attorneys' Fees.-South Carolina follows the common-
law rule that attorneys' fees payable after default are not allowed
in the absence of an agreement to pay these fees, and, in any
event, can only be enforced to the extent they are reasonable, a
determination to be made by a court."' Like delinquency and
default charges, they are imposed for breach of the loan contract
and, therefore, are not considered interest on the loan. Attorneys'
fees collected at the inception of a loan, however, are on a differ-
ent footing and are construed as interest unless they fall within
one of the non-interest categories discussed above." 6
679. Cooke v. Young, 89 S.C. 173, 71 S.E. 837 (1911).
680. Barringer v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 493 (E.D.S.C. 1935)
(approved a 2% prepayment penalty).
681. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-210, 37-3-210 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part II,
section D(3) supra.
682. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (Act 988 of 1966). See Part
I, section C(9) supra for discussion of the relationship between the SCCPC and Act 988
of 1966.
683. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-207, -501 to -507 (1976).
684. See Hershman, supra note 634, at 347. For a discussion of the lender's right to
interest after default and acceleration, see note 632 supra.
685. See, e.g., Hertzog v. Spartanburg Bonded Warehouse, Inc., 184 S.C. 378, 192
S.E. 397 (1937).
686. See notes 645-51 and accompanying text supra. Reasonable attorneys' fees paid
for drafting a deed and certifying title in a real estate transaction are examples of a non-
interest charge. But see Part 1IT, section C(2)(n) infra.
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(m) Due-On-Sale Clauses.-Many real estate lenders in
recent years have included clauses in mortgages that make the
sale of the property by the mortgagor a default, triggering an
acceleration of the mortgage, or conditioning consent to the sale
on agreement by the purchaser to assume the mortgage at a
higher rate. The purpose of these clauses is to enable the lender
to renegotiate the interest rate on the mortgage with the pur-
chaser. In lieu of changing the interest rate in a loan assumption
transaction, the lender may charge a large loan transfer fee that
has the effect of increasing the actual yield on the mortgage.
These devices became popular primarily because of the rising
interest rates on savings accounts and borrowed money that has
taken place in the past decade. Lenders with long-term mortgages
at low rates found themselves in a cost squeeze. The due-on-sale
clause is one method of alleviating the problem by preventing
assumptions at the old low rates. One other alternative, the use
of variable interest rates, has not been generally upheld and is not
as a practical matter available for most residential mortgages in
South Carolina." 7 Another device is the imposition of prepay-
ment penalties, which covers only prepayments and does not alle-
viate the assumption problem.
Although a few courts have held that a due-on-sale clause is
unenforceable in the absence of a showing that the mortgagee's
security or prospect of payment is significantly endangered by the
sale on proposed assumption, 88 most cases have upheld these
clauses primarily on the grounds that they are not illegal re-
straints against alienation."' They have also been upheld against
claims of usury because the due-on-sale clause is merely inciden-
tal to the original loan and the renegotiated loan is simply consid-
eration for the mortgagee's agreement not to be bound by an
assumption agreement in the absence of its assent.69 No South
Carolina cases on this issue have yet been decided. The alterna-
687. See note 500 supra.
688. See Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971);
Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972); Clark v.
Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
689. See, e.g., Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr.
505 (1964) (due-on-sale clause); Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo.
294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973) (increased interest rate). These and other cases are discussed in
Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 713 (1976).
690. See, e.g., Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d
1240 (1973); Note, Transfer Fees in Home Loan Assumptions: Illegal Interest or Legal
Consideration?, 9 GA. L. Rav. 454, 468-77 (1975); Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 713, 743-46 (1976).
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tive of an assumption fee has not been presented in any South
Carolina case either, but its characterization should be governed
by the general rules discussed at the beginning of this section.'
To the extent that the assumption fee represents payment for
actual services rendered in connection with the assumption, the
fee is unlikely to be held to be additional interest.
(n) Other Charges.-The general rules discussed at the
beginning of this section should be helpful in determining
whether a charge not specifically discussed in the preceding para-
graphs will be held to be interest. The absence of a charge can
also be interest if the transaction results in a benefit to the credi-
tor that can be tied to the agreement to loan the money in ques-
tion. For example, the difference between the fair market value
and the actual price charged to the creditor in a bargain sale of
property sold to the creditor as part of the loan agreement is
interest.9 2 The more a transaction looks like a scheme to obtain
extra interest, the more likely a court is to examine the facts
closely and to find a usurious intent.
Any existing statute covering the types of charges discussed
above overrides cases holding contrary to the statutory rule.
Other than the SCCPC, which extensively regulates all of these
types of charges,"'3 the most important additional statute is sec-
tion 34-31-90(1) of the South Carolina Code.694 It authorizes the
imposition of a service fee or origination charge in connection
with real estate mortgages. This statute, originally enacted in
1970, states:
Any mortgage lender may make an initial service or origination
charge; provided, such initial charge shall not exceed one per-
cent of the first twenty-five thousand dollars and one and one-
half percent on any amounts above twenty-five thousand dol-
lars. Provided, further, that any lender shall provide the bor-
rower with a statement showing all attorneys' fees, origination
fees and processing charges which shall be charged the borrower
upon closing the loan, and the lender shall obtain a signed re-
ceipt therefor from the borrower. Such initial charge shall not
be considered interest within the meaning of the laws of this
691. See notes 645-51 and accompanying text supra.
692. See, e.g., Oil City Motor Co. v. C.I.T. Corp., 76 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1935); First
Nat'l Bank v. Danek, 89 N.M. 623, 556 P.2d 31 (1976) (difference between fair market
value and sales price of stock transferred in connection with a loan held to be interest).
See also note 617 supra.
693. See Part II, section D(1)-(2) supra.
694. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-90(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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State, which limit the rate of interest which may be charged on
any transaction. " '
In the absence of this statute, this charge would be held to be
interest. " The statute does not, however, specify which charges
can be made in addition to this service charge. Because attorneys'
fees are mentioned in this statute, the Legislature may have
contemplated a separate charge for this item, but this seems un-
likely. Still, the inclusion of attorneys' fees without mentioning
any other charges casts considerable doubt on the exclusion of
any other charges from the interest calculations. It seems logical,
however, that any expenses payable to unrelated third parties for
services rendered in connection with the mortgage are not part of
the service charge, and also are not interest under the general
rules discussed at the beginning of this section.69 On the other
hand, since a service fee is normally intended to compensate a
lender for the internal expenses of processing a loan, prudence
dictates that a mortgagee who has collected the fee authorized by
this statute not impose additional charges for any services in
connection with the mortgage performed by its own person-
nel-for example, appraisals and property inspections- on any
mortgage that is made at the maximum permissible interest
rate.69
Other South Carolina statutes specifically allow mortgagees,
when authorized to do so in a mortgage, to pay for taxes, assess-
ments, insurance, and necessary repairs on the mortgaged prop-
erty and to charge these expenses to the mortgagor. The mortga-
gee may charge the mortgagor for the full amount advanced plus
interest "as provided in the mortgage, but not exceeding the legal
rate." '899 These payments clearly do not constitute additional in-
terest.
None of the problems associated with determining whether
695. Id.
696. See Part I, section C(2)(e) supra.
697. See notes 652-53 and accompanying text supra.
698. This statute is not a model of clarity. If and when the Legislature revises the
South Carolina usury statutes, this statute should be included among the candidates for
revision. See Part IV infra.
699. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-30 to -40 (1976). The legal rate of interest in South
Carolina is 6%. Id. § 34-31-20. The maximum contract rate is 8%, with higher rates being
authorized for larger loans. Id. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The wording of these
statutes apparently restricts the permissible interest rates on these charges to 6%. Perhaps
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a particular charge is interest exists in transactions in which there
is no applicable interest maximum.7 0
In transactions subject to a rate ceiling, a creditor will often
seek to have the laws of another state having a higher ceiling
apply to the transaction in order to obtain a higher rate on the
loan. Courts have traditionally applied the law of the state whose
usury limitations are most favorable to upholding the transaction
against a claim of usury, even in the absence of a contractual
clause stipulating which state's laws will apply.70' The South Car-
olina Supreme Court has generally been as liberal on this issue
as any state court in the nation.70 2 Partially in response to the
court's liberal attitude, the South Carolina Legislature in 1898
enacted a statute that requires that "the rate of interest allowed
and in all other respects" all real estate mortgages covering land
located in this state will be governed by South Carolina law.703
This section effectively prevents the use of a clause stipulating
that the law of another state will apply in a loan involving a real
estate mortgage covering South Carolina realty. If the other state
has some reasonable relation to the transaction, though, this type
of contract clause is probably effective for non-real estate transac-
tions that are not covered by the SCCPC.70 4
D. Penalties and Remedies
In order to succeed on a claim of usury in a non-SCCPC
transaction705 the debtor must prove four elements: (1) an agree-
700. See Part III, section B(2)(a)(i) supra. Some types of government purchased or
insured mortgages, however, are subject to federal limitations on the types of charges that
can legitimately be made. See notes 478 and 674 supra.
701. See Part I, section D supra.
702. See cases cited note 207 supra.
703. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-60 (1976).
704. An unresolved issue is the status of a loan that is secured by both real estate
and personal property. Section 29-3-60 (1976) says that not only the interest rate, but also
"in all other respects" the loan will be governed by South Carolina law. In Savannah Bank
& Tr. Co. v. Shuman, 250 S.C. 344, 157 S.E.2d 864 (1967), the South Carolina Supreme
Court held in a case involving a single note secured by both real estate and personalty
that the quoted language meant that South Carolina law applied to the entire transaction.
Would this prohibit the splitting of the transactions into two loans: one involving the real
estate mortgage to be governed by South Carolina law; the other, secured by the person-
alty, containing a clause that the second loan be governed by the laws of some other state
that authorized a higher interest rate than South Carolina? It would, if a step-transaction
approach were taken. Since loans in excess of $50,000 secured by personalty are free from
any interest rate regulation as of September 29, 1976, the effective date of the 1976 SCCPC
Amendment, this issue is less likely to occur now than prior to that date. See Part I,
section D supra.
705. See Part II, section E supra for discussion of the SCCPC remedy provisions.
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ment to lend money, or to forebear from requiring repayment for
a period of time; (2) an absolute obligation by the debtor to repay
the loan; (3) the lender's exaction from the debtor of interest
greater than that allowed by the applicable state statutes; and (4)
an intention to violate the usury statutes."' The third element,
the excess interest requirement, is generally the most difficult one
to prove. All four elements, however, must be present. If they
exist, various civil and criminal remedies are available to deal
with the situation.
1. Civil Penalties.-The general South Carolina statute on
the subject defines usury as follows:
Any person who shall receive or contract to receive as interest
any greater amount than is provided for in § 34-31-30 shall
forfeit all interest and the costs of the action and such portion
of the original debt as shall be due shall be recovered without
interest or costs. When any amount so charged or contracted for
has been actually received by such person he shall also forfeit
double the total amount received in respect of interest, to be
collected by a separate action or allowed as a counterclaim in
any action brought to recover the principal sum."'
Section 34-31-30 referred to in this usury statute is the 8%
contract rate provision." This specific statutory reference in the
definition presents an interesting legal problem. If the lender con-
tracts to receive interest under one of the statutory exceptions to
the 8% rate, other than those exceptions specifically mentioned
in Section 34-31-30, this penalty section does not apply to the
transaction. Under these circumstances, the only remedy is the
common-law remedy, which apparently is limited to a maximum
recovery of the usurious interest or charges collected.
700
The common-law remedy, thus, is apparently the only rem-
edy available for the following types of non-SCCPC transac-
706. See Hershman, supra note 634, at 336-38. South Carolina cases have tended to
stress the intent factor, but when the other three factors are present, the intent require-
ment is met unless the case falls within the minor error doctrine discussed at notes 733-
36 and accompanying text supra. See, e.g., Virginia Hotel Co. v. Dusenberry, 218 S.C.
524, 63 S.E.2d 483 (1951); Mayfield v. British & Am. Mtg. Co., 104 S.C. 152, 88 S.E. 370
(1916); Osborne v. Fuller, 92 S.C. 338, 75 S.E. 557 (1912).
707. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-50 (1976).
708. Id. § 34-31-30 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
709. Harp v. Chandler, 32 S.C.L. (1 Strob.) 197 (1847); Caughman v. Drafts, 18 S.C.
(1 Rich. Eq.) 193 (1845). See Flannery v. Bishop, 81 Wash. 2d 696, 504 P.2d 778 (1972)
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tions:710 (1) small loans made under the "fee authorized in lieu of
interest" statute,7 11 (2) installment loans made under the 7% add-
on statute,712 (3) revolving credit loans pursuant to bank credit
cards and check overdraft plans, 7 1 (4) state credit union loans,
714
(5) insurance premium service company loans, 71 5 and (6) loans by
pawnbrokers.
718
The general civil usury statute, the provisions of which are
set out above, 717 apply to all other types of loans not governed by
the SCCPC rate structure. Loans made by consumer finance
companies licensed under Act 988 of 1966 71 and loans by national
banks719 and federal credit unions, 720 which are subject to specific
federal penalties, are governed, however, by independent state
and federal laws. The National Banking Act penalty provision is
essentially the same as the South Carolina general usury stat-
ute.7 2' The Federal Credit Union Act provides that the loan is
repayable on an interest-free basis, but does not impose any addi-
tional penalty. 72 Act 988 renders any loan void when excess
charges have been made, "except as the result of bona fide
error."
713
The general usury statute contemplates two types of viola-
tions: (a) contracting and (b) actual receipt. Although the
method of imposing the penalties is unclear in the statute itself,
many case opinions make it clear that two distinct penalties are
contemplated:
(a) forfeiture of the right to all interest and costs imposed
710. To the extent loans made under the statutes qualify as SCCPC consumer loans,
they are governed by the SCCPC remedies. See Part II, section E supra. The one exception
is credit union loans, which are totally excluded from the SCCPC. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-
1-202(10) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part I, section C(8) supra. A considerable number of
nonconsumer loans, however, are still made under these statutes, and the absence of any
statutory penalty in these transactions presents a serious legal problem that should be
corrected by legislation.
711. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-40 (1976).
712. Id. § 34-13.120.
713. Id.
714. Id. §§ 34-27-10 to -270.
715. Id. 99 38-37-10 to -100.
716. Id. § 40-39-100.
717. See note 709 and accompanying text supra.
718. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-29-20 (1976), -140(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
719. See 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1976).
720. See id. § 1757(2).
721. Compare id. § 86 with S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-50 (1976). See also note 452 supra.
722. 12 U.S.C. § 1757(2) (1977).
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for the very making of a usurious contract and (b) liability for
double the amount of any interest paid by the borrower. 24 The
latter penalty, however, applies only when usurious interest is
actually received; it can be collected by the debtor in a separate
action or by counterclaim in a suit by the creditor.7 2 Therefore,
the creditor can only recover the principal when usurious interest
has been contracted for, but not actually received. He relin-
quishes any right to interest, legal or excess, and may not recover
any costs incurred in collecting the principal. When usurious in-
terest is contracted for and the creditor receives the interest, the
creditor must also forfeit double the amount of interest already
received-legal and excess; however, the debtor again remains
liable for the unpaid portion of the principal.
An additional general statutory provision protects the lender
from a usury claim when fees and other charges paid to "others
by the borrower in order to obtain a loan when the lender neither
took nor contracted to take more than lawful interest. '728 This
section was enacted in 1916 with the intent of overruling certain
South Carolina decisions holding that excessive fees paid by a
borrower to a third party for a loan would be counted as interest
against the lender.7 27 If these excessive fees are charged, the
debtor has six months from the date of actual payment or con-
tract for payment in which to bring suit against the person to
whom the fees are paid."' The amount of recovery is limited to
the excess above a reasonable fee.72 1 Therefore, unlike the general
usury statute,70 there is no forfeiture of the entire amount of the
charge or any penalty. This section applies only to those situa-
tions covered by the general usury statute.73' It does not apply if
the lender is the party that contracted for the charges or the
charges in question were paid to the lender's agent.7 32
As pointed out above,733 the common-law usury doctrine re-
724. See Atlantic Discount Corp. v. Driskell, 239 S.C. 500, 123 S.E.2d 832 (1962);
Frick Co. v. Tuten, 204 S.C. 226, 29 S.E.2d 260 (1944).
725. See note 724 supra.
726. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-60 (1976).
727. See Citizens' Bank v. Heyward, 135 S.C. 190, 133 S.E. 709 (1925).
728. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-60 (1976).
729. Id.
730. Id. § 34-31-50.
731. See notes 708-16 and accompanying text supra.
732. See Citizens' Bank v. Heyward, 135 S.C. 190,133 S.E. 709 (1925). The treatment
of various charges made by the lender rather than a third party is discussed in notes 645-
64, 652-53 and accompanying text supra.
733. See note 706 and accompanying text supra.
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quires as a prerequisite for imposing any penalty or forfeiture, the
lender's intent to violate the usury laws. While the courts will
carefully examine the facts of each transaction and will not hesi-
tate to find usury where the facts indicate an intent to evade the
usury limitations,734 this intent has not generally been found
where the amount of excess interest is relatively minor and has
been collected under a genuine mistake of fact-for example, the
misreading of a rate table, as opposed to a mistake of law.735 The
South Carolina Supreme Court has in the past followed these
guidelines."6
An affirmative claim by the debtor to recover for usury must
be brought within three years of making the contract or paying
the usurious interest;737 however, a debtor can utilize a claim of
usury as a means of set-off or defense to a suit brought by the
creditor to collect the balance due on the transaction.7 3 The cred-
itor's suit is governed by the contract statute of limitations sec-
tions which provide for a six-year limitation on all contracts ex-
cept mortgages, which have a twenty-year statute of limita-
tions.736
2. Criminal Penalties.-The South Carolina Code contains
two main statutes providing criminal penalties for usury in trans-
actions not governed by the SCCPC.
70
(a) The General Statute.-There is a general criminal
usury penalty making it a misdemeanor wilfully to "violate the
laws of this State enacted for the purpose of prohibiting the
charging, collecting or receiving of usurious interest. 741 The pen-
alty, which can be a fine and/or imprisonment, is completely
734. See authorities cited notes 617, 620, 673, 706 supra.
735. See notes 428-29 and accompanying text supra. Another possible defense is
estoppel, which many courts have used 4p prevent a borrower from asserting an otherwise
valid usury claim. See, e.g., Lakeview Meadows Ranch, Ltd. v. Bintliff, 36 Cal. App. 3d
418, 111 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1973); Cohn v. Receivables Fin. Co., 123 lI. App. 2d 224, 260
N.E.2d 67 (1970); Heubusch v. Boone, 213 Va. 414, 192 S.E.2d 783 (1972); Annot., 16
A.L.R.3d 510 (1967). The South Carolina Supreme Court has apparently not applied
estoppel in a usury case; however, it has never held that usury could not apply. See, e.g.,
Davenport v. Unicapital Corp., 267 S.C. 691, 230 S.E.2d 905 (1976).
736. See authorities cited note 428 supra.
737. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-540 (1976).
738. See, e.g., Allen v. Petty, 58 S.C. 240, 36 S.E. 586 (1900); Land Mtg. Inv. &
Agency Co. v. Gillam, 49 S.C. 345, 26 S.E. 990 (1897).
739. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-3-520 (1976), -530 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
740. Violation of other statutes can also result in license revocation, which is, how-
ever, generally considered a civil penalty. See, e.g., id. §§ 34-29-80(a)(3) (1976) (Act 988
consumer finance companies), 38-27-50 (1976) (insurance premium service companies).
741. Id. § 34-31-100 (1976).
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within the discretion of the judge, subject only to general misde-
meanor penalty ceilings. The wording of this statute does not tie
it to a specific type of transaction as the civil usury statute does.
742
Thus, this section presumably applies to all situations in which
usurious interest is exacted.
(b) Act 988 of 1966.-There is a general misdemeanor
penalty, with a fine of $100 to $1,000, for any wilful violation of
this Act, 74 which governs consumer finance companies holding
Act 988 licenses.7 4 Any licensee or agent who participates in
making charges in excess of the maximums allowed by any sec-
tion of the Act, except as the result of bona fide error,75 is guilty
of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, is punished by a fine of
$200 to $500 and imprisonment of thirty days to six months.
Contracting for, as well as receipt of, excess charges is regarded
as a violation of this provision.74 Civil or criminal violations of
any provision of Act 988 are also grounds for revocation of the
license of a consumer finance company. 77
PART IV: CONCLUSIONS
The SCCPC rate structure748 definitely improves the law gov-
erning those consumer credit transactions covered by its provi-
sion. The SCCPC reduces to relatively simple rules a myriad of
disparate statutes and cases dealing with consumer credit and
effectively regulates known creditor abuses. At the same time, the
rate ceilings are high enough to allow creditors to extend a reason-
able amount of consumer credit to all segments of the state's
population, and enough competition exists to keep the effective
rates at reasonable levels, when one considers the credit risks and
other cost factors involved. In addition, the SCCPC frees a sub-
stantial amount of business credit and all credit sales other than
those covered by its provisions from any credit charge limitations,
thereby eliminating the many problems involved in coping with
742. Id.
743. Id. §§ 34-29-20(e), -140(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
744. Id.
745. See notes 428-29 and accompanying text supra.
746. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-100 (1976).
747. Id. § 34-29-80(a)(3).
748. See Part II, section B supra.
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the intricacies of our usury statutes in these types of transac-
tions." 9
Nevertheless, the rate structures and other laws regulating
credit in South Carolina are still too complex and unwieldy. The
problems stem from the failure of the South Carolina Legislature
to enact all of the provisions of the UCCC, particularly the fail-
ure to enact the provision that repeals all usury statutes that
regulate transactions not governed by the SCCPC.750
Three areas need prompt legislative attention: (1) The regu-
lation of real estate mortgages; (2) the elimination or modifica-
tion of SCCPC exclusions not present in the UCCC; and (3) the
treatment of business and other non-SCCPC credit not in excess
of $50,000 and not secured by a real estate mortgage.
The regulation of real estate mortgages will be considered
first. Probably no state has a system regulating real estate mort-
gage rates that is as complex and ambiguous as that in South
Carolina. 5' The ideal solution would be to eliminate all rate ceil-
ings on non-SCCPC loans, including those on real estate mort-
gages. Studies done on the subject have concluded that the real
estate mortgage market is highly competitive and the rates in
states having no rate maximums are not significantly higher
than in states having rate ceilings."' Further, these studies show
749. See Part I, section B(2)(a) supra.
750. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-605 (Cum. Supp. 1977) with 1968 UCCC § 3.605
and 1974 UCCC § 2.601. The SCCPC did not repeal a single major rate statute. See note
66 and accompanying text supra.
751. See Part I, section B(4)(d); Part I, section B(2)(a).
752. See Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine - The Usury Headache, 19 CASE
W. REs. L. REV. 819, 858-64 (1968). The author, after studying real estate mortgage rates
throughout the United States and comparing the rates in states having no rate limitations
with those having relatively low rate ceilings concluded as follows:
[Tihe usury laws in this area do more harm than good. The fear that without
usury ceilings mortgage interest rates would go higher and higher is not justified
by the facts. Interest rates on home mortgages are responsive to general money
market levels and do not go to usury ceiling rates unless the general market
interest rates approach the usury ceiling.
Id. at 858. Professor Benfield further concluded that as the general interest rates approach
the statutory rate ceilings, the effect of the usury laws is to "(1) drive lenders to more or
less deceptive ways of avoiding the usury limitations, and (2) drive money out of the home
mortgage market." Id. at 864. At the time this study was begun in 1963, Boston, Massa-
chusetts, had the lowest mortgage interest rate of any major metropolitan area in the
country, 5.25%. Id. at 859. In June 1977, after more than a decade of steadily rising interest
rates, Boston still had the lowest effective rate of any major metropolitan area in the
country, 8.41%. (Unpublished data from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Washing-
ton, D.C.) Yet Massachusetts has not had any usury limitation for over 100 years. See
BENFIELD, supra, at 859.
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that when state rate ceilings are below the market rates, mort-
gagees (1) make fewer loans in the areas with the lower ceilings
and more loans in those areas in which higher rates are avail-
able, (2) raise their eligibility and other requirements, (3) resort
to devices, such as points, service fees, and due-on-sale clauses,
that help compensate for the low ceilings.753 Those hardest hit
by these tactics are consumers, the very persons the rate regu-
lations are designed to protect.7ss
Even if it is not politically feasible to eliminate rate ceilings
on real estate mortgages, 715  much can be done to simplify the
mortgage rate structure. One meritorious suggestion is to elimi-
nate the concept in the SCCPC of a mortgage debt "primarily
secured by a first lien which is a purchase money security interest
in land."7 This term is incapable of rational definition and inter-
753. See BENFIELD, supra note 752, at 858-64. See also E. KOHN, C. CARLO & B. KAYE,
THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK'S USURY CEILING ON LOCAL MORTGAGE LENDING ACTIVrrY at 3-6,
9-10, 50-54 (1976). The ultimate impact of interest rate ceilings at or below market rates
is the negative effect on housing construction because fewer people can obtain financing.
The authors of the New York study found that the number of building permits for residen-
tial construction in New York State, which has maintained relatively low rate ceilings on
real estate mortgages, has consistently lagged behind the 14 states that have no usury
ceilings or ceilings above the market rates. Id. at 9-10, 50-54. These findings confirmed
conclusions of other studies done in Minnesota, Mississippi, and Missouri as well as
nationwide statistical studies. Id. at 55-57. A recent study of the housing industry in South
Carolina concluded that the low ceiling on most residential mortgages combined with
higher rates of alternative investments would significantly reduce the amount of money
available for home mortgages in times of rising interest rates. See F. INGRAM & A. WARNER,
COMPETITION FOR HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS IN SOUTH CAROLINA: INFLUENCE AND IMPACT ON REAL
ESTATE MARKETS, 3, 30-32 (1977).
754. See authorities cited in note 753 supra.
755. North Carolina has recently passed legislation that essentially frees real estate
mortgages from usury rates. The North Carolina statute, effective in June 1977, imposes
no limit on home loans except for mortgages of less than $10,000 that are made by an
individual or any other lender that is not:
(i) approved as a mortgagee by the Secretary of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, the Federal Housing Administration, the Veterans Administration,
a national mortgage association or any federal agency; or (ii) a local or foreign
bank, savings and loan association or service corporation wholly owned by one
or more savings and loan associations and permitted by law to make home loans,
credit union or insurance company; or (iii) a State or federal agency.
1977 N.C. SEsS. LAWS ch. 542, § 24-1.1A(a)(2), reprinted in [1978] 3 CONS. CRED. Gum
(CCH) 6411, at 40,655. In 1975 the Virginia Legislature repealed existing interest rate
limitations on first mortgages. VA. CODE § 6.1-330.37 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Oregon autho-
rizes a 12% limit on real estate mortgages of $50,000 or less and no limit on mortgages
above $50,000. OR. REV. STAT. § 82.010 (1977). This statutory scheme is similar to one al-
ternative suggested in the text under which real estate mortgages of $50,000 or less should
be subject to the SCCPC nonsupervised lender rate of 12%. See text accompanying notes
774-75 infra.
756. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-104(2)(b), 37-3-601, -605 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Part
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pretation and unnecessarily complicates an already complicated
area.757 Two approaches to the problem might be followed. First,
all consumer residential mortgages could be brought within the
coverage of the SCCPC.711 If that is thought to be unwise because
it would raise the existing rate ceiling on most mortgages, the
1974 UCCC provisions, which exclude all mortgages that have a
rate of less than 12% from its regulation, 759 could be adopted and
would be a second preferable approach to the present situation.
If either of these suggestions is adopted, all real estate mortgages
I, section B(4)(d); Part I, section B(2)(a)(ii) supra. For the definition of purchase money
security interest in land, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-301(21) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
757. See Part I, section B(4)(d); Part El, section B(2)(a)(ii) supra.
758. The fear that the increase in rate ceilings would automatically result in the
actual rates moving to the ceiling is not justified, based on available evidence. See notes
752-53 supra. Furthermore, the massive study of all phases of consumer credit by the
National Commission on Consumer Finance, published in 1972 concluded as follows:
Staff studies show that assertions that rates always rise to the ceiling are incor-
rect except when the price ceiling is set at or below the market rate for the
particular form of credit placed under price control. Persuasive evidence that
rates do not inevitably rise to the ceiling, available prior to establishment of the
Commission, has been significantly reinforced by the Commission study of rates
prevailing for various forms of consumer credit during the second quarter of
1971.
CONSUMER FiNmcE REPORT, supra note 5, at 96.
Although the rate ceilings would be higher than the existing law allows if this proposal
were enacted (i.e., 18% for supervised lenders and 12% maximum for all others), the
consumer would benefit from the increased protection against creditor abuse in the
SCCPC. If these rates were considered too high, an alternative would be to subject all
mortgage loans for personal, family, or household use to the SCCPC nonsupervised loan
rates of 12% per annum. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-201 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Mortgage lenders might object to the notice and right of cure provisions. See notes
39 supra and 764 infra. As a matter of sound business practice, however, most mortgagees
already give the mortgagor advance notice of an impending foreclosure if overdue pay-
ments are not made, so the "cure" right in the SCCPC does not represent any significant
change in current practice. A more legitimate objection would be the inability of mortga-
gees to collect late payment, deferral, and prepayment charges if mortgages were under
the SCCPC because most real estate mortgages are not precomputed transactions. See
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-203, -204, -210 (sales), 37-3-203, -204, -210 (Cum. Supp. 1977)
(loans). See Part 1I, sections D(2)(a), (b), D(3) supra. These and similar problems could
be solved by amendments to the SCCPC designed to fit the particular needs of real estate
loans.
Suggestions for revision of several other statutes relating to real estate loans have been
made in various parts of this article. See notes 511, 603, 695-98, 699 and accompanying
text supra.
Other reforms, not specifically discussed in this section, have also been suggested in
other parts of the article. See notes 167, 448-50, 509-10, 708-16 and accompanying text
supra.
759. 1974 UCCC § 1.301(12), .301(15). The 1968 UCCC used 10% as a dividing line.
1968 UCCC §§ 2.104(2)(b), 3.105. See Part I, section B(4)(d) supra for a discussion of the
legislative history of the SCCPC provisions dealing with real estate mortgages.
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involved in transactions in which the proceeds are used other
than for personal, family, or household purposes should be
treated the same as non-real estate loans for rate purposes.76
The elimination or modification of the SCCPC exclusions not
present in the UCCC is a second area that needs legislative atten-
tion."' Exclusion of any consumer credit transactions detracts
from the comprehensiveness and consistency of consumer credit
regulation and perpetuates the complexity and, in many cases,
the legal uncertainty that exists in the statutes and case law that
govern non-SCCPC transactions. The SCCPC exclusion for credit
union loans"' is the most difficult exclusion to justify. Except for
being subject to rate ceilings of 12%, credit union loans are vir-
tually unregulated."' While there is as yet no evidence of creditor
abuse in South Carolina, credit union debtors do not have the
same rights and remedies as most other consumer debtors. 6'
There is no reason why such a large segment of the consumer
credit industry should be excluded from the SCCPC.765 Concern
about the necessity to maintain the 12% rate ceiling can be met
by exempting credit union loans from the SCCPC rate sections,
although even such a limited exclusion is hard to justify. In any
case, all other aspects of credit union loans should be made sub-
ject to the SCCPC.
Another exclusion that should be eliminated or modified is
the one that authorizes consumer finance companies to choose
between being supervised lenders under the SCCPC or restricted
760. Under the current structure, the rate ceiling for these loans is 8% per annum
unless the loan qualifies as an installment loan under S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-13-120 (1976),
in which case the rate limit would be 12.68% for a 12-month contract. Alternatively the
parties may agree that the loan is to be governed by the SCCPC pursuant to § 37-3-605
(Cum. Supp. 1977), in which case the rate limit would be 12% per annum. This proposal
would be more realistic if nonconsumer loans under $50,000 were freed from rate limits or
subjected to the SCCPC rates, and if the concept of the debt "primarily secured by a first
lien which is a purchase money security interest in land" were eliminated.
761. See Part I, section C supra.
762. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(10) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part I, section C(8)
supra.
763. See Part M, section B(2)(b)(ii) supra.
764. One prominent example is the limited right of cure given to debtors in transac-
tions covered by the SCCPC. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-5-109 to -111 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Under these provisions a creditor cannot accelerate maturity of the unpaid balance or
foreclose for 20 days following the giving of a required notice explaining what will happen
if the debtor does not pay past-due installments. The required notice only has to be given
one time, and the creditor would be able to accelerate without another cure notice if the
debtor subsequently defaults.
765. At the end of 1976 credit unions operating in South Carolina had $350.2 million
in outstanding loans. See 1977 S.C. CREDrr UNION LEAGUE Y.B. 17.
[Vol. 29
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lenders under Act 988 of 1966.766 The original rationale for this
bifurcation was that rates higher than those specified in the
SCCPC for very small loans were needed. The final legislative
implementation of the dual system, however, has resulted in
many other significant differences between equivalent loans
made by SCCPC supervised lenders and Act 988 licensees. 7 The
need for higher rates for small loans can be met by including a
special high rate provision in the SCCPC.765 If this were done, Act
988 of 1966 could then be repealed and all consumer finance com-
pany loans would be governed solely by the SCCPC.
The complete exclusion for educational loans is senseless and
should be eliminated. 69 In addition, no compelling need exists for
the exclusion of insurance premium loans from the SCCPC rate
structure.7 70 If the regular SCCPC rate ceiling is found to be too
low, a special SCCPC rate section for insurance premium loans
is a more logical approach than an exclusion.
The treatment of business and other non-SCCPC credit not
in excess of $50,000 and not secured by a real estate mortgage is
a third area that needs modification.' The UCCC approach is to
eliminate rate ceilings on these transactions.7 If this is not a
feasible political alternative, the simple expedient of making all
this credit subject to the SCCPC rate structure for nonsupervised
loans, or 12% per annum,7 4 is a viable alternative that would have
the effect of repealing a plethora of unnecessary interest rate
statutes, but would not increase significantly the effective rates
766. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-9-102 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part I, section C(9)
supra.
767. See Part I, section C(9) supra.
768. Oklahoma adopted a special, high-rate statute for loans of $100 or less when it
adopted the UCCC. OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 3-508B (1971). See note 189 supra.
769. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(9) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Part I, section C(6) supra.
770. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-202(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Part I, section C(3)
supra.
771. See Part M, sections A, B(2)(a)(i) supra.
772. See 1968 UCCC § 3.605, Comment; 1974 UCCC § 2.601, Comment. See Part I,
section A supra.
773. Political opposition was the main argument used to defeat this proposal when
it was brought before the UCCC Study Committee. Cf. notes 1, 102 supra. Other states,
however, including North Carolina and Virginia, have in recent years eliminated usury
limitations on most home mortgages. See note 755 supra.
774. This could be accomplished by amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-605 (Cum.
Supp. 1977). Amendments would, as a minimum, require the elimination of the language
"or are primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money security interest in
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that now can be charged for most of these transactions .775 The
resulting statutory simplification is in itself sufficient justifica-
tion for this action. More importantly, debtors in these transac-
tions would automatically receive the full array of protective de-
vices and remedies available in the SCCPC. Owners of small
businesses, including most farmers, generally lack bargaining
equality with lenders, and as a consequence, have as great a need
for the protection of the SCCPC as most consumers.
In sum, we have come a long way, but we still need addi-
tional legislation to achieve a simple, rational, and workable sys-
tem of usury statutes that govern all credit transactions.
ADDENDUM
After this article was completed, the South Carolina Legisla-
ture attempted to raise the maximum interest rate for real estate
first mortgages of not more than $60,000 from 9% to 10% per
annum effective until July 1, 1979, by including legislation
amending section 34-31-30 of the South Carolina Code in the 1978
General Appropriations Act.' An attempt to enact the same
amendment by separate legislation passed the Senate, but was
never brought to a final vote in the House.
The attempted amendment of section 34-31-30 is patently
unconstitutional, and for this reason it would not be appropriate
to amend the text or the summary chart at the end of this article.
Reference to this addendum has, however, been made throughout
the article.
Article HI, section 17 of the South Carolina Constitution
states that "[e]very Act or resolution having force of law shall
relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."
According to the cases, this section imposes two requirements,
both of which are absent in the attempted amendment of section
34-31-30: (1) that an act relate to but one subject; and (2) that
the subject be expressed in the title.
As for the first requirement, the cases hold that all of the
provisions of an act must be germane to the subject matter of the
bill.2 The subject of the General Appropriations Act is state fi-
775. See Part III, section B(2)(b) supra; Part V, Chart B(8) infra.
1. 1978-79 General Appropriations Bill, § 38, at 574.
2. E.g., Deloach v. Scheper, 188 S.C. 21, 198 S.E. 409 (1938).
[Vol. 29
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nances, and all of the cases in which the South Carolina Supreme
Court upheld inclusion of other matters in the Appropriations Act
have been based on the grounds that the challenged legislation
was reasonably and inherently related to the raising and expendi-
ture of tax monies.3 Raising the interest rates on first mortgages,
however, has no inherent connection with state finances and, as
a consequence, deals with other subject matter in violation of the
Article I, section 17 requirement that an act relate to but one
subject. The cases that come closest to this point would be those
in which the original enactment of the long-arm provisions (sec-
tions 36-2-801 through 36-2-809 of the 1976 South Carolina Code)
were held unconstitutional under Article I, section 17 because
they were not sufficiently related to the Uniform Commercial
Code.5
The attempted amendment of section 34-31-30 also fails to
meet the requirement in Article Ill, section 17 that the subject of
a bill be expressed in the title. The reference to the amendment
in the title portion of the 1978 General Appropriations Act is as
follows: "And (23) To Amend Section 34-31-30, Relating To Max-
imum Interest Rates and Exceptions So As To Provide Variable
Interest Rates On Certain Loans. . ... - The actual amendment,
section 37 of the 1978 General Appropriations Act,7 only amends
section 34-31-30 to delete any reference to a maximum interest
rate of 9% on real estate first mortgages not in excess of $60,000.
The amendment makes no change at all, however, in the existing
variable interest rate limitations. As a result, the title is mislead-
ing and contradicts the wording of the actual amendment. 8 This
3. See Calwell v. McMillan, 224 S.C. 150, 77 S.E.2d 798 (1953); State ex rel. Roddy
v. Byrnes, 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E.2d 33 (1951); Crouch v. Benet, 198 S.C. 185, 17 S.E.2d
320 (1941).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-801 to -809 (1976).
5. McGee v. Holan, 337 F. Supp. 721 (D.S.C. 1972); Tention v. Southern Pacific R.R.,
336 F. Supp. 25 (D.S.C. 1972); cf. Thompson v. Hofmann, 263 S.C. 314, 210 S.E.2d 461
(1974) (a 3-2 decision in which the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of separate legislation that reenacted the provisions previously declared constitu-
tionally defective). See also Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 233 S.C. 129, 103 S.E.2d 908 (1958) (in which the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the inclusion of a license tax on investment income of insurance companies as
part of the 1950 State Appropriations Bill violated Article I, § 17).
6. The remainder of this clause deals with the addition of a new code section to
establish a guaranty fund for certain state-chartered credit unions.
7. Note that one of the amendments to § 34-31-30 in Act 122 of 1977 did contain
language relating to variable interest rates. See 1977 S.C. Acts 222.
8. The heading on the amendment in § 38 of the 1978 State Appropriations Act
correctly describes the amendment to § 34-31-30, but this heading would not qualify as
1979]
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defect is fatal to the constitutionality of the amendment, even if
some way around the subject-matter defect could be found. The
case most apposite is Stewart v. Woodmen of World Life Ins.
Soc'y.I In this case the South Carolina Supreme Court held an act
dealing with incontestible periods in insurance policies unconsti-
tutional under Article III, section 17 because the title of the act
stated that the act extended the application of the incontesti-
bility of a life insurance policy to other related types of insurance
but the act itself included a clause changing the time from which
the incontestible period began to run. The later change had been
added during the course of adoption, but inadvertently, the title
had not been correspondingly amended. The court held as fol-
lows:
If the most liberal construction is given to the title of the
amendatory act of 1935, manifestly it could not be construed to
cover the particular amendment in question. Moreover, not only
does it fail to include this amendment, but it is actually mis-
leading, because the inevitable inference is that no amendment
other than the one mentioned was covered thereby. See the case
of Floyd v. Bennett, 124 S.C. 483, 117 S.E. 722, 723, which holds
that "the title must not be misleading."
If the title of the act had merely stated that it was to amend
Section 7986 of the 1932 Code, without more, perhaps it would
not have violated the constitutional provision in question, even
if not in compliance with proper legislative practice. Fleming v.
Royall, 145 S.C. 438, 143 S.E. 162. 59 C.J., 816, 817.
But here the title definitely and specifically limits the sub-
ject of the act by the language used, and makes quite applicable
the following excerpt from the opinion of the Court in the case
of State v. Blease, 95 S.C. 403, 414, 79 S.E. 247, 252: "While the
courts construe the provision of the Constitution in question
(that an act shall relate to but one subject, which shall be ex-
pressed in its title) very liberally to the end that legislation shall
not thereby be needlessly hampered and embarrassed, still,
when the title of an act definitely and specifically limits its
object, as that of the act of 1892 does, to the redemption of a
particular and specified issue of bonds, the court must limit the
operation of the act to the subject so expressed in the title.
the "title" to the amendment. Even if it could so qualify, it would contradict the title in
the 1978 Appropriations Act so that the constitutional problem would still exist.
9. 195 S.C. 365, 11 S.E.2d 449 (1940).
[Vol. 29
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Otherwise the provision of the Constitution in question would
be set at naught."' 0
10. Id. at 371-72, 11 S.E.2d at 452. For other pertinent cases holding acts unconstitu-
tional on similar grounds, see Douglass v. Watson, 186 S.C. 34, 195 S.E. 116 (1938)
(misleading title in act providing for the collection of delinquent taxes); Nettles v- Peo-
ple's Bank of Darlington, 160 S.C. 104, 158 S.E. 214 (1931) (statute dealing with bank
collection of checks held unconstitutional because the title restricted the act to state banks
while the body applied the act to all banks); Robinson v. City of Columbia, 116 S.C. 193,
107 S.E. 476 (1921) (misleading title of tax statute); State v. Blease, 95 S.C. 403, 79 S.E.
247 (1913) (title of act inconsistent with actual wording of the act).
177
Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ CC. 1:4 IV- 02- ! -
C) 0 "0 ow 4) C
0 .: )1 -w
r/w Ej 0 )
0,4) )F .) 0 C) k)11C=
0~ CD -' 
V.
'C--d =C 0 - -PZ
0  
kv v 0~4 0 ~ C
>~ ~~1- 0 C .~'C~
0~ .0cO)
Zw 0 ~ us )c
w- : X
b. gC)CC M 4
P4, Cho ~ O Oa~ 0 a
0~ C 0
=~ w
W" w* CC Q) o eg
w ~ ~  ~ L-0 10 -- 0-4
Z ) -Hk o-QCA9 8 1
CCs,.C 0 0. J ;. c
+0 .5 -B ~
z s
Z 4 0 UV-1
-g 4 C) 3. s~
N W 4- *I t
178
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss5/3






a ~ C' 4) 4) 4'2
"4 a) a) 4
0 .0 : 'o .4 .
0 0 4- C
cdC












Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
rn &a &n -H rn V-
W '0 x C. k
1. ~ ~ B r.4 W t
m P oocd C3
44 k q
- ) W. cd k I'a 0
r0 01 0 0 w Ok
000
4 a) 0 c
> . 0 0
0 4 0 Wp
0 4 0 ck4 - C
Cl Zn44~B
Zd -w Sl 4
04
0 0 ~ C
0
u2 0 0 w
Cz ...- s: r0.)
[Vol. 29
180
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss5/3






0 ~ ~ ~ ~ U _ ; )o0
cs (1'40 v
'4) -) ).4) (
4) .s c0 a) 4 C
U)) S: k QCP
-4~~~~'- ccs C,02P ;
03 41 04)
cc9a 42) Q) 0 -. 0 c 4 4
.=44 4)) 4)4)0 ' - Q
0. -1 0 0'~ -4)COD 4 ' ;
r P)C >~ GP,. 0 g Z
C~~~U D 'n W l S4 .
00 -r. o.o-
6-1 VB. .42 69 4)-QB.-,
0c) - r.










Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979



















South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss5/3


















v) -.. a)va 0," . c
A ) a) -- - C3c
0Z a
034 54) I ) t
cs ~ ~ ' c: Ei ). qD4 l 0
;4 03 0~10 cs +' CS 0
cc4))') M Z 4)4 C -
4)0 4-* o )
-I. k4 0
od o3-I.4







Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fn~C ; . 1.u4-0(V
w 0 00








o 0u~ tHC a)
en 0 u. .C0u~ *~ e
Ei -i 4 . .
~ ~ C-a
4-1 CS 43
0.C 0- g 0~ . n
(D P..0 4
Cu. 0 ~ . -0 0P
o $4 )0S C
Cuu
en r..W.-
to 45..,s .0 a== A 1c) Cu
- 1 0 0o .2 0 O.
o>02 0Cu (1 uD Cua.w
0 k >u CDPu. 0 C'
'-(P. C ~ .. 0 4 n 4- ;j %a,
r W &02 csC0 - :&(114~ 0 0 CIO
;40 64. 00 en) 0
r- SD40) 0  00d - r. cs -'- Cu ;>. =o
ca! 04- en 0 Cu... -1 0~ -cs . 0 e
Cu1)P co 00 0 .cag
Cu) a).. -1 Cu Cu Cd 44~ P.'.0.4- 4 Cu Cu .
4-uu--W
(v ~ ~ ~ ~ C 0Cu 0 c 3) ' ,a
'0~ ca ~ I
Cr. - A 06 0n6 .
en~~~~~ en.0u-d O eCuj 01 0n, Cu-- ..
0 dr 
0  
0 .~ .....---- 0- LO (2)
Cu u0C uCu O 00000 ) 00































South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss5/3
19791 CONSUMER PROTECTION CODE
cd 0 > -4
0. 4c
-0 - C? 0 
> to t
w ~ a) . 0 bo 0
V.)-4- C
-- 3. ~ 10 ;4~- ~ C
C) C) n 2
~ ~ '~ **4.4.-
0~ ~ .U2U P,)~C
cs) cd
0 "
C3 1 oZ*): r4C ;
0
m ) 4) U r . 6V '
9'. 0 Cww p
185
Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
84.4
m 4-1
CSl 3 s 4 Z 0 4 03
0 * 2 8f2
r.2 44 c
4) co~*4) 02 2 40 ~ ' 4) 9: 0 ' U )
4.. a) Q3'4. 44)) Z ;3 .0
- J 0 -c 4)0 .0
00 . 4 4.. .0
t-. k -~ caC3c
0 0 022
tj c c 4 x )24 0
4)) ~ 0 0 2 4 ) .c -4 a) (1
Q.0 M - 5.. ,
-. 4.Q 
. 0.4)002 r.>4)cd 00


















South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss5/3





W C) 1 4- - 0434
0000
02 0- 0: C? It
ca 13 g t!.. u ~ 3 0' 3 Wa C O 4 CS4
C2 m 0 W -
-, 4- 0 d 4 co'C
1 0~~C 0 C u
w ~ 0C 0 0.. 03
W Huu4  cd 9C~ = 0.
o~u -C . Cu >c'C Cu0 cr 0 .k Cu
Cu 0C0uC












Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
;.2
0 S D cej
S P4 Z;;-4-4
r - .. OOS1
0
05w 0 0














A- L 0 00









0 U].4 '114 0 0 0' k















South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss5/3




0n 4 w a 00
p ca4. ~ 0 . ,
W 0 0'- .d g: 0 c
0~~~ A 4~U O
4.o Q 00 4 0 w 0 cs t
Lo Q in4 0
.4. : 4.. ... 4&4 :i M u c;. *
0 o .4* k ~0 P P
0 0P * md 9 wc
00 a) = co 0 ~z - w4. wC~ 4 . 2. 0 0
cs 0 ,~~ A
0 0 9: U2 4
.W =c 0  0 . p 4 0  4 4 W 00 0






Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979

























































































Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979















































South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss5/3
1979] CONSUMER PROTECTION CODE
V4) 4 0 43
S' 0 toOS a.. .00
.O o 0 JOS






-4i e 49~ S
AS 0
40 0 t'
o -4' 0 W
,' 0S 0 4 p 0. ; 0s 4 0
OS . ~it, SQ.- SO
C.)c' - . 3*0 cd
OS 45) C* 4341) 0 CS~
0O r. 4 ; :vo - o*
0oS .. , cd CS k n4
O0 -l 0) OSC3)
OS ~ ~ ~ c J4 S O W S ~ .~~
C.)'~~4 4)S4)SS
2
C S r. 5 X .- ~ -A 4
OOS'
4 ~~~ >C4SO 41 0 O
cd to'V 00)
4-:~ OS !d a) 'o3 -oa4 .c
OS4 ;. 4.
AO jr. 0 x E 0o 0v
'Cdr. )s OSd 4 4) to. C
.OS .0 : '= O = 0 0 -H o 034 ) .0 02) _ 03 %0 43 44 - 0 
4
4
~~C gS 0o .-~- CDSOSS 1
caS w uS OS3.S Z; 0 1.. -a
OS ~ S 14 .0 ~ 0 *.0 O 14 O cs r)3 2e
F:0C3 ( 4 P, ) d d 4












Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
w ~I2 I I








69. C) W F4 00V
C' S I s.
044 A - C4
-%s C CS *~O~
C C) 5 4 C3
co ;4
. 0 VS 0oV-
0 VS C) cs 4)*' S-.
VS C 4 ) VS 0 WC3 V V
'w 4).V- 0)~ V 0- to ..
c3 s. V C)  S -, 4 0 3 c
V~~t










































South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss5/3




OS' d ~ -- W 'w O O
.0 co. >
;S4 4 0 - *0* 4)>, l
0S 4rA








04O a: .0a ) sW
0O -q +- A 04OQ) 0 .
-4 0 ,0 0- 4.
'03 Vo gs . a).0 . 0 *0
--3 ca ;30, 0~S O W w,0 SW a)O









Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979











































;;k r. cl s4 W4
0 cq -q To. *.
o S V C .3 :0 - 4
. 0 .k'~ cs , . o
q4 4 43
43*4
k. 40 o,1 0 0
'- csc' a0 C r.
S-r. - , '. , 'A
0 52 9 o..
co~ 0o 00W ; 4.P;; 0 . 0? 0co . C 0 c
". - M.-i 0 )
CD -4a W) r. 94> 0
43 C5 cm q), -0 Q)
1O40 cd 0 .0'S
"o t,4 -i4
4C 'r. '- .-






3,0 C3 ) d
4)4 4
'C) 4S,-
to a) C3CS C4..
I S .0434.C







Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
wCO -4) 140 () b
































South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss5/3









'Qt ,v0 1 11q
& o-4 cq :e& 
44
. - m M 0g )u
4)g 4)c040
Wt4 *4 40 )
C,~ 0 0 0
&a4) u VR-4 C t4 o)) 0 .0 A
0
199
Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979

















ca ~ '4- B
F44.4
;c .~ 40C - - C)
4.~)C 0 W CL
*~~~~*. CCc. C
-dC b C QD- .> X 4
mCIC







c* mC c4 .4
03 C S.













C:. W,4w ta V c
IH
as' 4 C

















E p- r. C, " -j w cao. n
I., '* .0
as m cs co ~
=s 0+ Sm em 0 3'~ ~ C
5) cl 5- '. ~
C' 44
*..-o as2as ~-.s o...
0 7)o 0c~0( 'o) 5)o - =
(v. > c - d.














0~~ 0 U g






Haynsworth: The Impact of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code on Sout
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979










C) ca ~ OO
.- n U)0
202
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss5/3
